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transformative. On the other hand, collective memory studies now tend to
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heuristic approach to the different mechanisms that come under the umbrella
of transitional justice, including legal prosecution, truth-seeking and
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ing than for embracing international norms of transitional justice, such as
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losses and, in doing so, open new possibilities to build more inclusive
processes for addressing the present consequences of past injustice.
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1 Spotlights and shadows: revisiting the
scope of transitional justice
Guy Elcheroth and Neloufer de Mel
Transitional justice at a crossroads
There are two different ways of answering the question “what is transitional
justice?” The first focuses on what differentiates transitional justice, in prin-
ciple, from other human activities meant to respond to injustice and crime.
From this angle, two elements can be seen as critical to the definition of
transitional justice. On the one hand, it occurs in societies that are in some
way over-burdened by a past legacy of systemic injustice, generally to a
degree that would impair social life and the functioning of institutions in
manifold ways. On the other hand, it refers to forms of justice that can only
be delivered when such societies have reached a turning point at which pre-
viously closed opportunities for dealing with a criminal or oppressive system
become open, most typically after the toppling of an authoritarian regime or
the end of war. In that view, transitional justice is largely defined by its his-
toric context. The Nuremberg trials can be considered as (pioneering)
examples of transitional justice not only because of the Nazi regime’s scope
of atrocity, but also because Nazi Germany had been defeated when the trials
took place. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
is generally seen as an emblematic case of transitional justice, not only
because of the horrendousness of the racist crimes institutionalized by the
apartheid regime but also because it was instituted in the wake of the legal
abolishment of apartheid and of democratic elections bringing to power a
previously oppressed majority.
The second way of answering the definitional question focuses on what is
typically done in practice under the banner of transitional justice. From this
perspective, transitional justice is mainly defined by the particular type of
mechanisms that have been implemented historically to address past injus-
tice. At the heart of such a definition one can identify a triangle of mechan-
isms which foreground dealing with either perpetrators, victim-survivors or
the system: prosecution, reparation and truth-seeking. These are often com-
plemented by a second triad of mechanisms aiming to prevent reoccurrence,
through changing institutions, elites or ideologies: reform, lustration and
memorialization. From this view, the Nuremberg trials were transitional
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justice simply because they were war crimes tribunals, and the South African
TRC because it was a truth commission. Such a working definition poten-
tially broadens the scope of transitional justice, as political transition
becomes a secondary criterion – or defined circularly, as transition to a
situation where there is sufficient political will to institute a given mechan-
ism. In this view, a political decision to “belatedly” tackle a so far unad-
dressed legacy, such as Belgium’s recent decision to create a special
commission to examine its colonial past (Ponselet 2020), or a “premature”
move to address crimes in the midst of open violence – as with the creation
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993,
while war was still raging in Croatia and Bosnia – can also be seen as
transitional justice, as long as the way of dealing with misdeeds draws on
transitional justice’s cumulative toolkit.
However, a recent wave of debate in the field further complicates the pic-
ture. The crux of current discontent within an important part of the transi-
tional justice community of scholars and practitioners lies with the
recurrently observed failure of key mechanisms to trigger systemic change, to
deliver on social justice or to tackle deep sources of violence, suffering and
conflict rooted in economic structures (see Gready and Robins 2019). This
debate is based on the understanding that “transitional justice is in crisis”
(Gready 2019, p. 1) and has led some observers to wonder whether a
“schism” is in the making in the field (Balasco 2018), between sceptics and
enthusiasts of its transformative turn. For the latter, the quality of social
change achieved in effect through a transitional justice process is a more
central concern than the intrinsic qualities of the means mobilized. This
approach appears, hence, to open the door to a third type of definition,
focusing more on the grand objectives of any transitional justice process than
on the type of mechanisms it institutes. What matters most in this view is the
transformative ideal a society is capable of moving towards: minimally, to
become more resilient and to prevent further outbursts of violence; more
ambitiously, to become fairer and to overcome systems of oppression. Such a
focus on “transformation” also further relativizes the importance of “transi-
tion”: sometimes this notion is even seen as being part of the problem, as it
focuses on a particular historical moment, rather than on chronic, long-term
patterns of oppression.
In short, the transformative current proposes a new vision of what transi-
tional justice should aspire to be. Doing so, it may be blurring the lines – or
revealing disagreement – about its specific contribution to a much broader
field of practices that work towards greater social justice. (What else can
transitional justice offer to the wider field, if not the idea that engagement
with the past during political turning points can be a powerful pathway to
change?) It raises the question whether transitional justice’s traditional focus
on the extraordinary – on extraordinary circumstances following authoritar-
ian regimes or armed conflict and on extraordinary tools such as special
jurisdictions, ad hoc truth commissions or reparations for specific groups of
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victims – has become both its main strength and its main weakness. What
space can be given to shake “ordinary” forms of oppression or to attune
“ordinary” forms of suffering within a “limited mandate” for transitional
justice? Will it still be possible to reconcile the renewed focus on dismantling
oppressive structures spanning from the past into the present, and the pro-
gressive values underlying this focus, with the tools that decades of transitional
justice practice and research have left us with?
Societies caught in transition: when justice is postponed
The fact that transitional justice can be strong when facing the extraordinary,
but weak towards the ordinary, implies that its brilliance sometimes fades
with the passage of time. South Africa is certainly emblematic of these two
faces of transitional justice. While the country’s experience has often been
referred to as an exemplary demonstration of what a truth and reconciliation
process can achieve, and while it has shaped the field’s “global norm” (Ben-
Josef Hirsch 2014), today it anchors the most influential critiques of the same
norm (Gready 2011; Evans 2018). Apartheid has disappeared in law, but
segregation and racial inequality remain as an enduring social reality in
urban landscapes and in the daily experiences of South Africans (Dixon and
Durrheim 2003; Evans 2016). If the focus is on social transformation, retro-
spectively, the South African TRC might be seen as a weak form of transitional
justice, in the sense that it has not set in motion profound changes to the
social and economic structures which sustain racial inequality. In a context
where change has been fought for and has been celebrated, but then never
realized at the promised scale, different aspects of social life appear frozen
while the past does not go away. The experience of racial inequality but also
the rhetoric of struggle – reoriented against new targets (Kerr et al. 2019) –
are both persistent and blurred.
To be fair, however, we don’t know what kind of society South Africa
would be today had there been no truth process in the 1990s. In Palestine,
where the experiment of a peace process without a truth process addressing
past violence and collective expulsion was launched during the same period,
a regime of formal segregation is in place today, with a complex web of ter-
ritorial fragmentation, permit systems, separate roads, military checkpoints
and the fence that Palestinians call the “apartheid wall”. Within and outside
Palestine, Palestinian refugee camps display dramatic instances of the para-
dox of a transient situation that lasts, and of a language of struggle, of mar-
tyrs and heroes passed down over generations together with the memories of
the lost places and a non-enforced right to return (Khalili 2007).
Triumph and trauma: when commemoration becomes invasive
It is more than a bitter historical irony that the state that is currently holding
the reins of this institutionalized system of segregation is itself born out of
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unimaginable atrocity. Klar et al. (2013) have analysed Israel’s treatment of
the Holocaust, from an earlier period of silence to the current reality of ever-
present commemoration – in the daily news, books, classrooms, remem-
brance days and organized trips to Poland’s death camps. While all of these
commemorative activities gravitate around the moral imperative of non-
reoccurrence, there is more than one way to understand the lessons of history
and more than one meaning of “never again”: from never again letting cat-
astrophe happen to the Jewish community, to never again accepting cruelty
inflicted on any human community. In present-day Israel, these different
voices are not equally strong, and are not equally sustained by state institu-
tions. The Israeli case therefore illustrates that, while collective trauma can
contain the seeds of its non-recurrence, eventually the lessons learned depend
on what exactly is seen as needing to be avoided and hence, not least, on the
nature of the state and regime that channel the commemorative energy.
Rwanda is arguably the most far-reaching contemporary experiment with
transitional justice. Mechanisms unprecedented in their range and scope have
been implemented in response to the horrendous tragedy of the genocide
committed in 1994. These include a special international criminal tribunal
and local Gacaca tribunals, a reorganization of the state and legislation to
eradicate the institutional roots of genocide, as well as massive memorializa-
tion projects to tackle its ideological roots, and entrench the “never again”
imperative. The sheer number of people involved in different roles bears no
comparison, with the number of accused génocidaires, witnesses and even
local Gacaca judges being counted in the hundreds of thousands (McKnight
2014), while the annual 100 days of mourning have become an inescapable
commemorative routine for the country’s 12 million inhabitants. As in the
case of South Africa after apartheid, these massive efforts could not have
been deployed without the required political will. Similarly to Nelson Man-
dela’s African National Congress, the party and regime led by Paul Kagame
is imbued with a twofold historical legitimacy in Rwanda after the genocide:
as representatives of the historic victims and as leaders of an eventually
victorious struggle against the previous criminal regime.
Rwanda seems, hence, an interesting place to look for how a transitional
justice experiment can transform a society when it is delivered top-down by a
voluntarist state power and is designed to infuse all spheres of social life.
Research from different fields has revealed a range of worrisome side-effects
of such collective state-enforced “treatment”. Psychologists have warned
against the re-traumatizing effects on survivors and witnesses (e.g. Brounéus
2010), anthropologists against the diversion of justice to serve individual or
collective agendas (e.g. Burnet 2008) and political scientists against the blur-
ring of power relations when idealized “local” forms of justice are manipu-
lated by overhanging state actors (Kochanski 2020). What seems to hold
these apparently disparate problems together is the underlying “danger of a
single story” (Jessee 2017): the narrowing down of complex stories about
past violence to one pre-eminent and tightly monitored narrative. Today, it is
4 Guy Elcheroth and Neloufer de Mel
possible that many Rwandans are psychologically, socially or politically
insecure not because of a lack of engagement with the past, but because they
struggle to integrate their own experiences, concerns or aspirations with the
regime’s overarching call for remembrance, instituted as a moral, social and
even legal imperative.
But, again, it seems unfair to judge the impact of transitional justice
without looking at societies where there is no full-hearted attempt to hold
perpetrators accountable or to memorialize the collective trauma. In Sri
Lanka, the military victory of the government forces over the rebel forces, in
2009, not only brought to its end an almost three-decades-long civil war, but
also opened a boulevard for a triumphalist, state-led narrative on the war,
which left little space to mourn losses, especially among the Tamil minority
which bore the highest toll during the brutal ending of the fighting. Victory
monuments were built throughout the country – including near sites where
countless civilians were trapped during the latter stages of the war – and Sri
Lankans from the south of the country were “toured” into the war sites in
the north, to be told the government’s tale of war and victory against ter-
rorism (Hyndman and Amarasingam 2014). At the same time its former
opponents, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, were wiped out in the
country, through the elimination of its leaders during the final offensive, the
“rehabilitation” of its surviving, lower-ranked combatants and the removal
of its military cemeteries. Keeping intact sites to mourn the losses – even
modest and informal – has become a risky operation within the country, and
remaining attempts to preserve the memory of the struggle are sometimes
displaced to the diaspora (Orjuela 2020). In this context of post-war tri-
umphalism, an emboldened Sri Lankan government has made resistance
against a “global norm” version of transitional justice a part of its heroic
narrative to defend national sovereignty against both terrorism and Western
interference (Parasram 2012).
Disenchantments, new expectations and the scope of transitional justice
To recap, transitional justice has become an inherently controversial project,
contested on multiple grounds. On the one hand, it is opposed by those who
worry when it goes too far, permeating social life with an inescapable duty to
remember, and on the other hand by those who are disappointed when it
does not go far enough, and provides only symbolic or exceptional justice
where chronic injustice remains. Furthermore, it has become a target for
those who denounce the double standards of the international community
and see the global norm as a Western norm, as an ideological justification to
the promotion of Western geopolitical influence.
Notwithstanding these critiques, there are concurrent calls to further
expand the scope of transitional justice to the most pressing unresolved
problems of our times. When African nations call for an international inves-
tigation into systemic racism in the United States on the backdrop of its
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unaddressed history of slavery (Human Rights Council 2020), or when the
European Union, in its current anti-racism action plan, responds to the
Black Lives Matter movement by encouraging a critical re-examination of
Europe’s colonial history (European Commission 2020), the intellectual
heritage of transitional justice is clearly discernible. More creatively, some
scholars are mobilizing a transitional justice lens to fight against global
warming and its consequences, by addressing the historical roots of current
obstacles to climate justice (Klinsky and Brankovic 2018), or by designing a
framework for reparative justice for climate refugees (Buxton 2019).
All in all, it seems that transitional justice has become a site of both
recurrent disenchantments and new hopes. With this book, we aim to take
both seriously, recognizing the good reasons underlying disenchantments and
hopes. But the book is also rooted in something more. Something that runs
through the history of transitional justice as a red thread, underlies its bright
and dark sides, and helps to make sense of the formidable – sometimes
excessive and unrealistic – expectations placed on transitional justice as well
as of dreams that turn sour: our collective intuition of the world-making
force of remembrance.
Memories can be our prisons, but sometimes they pave the ways out of
them. Transitional justice processes are typically high-stakes events, which
crystalize strong advocacy and resistance, not only because they can send to
jail high-profile leaders, or better the living circumstances of those recognized
as victims of criminal systems, but also because a society that accepts to
revisit its past potentially remixes the cards for what becomes possible (or
impossible) in the present. Forced after World War II to look deeply into its
own moral abysses, German society had symbolically closed doors to certain
forms of political and military organization for its post-war generation, and
cleared the way to a new constitutional democracy. This process created
winners and losers, but it was able to draw on a then consensual set of values
and worldviews. But to what extent does remembering our collective pasts
affect how we organize and act together, and why does it often result in
entrenching the social status quo, while at other times turning it upside-down?
Can remembrance change societies?
If we want engagement with the past to be a lever for change, then what we
remember from the past needs to be more than what the powerful and the
victorious retain and celebrate. To be clear about that point, it is helpful to
disentangle notions that are sometimes used in a loosely overlapping way,
such as remembrance, commemoration or celebration of the past. Com-
memoration can be thought of as a socially instituted form of remem-
brance – often orchestrated by nation-states – while celebration stands for a
triumphalist form of commemoration, which foregrounds victory, virtue and
vindication. The examples alluded to in the previous section call to mind
what can happen when remembrance is reduced to commemoration, or when
6 Guy Elcheroth and Neloufer de Mel
commemoration is reduced to celebration. But they should not lead us to
overlook the fact that commemoration can also be more than celebration,
and remembrance more than commemoration. It is therefore important (and,
indeed, a primary motivation for this book) to clarify why non-celebrative
forms of commemoration are essential for reimagining social life during
periods of transition, and how non-commemorative forms of remembrance
provide the creative building blocks for such an undertaking.
Selective silences: worlds built on oblivion
When opening their monograph dedicated to formal commemorations of the
1974 Portuguese Revolution, Billig and Marinho (2017, pp. 3–4) warn readers
about what they do not aim to do:
Works about collective memory often examine texts and speeches in
order to extract and then reconstruct a group’s shared, or contested,
collective representations of its past. We could have done this. It would
have been possible to pore over the ceremonial speeches, extracting hints
about the memory of 25 April and then collecting these hints together to
form a pattern that we then claim to be ‘the Portuguese collective
memory or memories’ of the revolution. If we did this, we would be
acting like the police inspector who overlooks the obvious absence. In
our desire to find the shared memory, we would run the risk of failing to
notice how little direct remembering is going on in these ceremonial
speeches.
Instead of searching for “the memories” in the solemn words and phrases
pronounced by leaders during commemorative speeches, or in their grand
symbolic gestures, Billig and Marinho set out to “look for absences” and,
this way, were able to highlight some notable patterns of meaningful silence.
Across the political spectrum, parliamentary speakers have commemorated
the events of 25 April 1974 “forgetting” to mention what concretely hap-
pened on that date – past its mythicized dawn, when the captains were joined
by the people in the streets of Lisbon – or what General Spinola, who
became the new republic’s first president, did during the day. Despite the
solemnly displayed national unity, they would also systematically “forget” to
applaud the words of their political opponents. Most conservative politicians
would, moreover, “forget” to decorate their buttonholes with a red carna-
tion – not only the commemorative symbol of the popular revolt, but also a
reminder of its socialist inspiration.
To literary scholars, Billig and Marinho’s approach might ring a bell.
Pierre Macheray, in his classic Theory of Literary Production, wrote:
The speech of the book comes from a certain silence, a matter which it
endows with form, a ground on which it traces a figure. Thus, the book
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is not self-sufficient; it is necessarily accompanied by a certain absence,
without which it would not exist.
(p. 85, emphasis added)
But making sense out of silence might prove enlightening well beyond the
realm of books, scripted texts or solemn commemorative speeches. The social
worlds surrounding us – if we dare to use the oxymoron – are filled with
absences, which can prove heavily meaningful when set in their relevant
context. Selective forgetting happens when families talk or don’t talk about
their country’s colonial past (Licata and Klein 2010), when archivists decide
which documents to conserve in a national archive (Millar 2006) or when we
share our most memorable life events with other people (Pasupathi et al.
2009). It filters what we retain from intimate experiences and from social
crises, and it holds together our national narratives, from their most mun-
dane (Billig 1995) to their most aggressive and militant expressions
(Ramanathapillai 2006, 2012).
Truth, memory and the quest for shared reality
From a strictly logical point of view, the phrase “selective memories” comes
close to a pleonasm. Memories simply are what we retain, for a given period,
from a potential infinity of events, experiences or sensations, and there is no
plausible reason to expect such selection to occur “randomly”, in the way that
statisticians use the term: with equal chances of selection given to each instance.
The idea of living every moment of our individual or collective existence with
the cumulative legacy of anything ever experienced beforehand seems logically
and psychologically untenable. It furthermore makes sense to expect that some
good reasons are at play when we keep certain memories and unburden our-
selves from others. But, as there can be a plurality of good reasons potentially in
conflict with each other, the critical question is: what makes certain good rea-
sons outweigh others, or when it comes to collective remembrance, what makes
some people’s good reasons prevail over those held by others?
The examples given in the previous section suggest that, for experiences
that can either be forgotten or remembered in societies confronted with their
troubled past, there is always an underlying political dimension. The “good
reasons” of leaders, state representatives or militant challengers to favour
certain memories over others appear often relatively easy to infer, once we
have a good enough idea of the past involvements, current interests and
future agendas of specific actors. The more complex and less well understood
part of the process lies with larger groups of people, and with the questions
of when and how they align their memories with those of particular political
leaders, especially when there is no perfect match between elites and people’s
involvements, interests and agendas.
To grasp what is at play in these collective processes, we first need to be
clear about one thing: the fact that there are specific reasons why certain
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things are remembered and others forgotten does not imply that the process
is fully deliberate, i.e. that we only remember what we want to remember. We
also need to have a chance to remember. It is sociologically and psychologi-
cally well established that “memories” are not like inert things that can be
put away and stored somewhere to be preserved. The only chance for our
memories to survive is that we practise them: we remember by rehearsing. We
retain a memory by spending time thinking about it, by telling it to someone,
by writing it up, singing it, crying it or playing it. Therefore, when stripped of
sufficient opportunities to do any of these things, we will, sooner or later,
loose a memory. Another consequence is that each time we tell, write, sing,
cry or play a memory, we do more than simply keep it alive: we give it new
life. The memory is not simply preserved, it is re-elaborated and trans-
formed – potentially enriched of certain qualities and impoverished of
others – each time we remember.
The critical point for understanding the relationship between remembrance
and social change is that we are seldom alone in these transformative
moments. Two decades of research into the social psychology of remem-
brance suggest that “not being alone” when remembering might actually be a
pre-condition both to keeping a memory alive and to transforming it by
sharing it. Two telling experiments help to make this point concrete. In one
experiment, Pasupathi, Stallworth and Murdoch (1998) showed short movie
excerpts to research participants and then asked them to recount some of
the clips they had seen to someone else. The clips were actually randomly
allocated to three different types of treatment: for some clips, the person to
whom a research participant retold the movie content was instructed to do
nothing other than to listen attentively; for other clips (s)he was distracted by
a different task while listening; while the remaining clips were not recounted
at all. When asked to recall the content of the movie excerpts three weeks
later, research participants proved able to provide significantly more details
for those clips that they had been given an opportunity previously to relate
to someone who was actively listening. Interestingly, distracted listeners were
of no help: as many details were forgotten from the clips recounted to
someone displaying no signs of genuine interest as from the clips that were
not retold at all. These findings suggest, therefore, that we remember better
what we are able to share: remembering is a social practice, not something
that can be done effectively in isolation, or without the sense of a meaningful
social exchange.
In another noteworthy experiment, Marsh (2007) was interested not so
much in how detailed or accurate memories are depending on the social cir-
cumstances, but rather in how they are transformed by being shared. She
asked research participants to read a story, then to retell it with a specific
purpose (either to recommend the main character or to complain about him/
her) and, finally, to recall the original story as accurately as possible. As a
result, in the final recall, participants tended to forget elements from the
original story that were incongruent with the purpose of their own previous
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retelling of the story, and they added elements (not present in the original
story) that were congruent with this purpose. This finding led Marsh to
speculate: “What people remember about events may be the story they last
told about those events” (p. 19, emphasis added).
Subsequent studies have reached similar conclusions. Some authors have
gone further in theorizing the underlying motives and mechanisms through
which our memories change. Echterhoff et al. (2009) have highlighted our
epistemic and social need to live in a shared reality as a driving force. Most
facets of our lives unfold in a social world that is the world we share with
others and upon which we can act jointly. Being unable to live in a shared
reality breeds isolation, helplessness and estrangement. As a consequence, we
invest effort in keeping intact a sense of shared reality by selecting and
accommodating what we share with others to what we anticipate they will be
able to hear and recognize as true and as relevant. But there is also an
internal side to the process: we tend to remember our experiences in the way
we’ve shared them. Our stories become our memories and what we can’t turn
into “good stories” – stories others will listen too attentively – is doomed to
oblivion.
Those who control state power can pull a variety of strings that shape
opportunities to share stories publicly and position them as “good stories”
that are worthy of being widely heard and rehearsed. But no state is
almighty, and the spaces to share stories are negotiated at multiple scales.
For example, Di Pasquale (2012) has studied a small mountainous village
community, in the Italian region of Tuscany, that has managed to keep alive,
over a period of 60 years, a locally shared memory of a World War II mas-
sacre, despite a policy of forgetting and impunity pursued by state autho-
rities, until their memories were finally sanctioned by a belated trial of the
Nazi officers responsible for the atrocity:
The survivors and the relatives of the dead have constructed their
memory around their own cognitive and cultural horizons. They have
crystallized their experiences, integrated personal stories with details of
everyday local life and linked this collective representation with relevant
information from the outside. In this way, the subjectivities of mourning
have formed a mnemonic community defined by continual recollection of
their wartime past. This means that the Nazi violence has affected the
entire social group: none of the members has been able to forget it, even
if not all of them have wanted to deal with it.
(p. 501)
Scales of transformation
So far, we have referred rather loosely to processes that play out at the most
contrasting levels of human experience: from the intimate process of
remembering to the “global norm” of transitional justice, with community
and state levels in between. In our current world of nations, how a process of
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transitional justice becomes instituted at the national level is often particularly
consequential and the question as to what international actors can and
should do to facilitate the occurrence of such a process is typically of parti-
cular pragmatic relevance. This question is tied, however, to difficult
unresolved problems, both normatively and analytically.
Normatively, there is the question of what legitimacy “foreign” actors have
to influence a domestic process. As alluded to already with the Sri Lankan
example, state actors facing international pressure are often eager to point
out their own democratic legitimacy and the principle of national sover-
eignty, and to denounce external human rights claims as power politics con-
ducted under a moral guise. Friction between international and local actors
accusing each other, respectively, of “interference” and “spoilerism”, might
be more typical than harmonious cooperation and converging objectives (e.g.
Höglund and Orjuela 2013). In this context, recent voices have warned
against romanticizing local communities’ roles in transitional justice, as they
often become the sites of competition between domestic and international
actors, where either side refers to local practices, traditions or aspirations to
further their own agendas and project their own understanding of coming to
terms with the past (e.g. Kochanski 2020).
Thorough and controversial ethical debates certainly remain necessary in
this field, as there will never be a neutral perspective from which to judge
the legitimacy of different actors entering into friction with each other in the
global system. But these debates might remain fruitless so long as they
are guided by abstract and idealized notions of the “national community” or
of the “international community”. It is important therefore to look at spe-
cific groups of actors that have a stake in the process and to wonder to what
extent their perspective and interests are, and can be, concretely represented
by entities such as state institutions or international organizations. For
example, what justice can defeated groups or minority communities expect
from the nation-state when state institutions are controlled by the majority?
What effective access do groups that occupy a peripheral position in any
given social structure have to formal justice?
Analytically, there is the question of how complex processes that intersect
across different scales end up making a difference in practice. A simple poli-
tical analysis of key actors’ interests, power calculus and resources risks fall-
ing short of processes that are also about emerging dynamics, unintended
consequences and shifting social ecologies. Political power is always con-
tingent upon the capacity to mobilize support and shape collective action:
even in the most coercive authoritarian regime, the question remains, for
example, at what point people expect that others will follow orders and
that those who disobey will be punished. Moreover, social groups and social
systems generally do not come out of periods of collective violence as they
have entered them (Elcheroth and Reicher 2017). What is valuable – and
hence defines collective and individual interest – changes in the face of col-
lective trauma (Spini et al. 2019), or during the very process of addressing
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past crimes (Rimé et al. 2011). Sometimes new groups emerge out of violence
(e.g. Thiranagama 2013). Often, intergroup configurations shift entirely,
when previous alliances break up or new alliances are created, or when pre-
viously passive third parties become actively involved (Dixon et al. 2020).
Such complex dynamics and moments of unpredictable change are some-
times feared as potential roads to chaos, but they also sow the seeds for
progressive social change (Drury 2018). In moments of transition, small dif-
ferences can have large consequences when one change triggers the next, in a
cascading sequence of events. Social change is not decreed top-down, but
well-timed policy initiatives can take an emergent movement beyond a spe-
cific tipping point (see Nyborg et al. 2016). If the success of transitional jus-
tice is to be measured at its capacity to be transformative, it becomes
important to judge any transitional justice process not only by its internal
procedures, but also by the way it interacts, at a specific place and time, with
collective resources set in motion locally and globally. The oversights of
transitional justice with the most far-reaching consequences might be those
that “forget” that resources such as potential allies for justice, changing col-
lective values or facilitative “stocks” of common experiences are available,
where and when they are.
Exploring the shadows
At this point, a range of reasons why we aim to revisit transitional justice
from its shadows might have transpired. We do not only borrow the idea
from Billig and Marinho, and Macherey, that omissions – what is not shown,
said or remembered – can be meaningful, but also anticipate that by shifting
our gaze away from what is actively lit to what is rendered more difficult to
see, we can learn something useful about demobilizing delusions, missed
opportunities or unexplored possibilities. To recap with examples from two
sites already alluded to, which will be deepened throughout this book: in
South Africa, deep economic injustice and racial segregation never went
away, but might have been temporarily more difficult to see, during the post-
apartheid “honeymoon” period. In Sri Lanka, internally displaced commu-
nities have been caught in transient spaces over periods long enough for new
generations to grow up as so-called refugees, but largely moved out of sight
for the country’s dramatic end of the war and triumphalist transition to the
new post-war era. Other examples of questions raised by typical oversights
that merit closer scrutiny are: what is overwritten when a state celebrates the
“rehabilitation” of the combatants it has just defeated? Or, which experiences
are implicitly accepted for marginalization when transitional justice is deliv-
ered nationally, while many armed conflicts or repressive regimes around the
world have also produced generations of forced exile communities?
While we believe in the relevance of critically questioning the effective
contribution of existing transitional justice processes for creating more fair-
ness and less suffering in the long term, we do not want to throw the baby
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out with the bathwater. Setting in motion processes of “transformative jus-
tice” is certainly a laudable objective in many circumstances, but affirming
this objective does not remove the need for societies that have been con-
fronted with injustice and suffering at an extraordinary scale to find extra-
ordinary means to deal with their past – and to seize windows of opportunity
for doing so during periods of political transition. Rather than shelving the
historic “toolkit” that several decades of societal experiments with transi-
tional justice have left us with, we therefore suggest looking at this collective
legacy from new angles, in order to reimagine its transformative power.
Joint aims, plural approaches: how 15 original angles make a book
To find these new angles, we have prioritized out-of-the box thinking and
proceeded in a somewhat unorthodox manner. Most of the scholars who look
into the shadows of transitional justice here are not specialists on transitional
justice. This means that – several notable exceptions apart – most con-
tributors to this collective volume did not make a career studying, let alone
implementing, transitional justice mechanisms, but come from a broad range
of different research fields. It also means that many of us have been trained
originally in disciplines not seen as core to the transitional justice commu-
nity, such as social psychology, oral history, anthropology, cultural or gender
studies – while law, criminology and political science are not absent. But we
all have in common a marked interest and years- or decades-long research
experience with problems of social justice, collective action, social trauma,
collective remembering and/or history writing.
There is still something else that binds together the different contributors:
a joint involvement in an international doctoral training initiative – initially
as part of the Pluralistic Memories Project, before it became the Lausanne
Summer School on Transitional Justice and Conflict Transformation – as
lecturers, participants or organizers. This common involvement has facili-
tated, over the years, the development of common references and a culture of
dialogue between scholars with different sensibilities, rooted in different
societal and disciplinary backgrounds. When the project to write a collective
book arose and concretized, this culture of exchange was further nurtured
through author-editor brainstorming meetings, original co-writing arrange-
ments for some chapters, collective discussions of chapter drafts between
authors from each section, and written feedback from peer contributors as
well as the editors. The aim of this process was not to create consensus, but
rather to eventually convey a lively debate where different voices express
themselves with sufficient clarity to be mutually intelligible, and where argu-
ments rooted in different sensibilities speak to each other, instead of ignoring
each other. One salutary aspect of this process is that it sometimes led us to
see and circumvent peculiarities of the conceptual jargons or assumptions
shared conventionally within specific fields, hopefully to the benefit of a
similarly diversified readership.
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From spotlights to shadows: how the book is organized
The cross-national orientation of the book, and the case examples it dis-
cusses, serve its overarching goal to look into both the local and global sha-
dows of transitional justice. To inspect the local shadows, the book relies on
some emblematic cases which include South Africa, but also Rwanda and
Argentina, with a focus on processes and societal dynamics not yet main-
streamed in the abundant literature that exists already on these cases. To
inspect the global shadows created by these same cases – which tend to set
the standard of what is and what is not considered as a transitional justice
process in the international arena – the book integrates contributions from
experts of sites better known for resisting the setting-up of mechanisms to
deal with their troubled pasts than for embracing international norms of
transitional justice, such as Sri Lanka, Turkey and Côte d’Ivoire. To com-
bine, moreover, the advantages of contextual depth and multiple perspectives
on one specific case with the reward of cross-contextual variability and
comparative analysis, the book features two key case analyses deepened
through several contributions – South Africa, as a prototypical case of tran-
sitional justice, and Sri Lanka, as a case of “resistance”, alongside analyses
of multiple cases, within and across individual contributions.
In effect, the book is organized as a counter-current journey from the spot-
light to what is in the shadow of transitional justice. Starting with a description
of how instructive cases of transitional justice have turned commemoration into
celebrations of a certain version of history, the different contributions then pro-
gressively explore the issues, actors and resources that are typically forgotten
when societies celebrate their pasts rather than mourn their losses, or get
sidelined in the focus on the classic pillars of transitional justice.
The first section of the book hence presents three cases where com-
memoration of past suffering has turned into political celebration of the
moral triumph of overcoming past harm, and of the role of current regimes.
The ensuing self-referential dynamics by which victors, or those “on the right
side of history”, celebrate their achievements tend to obscure the creative
process of undoing frontlines, making emergent communities visible, trans-
forming understandings of social relationships and empowering new collec-
tives of actors. The first two case analyses, by Murithi and by Jessee, show
how commemoration has turned into celebration in the aftermath of emble-
matic transitional justice processes in South Africa and Rwanda. The fol-
lowing contribution, by Saravanmuttu, shows how, in Sri Lanka, similar
political ends are achieved, ironically, through resisting international
pressures for transitional justice rather than by complying with them.
The second section pursues a systematic analysis of three types of chal-
lenges that justice delivered during limited periods of transition, and focusing
on the most egregious forms of violence, struggles with tackling structural
social inequality (Durrheim and Murray); being relevant to post-generations,
born after specific violent events but affected by their long-term
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consequences (Surenthiraraj); and preventing new forms of violence groun-
ded in the disenchantments of the formerly oppressed, when expectations for
historical redress remain unfulfilled (Kerr and Dixon). Bringing into focus
time periods long after the official dismantling of apartheid in South Africa,
or the resettlement of Muslims evicted from their homes during the civil war
in Sri Lanka, these chapters foreground what has been neglected in the
mechanisms instituted and the fault lines that have emerged in the meantime.
The third section highlights those who are left out, or inadequately con-
sidered, when transitional justice is delivered as a nationalist and state-driven
process in the hands of victors, or parties and institutions claiming the moral
high ground. Discussing prosecutions and truth-processes from the perspec-
tive of exiles on the one hand (Parmentier, Rauschenbach and Hein), and
women from rural communities on the other (de Mel and Medawatta), and
state-sponsored “rehabilitation” from the perspective of former combatants,
including child and female combatants (Usoof-Thowfeek and Gunasekera),
the section offers insights into why a broader or fairer inclusion of forgotten
actors is vital for avoiding some of transitional justice’s pitfalls.
The fourth and final section starts with Jones’ critical examination of
resistance to transitional justice, problematizing the normative assumptions
underlying its understanding and inviting us to see the creative potential in
certain forms of resistance. The section then moves on with three systematic
discussions, offered by Vollhardt, Twali and Jayakody, by Acar and Reicher,
and by Penic, Drury and Bady, of under-exploited collective resources that
can potentially make engagement with collective trauma more transforma-
tive, such as inclusive, cross-sides narratives, the creative power of crowds
and new, emergent forms of solidarity and resilience.
Our guiding ambition in the process of assembling and bringing into dia-
logue these different contributions has been to end up with a collective book
that becomes more interesting when it is explored as a whole. We hope that
its readers might approach it like a collective exhibition, where one not only
wishes to rush to one’s favourite piece but takes the time to wander around
and let oneself be surprised by how each piece gains an additional dimension
through the context created by all the others.
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2 Celebrating the end of apartheid
Tim Murithi
Introduction
In the mid-1990s, transitional justice originated from a legalistic tradition,
with a narrow emphasis on the use of judicial processes to address civil and
political violations in countries undergoing transition (Murithi 2009). Afri-
ca’s experience demonstrated that traditional notions of transitional justice
needed to be rethought and reframed. African actors derived these lessons
from their own cultural practices as well as from elsewhere around the world
and contributed towards diffusing them. Specifically, in order to effectively
address the real concerns of victims of past violations, transitional justice
norms had to be expanded beyond their civil and political focus to include
socio-economic and psychosocial dimensions and to engage memorialization
and commemoration.
One of the central dilemmas of transitional justice, namely the tension
between the pursuit of accountability and the inclusive memorialization and
commemoration of past violations, continues to play itself out in the major-
ity of post-conflict situations in Africa. Specifically, South Africa, Rwanda,
Uganda, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Liberia adopted processes and institutions
which sought to address the violations of the past, but did not leverage the
opportunity provided to deepen the processes of commemoration. Rather,
the South African, Kenyan and Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions (TRCs) touched upon the importance of memorialization and
commemorative processes, and some of their experiences have been analysed,
modified and adopted by other states around the world.
The South African TRC was established in the context of a transition
impacted by violence and the targeted, politically motivated killing of over
5,000 people (eNCA 2014). In the aftermath of the transition, the opposing
military forces were entirely capable of unleashing more mayhem on the
citizens of the country. On the one hand, there were heightened fears of
retribution among the so-called white, previously advantaged communities.
On the other hand, demands emerged for a punitive form of redress for
apartheid atrocities among sections of the previously disadvantaged people
of colour. Consequently, the South African TRC was conceived as a
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palatable “middle way” between outright retribution and blanket impunity.
There had been very few previous experiments with the use of truth
commissions, based mainly in Latin America and the Balkans, and in which
the importance of quelling the flames of political violence and retribution
was taking priority over correcting the economic crimes of apartheid.
According to Charles Villa-Vicencio – who had been Research Director of
the TRC and then Executive Director of the succeeding Institute for Justice
and Reconciliation (IJR) – the TRC was assigned “the important task of
instituting corrective moral justice by putting the record straight … it had no
power to execute punitive justice, nor did it have the power to execute dis-
tributive justice, in the sense of correcting material imbalances” (Villa-Vicencio
2004, p. 20, emphasis added).
Focusing on the South African experience, in this chapter I will explore
how transitional justice processes can raise awareness, and mobilize societal
and political engagement with the lasting legacies of historical experiences,
by providing a narrative of the past that is “complete enough”. In my view,
this presupposes, first of all, an effort to identify the lasting effects of mate-
rial imbalances, which can then provide the basis for more pluralistic and
inclusive forms of commemoration.
Apartheid and memory
South Africa’s history is a story of entitlement and preference for one group
at the expense of another. The way that the ensuing historical injustice is
remembered reflects the extent to which South Africa’s citizenry is transi-
tioning towards a fairer and more inclusive society (Alexander 2002). In
1652, the Dutch settler community, led by Jan van Reeibeck, gradually begun
to define what belonged to them and what they were entitled to. Perversely,
this process also defined what the natives and indigenous people were not
entitled to. In 1913, the Native Land Act solidified European settler privilege,
and further disenfranchised the coloured and black population (Alexander
2002). This act eschewed the moral responsibility of the European settlers to
their fellow human beings, and through such legal instruments a culture of
entitlement became entrenched further in the country. Simultaneously, so-
called coloured and black people, which are problematic terms to use,
became dispossessed of their land and rights to their land. They became
disowned by the nation that was supposed to provide them with the means to
self-sovereignty and the means to flourish as human beings.
The South African apartheid project, which was formally implemented
between 1948 and 1994, was one of the most extensive projects of racial
entitlement and disenfranchisement in recent human history (Wilkins and
Strydom 2012). It was a vast and comprehensive “white” cultural, political,
social and economic empowerment programme which generated and perpe-
tuated wealth for the white minority population. Its logical consequences
were poverty, deprivation and destitution for a large majority of black and
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coloured people (Van Der Westhuizen 2007). Apartheid, at its core, was also
a patriarchal project: it promoted gender subservience, an elitist philosophy
and the subjugation of some human beings for the benefit of others. It
established an aggressive misuse of power for the purpose of materialistic
gain and thereby created an alienated sense of nationhood, particularly
among the oppressed. In effect, it was a system of exploitation and systemic
oppression which also perpetuated great harm to the psychology of its
victims and survivors (Bunting 1969).
The extensive apartheid laws imposed on South Africa during this period
were designed to brainwash the population and insinuate a racial prism in
their psyches. Apartheid was at its heart a totalitarian system: a programme
designed to alter the minds and souls of human beings and orient them
towards separation and segregation in deeply fundamental ways (Bunting
1969). If we want to transcend, through processes of commemoration and
memorialization, the psychic orientation created by this brainwashing pro-
gramme, it is essential to grasp the full extent to which it has altered people’s
understandings of social reality.
The reason why the apartheid “reality construct” remains so powerful in
memory, and in the lived reality of many South Africans today, is because it
was insidiously effective in moulding people’s minds through political, eco-
nomic and social engineering (Bunting 1969). In effect, apartheid was one of
the most devious mind-altering systems ever devised by a group of human
beings to subjugate, subordinate, marginalize and exclude another group of
people. It is important to understand, however, that the legacy of the reality
of apartheid produces effects that shape different people’s memories in dif-
ferent ways. The sense of injustice of the system does not permeate the
memories of the beneficiaries of apartheid and their descendants as strongly
as it does those of the survivors and their descendants (Institute for Justice
and Reconciliation 2019).
During apartheid, South Africa was a divided nation. The answer to the
question of who constitutes the nation was quite clear to the authors and
beneficiaries of apartheid. At the core of their brutal psychic experiment was
race socialization (Fatton 1986). So-called white people were systematically
taught how to be, act and interact with their fellow human beings as racists
(Helms 1990; Thompson and Carter 1997). The eminent Martinican theorist
of race Frantz Fanon has argued in his seminal book Black Skin, White
Masks that the objective of race socialization is to programme a sense of
superiority and self-pride among “white” people and to inflate their sense of
self-worth (Fanon 1967). The opposite side of the coin was a systematic
programme to malign the so-called black people by casting them as sub-
human, primitive, lazy, promiscuous, untrustworthy, violent and crime-prone
(Thompson and Carter 1997). This apartheid construct sought to impose
black inferiority as an acceptable worldview and the segregation of black
people in dilapidated townships and shanty towns – with all the social ills
that this generated including, ironically, criminality – as an acceptable policy.
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This system hence instituted a lack of self-worth among black people and
strictly constrained their opportunities for self-expression, creativity and, in
particular, for commemoration and memorialization.
The apartheid system established race identities based on the perception
that people share a common heritage with a particular racial group, such as
so-called whites, and not with others, such as so-called blacks (Frederickson
1988). These sentiments are still widespread and very much alive in today’s
South Africa. For example, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation’s
South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) shows that, while there
has been some degree of racial integration, there is still a long way to go for
the country’s citizens to genuinely interact with each other as cultural equals.
Specifically, the SARB data show that “most South Africans report that they
would like to interact more often with people from other race groups, but for
many people language and confidence barriers, as well as negative prior
experiences, represent obstacles to doing so” (Institute for Justice and
Reconciliation 2019, p. 8, emphasis added). Findings such as these suggest
that the racial prism instilled by apartheid into all who lived with the system,
whether as beneficiaries or survivors, continues to have lasting, transgenerational
effects.
The transformative function of transitional justice
Transitional justice can be delivered through a wide range of mechanisms,
which seek to frame and catalyse the different processes by which societies
affected by violent conflict or authoritarian rule address past violations, as a
precursor to laying the foundations for more inclusive societies (Murithi
2009). From its predominantly legalistic origins, transitional justice has con-
fronted a range of societal, economic and political pressures that have pre-
cipitated a broader scope and mandate. Many of these pressures emerged
from processes that were unfolding on the African continent, which placed
the continent at the forefront of experimentations with pushing the boundaries
of transitional justice (Murithi 2016).
The prosecutorial framework implemented in Latin America and the
Balkans in the mid-1990s was soon confronted by a proliferation of cultural,
social, economic and political contradictions, which challenged the narrow
focus of legally inspired transitional justice norms (Murithi 2016). In cases
where historic violations went unpunished, unrecognized or not memor-
ialized, a sense of injustice and moral contradiction can prevail for long
afterwards (Buckley-Zistel et al. 2014). The legal approach to transitional
justice is also generally unable to provide effective redress for systematic
societal injustice or economic crimes, because the causal relations involved
can hardly be established in terms of specific acts perpetrated against specific
victims. In situations in which a particular ethnic or racial group has bene-
fited from the economic exploitation of another, responsibility is often wide-
spread and diffuse, from the political leaders who implemented the policies to
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the constituencies that supported or voted for them. In most cases, it is
challenging to pinpoint individual perpetrators for the prosecution of eco-
nomic crimes. The processes needed to promote redress typically include,
therefore, a range of interventions located beyond the scope of a punitive
model of transitional justice. Transitional justice rapidly had to face a broad
range of challenges and a multiplicity of expectations: to administer justice;
to restore societal trust; to facilitate commemoration and memorialization of
past violations; and/or to promote reconciliation in deeply divided commu-
nities. In particular, the demands for socio-economic justice have pushed the
normative boundaries of transitional justice beyond the confines of its
historical origins within the legal sphere.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In spite of the available option of pursuing prosecutions for the human rights
violations that were committed during apartheid, South Africa deliberately
chose the path of prioritizing a restorative transitional justice model (Du Toit
and Doxtader 2011). The option of prosecution was available during the coun-
try’s transition, in the mid to late-1990s, and is still viable even to this day. The
fact that South Africa adopted its own unique path still distinguishes it as a
norm-setter, and the model it adopted is constantly being analysed and scruti-
nized around the world for its important insights. Following Ben-Josef Hirsch
(2006), the South African TRC has critically contributed to an international
norm-setting process in terms of the global popularization of truth commissions
and the trans-nationalization of its guiding principles (Ben-Josef Hirsch 2006).
The South African model has been attractive to a broad range of national and
international actors, due to its widely perceived success in enabling South Afri-
can society to move forward from a divisive and brutalizing past, avoiding a
full-blown descent into internecine armed conflict. However, it is evident that,
despite the path it chose, the country has not yet addressed all the challenges
emanating from its past. Apartheid-generated racism, gender-based violence,
inequality and poverty remain endemic in South African society. In effect, there
is latent violence within South African society which, like the apparently dying
embers of a glowing fire, can rapidly flare up again and undermine social stabi-
lity. This fact seems to be routinely glossed over by many international obser-
vers, which continues to imbue the South African TRC with a false aura of
efficacy (Waldmeir 1998). Consequently, because it has frequently been por-
trayed as the quintessential truth and reconciliation commission, the widely
disseminated South African model has had a major impact on the establishment
of public truth-telling as a critical component of transitional justice in the global
arena.
The South African TRC was empowered with adequate authority and legiti-
macy to discuss the socio-economic basis of apartheid, and to suggest possible
reform programmes (Selim and Murithi 2011). However, the TRC adopted
specific definitions of key terms like “violations”, “abuses” and “participation”
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that significantly narrowed its mandate, and consequently limited its ability to
engage with, and provide guidance on, the ideological and socio-economic
aspects of apartheid (Barchiesi 1999, p. 8). Advocates of the approach adopted
by the TRC have argued that if the TRC had attempted to provide a historical
reconstruction of the “truth” which included socio-economic oppression under
apartheid, and elaborate on decisive recommendations for systemic economic
and social restructuring, then the Commission would have faced formidable
political obstacles. According to Barchiesi (p. 8), “any attempt by the TRC to
challenge those obstacles would have probably entered a contradiction with the
functional purpose to promote national unity and reconciliation”. However,
critics have responded that millions in South Africa did not identify with the
TRC initiatives under the chosen terms, or did so to a limited extent only and
instead turned their hopes towards education, employment, healthcare or
economic growth (Colvin 2008, p. 418).
Shifting paradigms and the enduring impact of the TRC
Over time, growing historic distance and shifting theoretical paradigms have
reopened the debate on the enduring societal impact of the TRC (Bell and
Ntsebeza 2003). Specifically, the inability of South African society to achieve
a much more profound transformation has raised questions about the effec-
tiveness of a reconciliation agenda that is not sufficiently buttressed by an
equivalent programme of socio-economic redress. In particular, a younger
generation of South Africans, who were born after the 1994 transition to
independence and democratic governance, have questioned the legal and
socio-economic utility of the TRC. Concretely, progressive and humanist-
oriented youth formations have argued that while the political functionality
of the TRC was evident, the inability of the Commission to lay the founda-
tions for bringing about a fundamental transformation in the material lives
of the majority of people in South Africa has undermined its moral effec-
tiveness. In addition, they have questioned the moral probity of a national
institution that seemed to have placed the burden of “reconciliation” on the
victims and survivors of the brutal apartheid system of white supremacy and
human exploitation (Crush 2008). Njamnjoh, in his seminal book #Rho-
desMustFall: Nibbling at Resilient Colonialism in South Africa (2016), and
other critics of the South African transition, have further argued that the
failure of the wider “white” sector of the South African society to embrace
the TRC as a collective platform for memoralization and commemoration
of the injustices of the past – as a tool to promote deeper cultural and soci-
etal transformation of racial attitudes and economic wealth – implies that it
was a missed opportunity for the country as a whole.
For the South African project going forward, it has to pick up from where
the TRC left off and to pursue the challenging pathway of deeper introspection
as well as the unlearning of white supremacists’ attitudes, which regrettably are
all too common and are regularly reported upon across the society as a whole
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(Njamnjoh 2016; Reddy 2015). This will require revisiting the objectives of the
TRC with a view to creating new spaces for more pluralistic forms of memor-
ialization and commemoration, which challenge the perceived and persistent
orthodox viewpoint of the South African “miracle” or the “rainbow nation”.
This will be a challenging but necessary journey for South Africa to undertake
in order to mitigate against the further fragmentation and the resurgence of
apartheid patterns of thought and behaviour, which are increasingly becoming
evident across the country. As Kerr and Dixon (Chapter 7) as well as Durrheim
and Murray (Chapter 5) in this volume observe, these include the phenomenon
of xenophobia, witnessed in 2008, 2015 and 2019, which included the targeted
killing by South Africans of African citizens who had immigrated from other
parts of the continent, particularly in the high-density low-income urban infor-
mal settlements. In effect, this is a side effect of the increasing fragmentation of
the society, fuelled by unresolved and residual identity politics and by patterns
of economics distribution inherited from the apartheid system of segregation
and exploitation (Crush 2008). The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation’s
SARB notes that “xenophobic sentiments are pervasive with roughly four in ten
(40%) of South Africans agreeing that they are likely to prevent people from
other African countries from accessing certain services and from participating in
certain activities” (IJR 2019, p. 8).
The South African TRC was established during a “honeymoon” period,
when the celebration of the end of apartheid overshadowed reflections which
could have created the space for a deeper form of engagement with the his-
torical injustices that were meted out to the majority of the country’s people.
The South African TRC was therefore symptomatic of the “celebrative
moment” that accompanies countries undergoing transition from conflict
and authoritarianism towards democratic inclusivity and the rule of law.
Consequently, the majority of South African society – and in particular
affected families – were not able to utilize the national platform to give a
broader range of meanings to past losses experienced during the brutal era of
apartheid. A quarter of a century later, individuals and families are still
attempting to take the initial step towards expressing more profound and
meaningful forms of commemoration for the historical injustices that they
endured. Regrettably, these processes have now been left to survivors to drive
through on their own initiative, as successive post-apartheid governments
have become absorbed in addressing basic socio-economic challenges.
Revisiting the TRC’s limited engagement with the past
South Africa’s TRC sought to trigger social change in the country by illu-
minating a certain version of its past and promoting the envisaged future of
an idealized “rainbow nation”. In effect, the TRC did establish a dedicated
institution to oversee the implementation of its recommendations, but sub-
sequent African National Congress (ANC) governments only paid lip service
to the recommendations of the TRC. This was in part because they disagreed
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with the TRC’s approach of attempting to establish a moral equivalency
between some actions of the anti-apartheid liberation struggle and the deeds
of the apartheid system of police, military and intelligence. Ultimately, the
oversight in establishing more wholehearted TRC implementation mechan-
isms has undermined efforts to leverage the achievements of the Commission
to advance societal dynamics that could reconfigure South African society
and transform it more deeply.
What did South Africa leave out when it convened the TRC to remember
its past? Some critics have argued that instead of being a framework for truth
recovery, the South African TRC was in fact the place where the truth went
to die (Molefe 2014). The fact that only 21,000 statements were collected by
the Commission, in a country of 43 million people at the time, implies that
numerous atrocities and human rights violations still remained undocu-
mented. Consequently, the documented narratives contained in the TRC
reports represent an incomplete historical record of the wide-ranging experi-
ences of South Africans across the country. While there are multiple factors
why more people could not participate in the TRC process, it is clear that
there is still a need for ongoing engagement with the past, on a nation-wide
scale. There have been a number of state-led commemorative processes,
including the construction of key memorials across the country, such as the
Freedom Park in Pretoria, the Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg and the
Hector Petersen Museum in Soweto, to name but a few. In addition, there has
been a concerted effort by national and provincial governments to rename
places and streets in order to commemorate the injustices of the past and, to
a certain extent, contribute to the pluralization of memory. However, there
are issues and societal dynamics that the TRC was unable to address, despite
its efforts to memorialize the violations of apartheid.
Rhodes Must Fall as a commemorative movement
The TRC did not rise to the challenge of dismantling the structural violence
of racist ideology and racial attitudes that were indoctrinated into the so-
called white population of South Africa. The Rhodes Must Fall (RMF)
movement unleashed societal dynamics that, once more, brought to the fore
the failure of previous attempts to address the white supremacist ideology
that was, and still is, all pervasive in South African society. The RMF
movement emerged as an organic movement led by a horizontal structure of
student collectives. Ultimately, it spread to other universities across South
Africa, and even inspired a similar campaign at Oxford University’s Oriel
College which was a beneficiary of Cecil Rhodes’ financial contributions and
which displayed his statue prominently at its entrance.
The RMF as a commemorative movement directly challenged the “silen-
ces” and continuing marginalization of the majority of the country’s popu-
lation, which were all too evident more than two decades after the
celebratory end of apartheid. The RMF movement advocated for a different
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form of commemoration: one that is rooted in the celebration and apprecia-
tion of the “Africanness” instead of the “Europeanness” implied by the
colonial and apartheid-informed logic that continues to persist. The most
evident form of the attempt to create space for new representations of the
past was the concerted campaign, launched on 9 March 2015 by the RMF
movement, to bring down the statue of Cecil Rhodes from its prominent
location at the Upper Campus of the University of Cape Town. The statue
depicted Rhodes sitting and surveying his vast empire which he had accu-
mulated by implementing a policy of white supremacy and predatory
exploitation of South Africa’s people, land and resources. As noted in May-
lam’s book entitled The Cult of Rhodes: Remembering an Imperialist in
Africa, these policies served to establish a colonial system of rule, his own
private accumulation of wealth and stated ambition to dominate Africa from
the Cape to Cairo (Maylam 2005). On 9 April 2015, the RMF student
movement succeeded in achieving this objective and the Rhodes statue “fell”
leading to subsequent calls for replacing it with a statue of a prominent and
distinguished African (Njamnjoh 2016).
The RMF movement was not only committed to removing the statue and
calling for alternative forms of commemoration, including the renaming of
university buildings after prominent Africans, but was also driven by a stated
agenda to “decolonize” education across the whole of South Africa
(Njamnjoh 2016). The South African TRC had been unable to confront and
foreground the issue of the decolonization of education, as well as of other
sectors, which consequently remained silenced or overshadowed by the
selective performance of transitional justice that was enacted during and
after the work of the Commission. The RMF movement is now setting in
motion these previously overlooked dynamics of introspection and of con-
frontation of internalized Eurocentric norms across South Africa, the
government bureaucracy, the judicial system and the private sector.
This project of decolonizing South African society echoes historical
initiatives across the continent and is reinforced by the appeal in the African
Union Transitional Justice Policy “to come to terms with the traumas of
slavery, colonialism, apartheid, systematic repression and civil wars” (African
Union 2019, p. 1). In advancing its campaign, the RMF movement directly
challenges the silences that still prevail in relation to the “traumas of slavery,
colonialism, and apartheid” while appealing to the wider South African
society to embrace a more complete memory of the brutal history that the
majority of the people of colour across the country endured. The com-
memorative act of bringing down the Rhodes statue at the University of
Cape Town was, at its core, a statement alerting society to the urgency of
questioning the historic creation of racial inequality, by targeting one of its
most ardent proponents in the form of Cecil Rhodes. This was a necessary
act because, among a significant portion of the so-called white population of
South Africa, the attitudes and machinations of colonial entrepreneurs like
Rhodes are not problematic (Cilliers 2008). For some members of this section
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of society, there is no need to dwell on the past. The South African author
Charles Cilliers, in a chapter on “White Denial” in his insightful book For
Whites Only, notes that, according to his own father, “apartheid is dead and
buried – it does not matter any more” (p. 13). Cilliers argues that the views
held by his father and other whites who identify with this position are the
reason why it is necessary to commemorate the historic construction of racial
inequality. In effect, without an attitudinal change in these mindsets, it will
be more challenging to make the case for policies and legislations that would
create fairer distribution of economic goods and reparation in favour of the
descendants of those who were oppressed under apartheid.
Economic commemoration as an act of memorialization
The South African TRC did not address the structural economic crimes that
were at the heart of the apartheid project. As Van Vuuren notes,
the relative invisibility of economic crimes and violations that resulted
from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
focus on torture and physical violence is something that continues to
compromise those seeking economic and social justice in South Africa’s
ongoing transition.
(2017, p. 506)
The era of colonial conquest, which was closely accompanied by slavery, and
then apartheid, was fuelled by a meta-narrative of racial superiority, but it
was at its heart a project of economic subjugation and of the conversion of
people of colour into units of production. How can such economic crimes
and predatory exploitation be commemorated in the aftermath of a transi-
tion that seeks to right the wrongs of the past (Mamdani 1996)? In South
Africa, there has been a tendency to consign this question to the realm of
politics and economics, rather than to engage with it in the field of memor-
ialization. However, memories of the historic economic exploitation of
people of colour persists on a daily basis in the minds of their descendants,
in South Africa as well as across the wider continent and in other parts of
the world. The seminal book These Are the Things that Sit with Us (Gobodo-
Madikizela et al. 2019), for example, shows that the memory of economic
subjugation and exploitation looms large and can be a recurring source of
trauma to subsequent generations of people of colour, whose forebears suf-
fered under the yoke of apartheid and slavery. The lived reality of previous
generations has been passed down through an oral tradition. Some of these
stories have been documented and now exist as an historical societal record.
Van Vuuren suggests that in South Africa “the memory of iniquity, injustice
and oppression could not be erased as easily. It remains with those who carry
that burden, physically, emotionally and materially” (2017, p. 2). This points
to the need of “economic commemoration”.
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Economic commemoration can be described as a process of memorializa-
tion conducted with the specific aim of promoting redress for the effects of
economic exploitation, in particular to benefit subsequent generations of
descendants of the criminally dispossessed. Historical economic exploitation,
so long as it remains unaddressed, prevents the transmission of generational
wealth to the descendants of the destitute as a means of improving their
future livelihoods. The lingering memory of economic exploitation also
complicates the overall processing of trauma. Consequently, in South Africa
it is necessary to initiate processes of economic commemoration to con-
tribute towards healing the memories of economic exploitation, as well as
transforming the material livelihoods of the subsequent generations of the
descendants of victims and survivors of apartheid.
In terms of the practical modalities of implementing economic com-
memoration, it is evident that symbolic actions will not be sufficient. Rather,
economic redress and commemorative processes should be linked as means
towards the improvement of people’s livelihoods and well-being. Only by
ensuring that there is a material improvement in the circumstances of des-
cendants of survivors, as a form of reparation, can the journey towards the
healing of memories begin. Practically, economic reparation can be imple-
mented by ensuring that land that was forcefully dispossessed is restored to
survivors and their descendants, as well as by ensuring that survivors and
their descendants have fair access to hospitals, schools, university pro-
grammes and employment opportunities, in order to improve their livelihoods
and lay the foundation for subsequent generations.
In South Africa, various government policies have sought to redress eco-
nomic injustices of the past, such as wider access to education and social
grants for millions of South Africans. However, the notion of economic
commemoration has not been explicitly mainstreamed so far. Therefore,
there is scope going forward to rearticulate the processes of economic redress
in South Africa with acts of memorialization and commemoration for the
historical exploitation of people of colour. As Hennie Van Vuuren notes in
his seminal book, Apartheid Guns and Money:
[W]e do not need to consider South Africa’s transition as ending with
the report of the TRC … the identification and return of money stolen
through [economic] crimes could contribute towards a broader and fur-
ther-reaching reparations programme. New hearings and community
meetings could help to develop a better understanding of how indivi-
duals and communities suffered as a result of economic crimes and
structural violence.
(2017, p. 507, emphasis added)
Furthermore, Van Vuuren (2017, p. 510) argues that the “abuse of power
cannot be treated as an uncomfortable fact to be dealt with by future gen-
erations. It deserves our attention right now … and … we must … seek to
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hold those who profited from injustice to account”. In effect, it is necessary
to challenge the current orthodoxy of transitional justice mechanisms, and to
advance processes to remedy the lingering and lasting effects of economic
crimes, which continue to afflict the survivors of apartheid and their
descendants.
The transformative potential of commemoration
The South African TRC has become an example of pursuing a moral com-
promise, namely dealing with the legacy of the apartheid regime, but without
triggering a profound transformation of racial inequality. Ultimately, the
Commission will be assessed on the basis “not of who went to jail but
whether the quality of life is better” (Seider, cited in Mani 2002, p. 125).
Transitional justice processes, and truth recovery commissions in particular,
have the potential to provide a context for the memorialization of a broader
range of issues relating to the livelihoods and well-being of survivors and
their descendants, such as racial equality, land restoration, health and edu-
cation provisions. But when truth commissions prove incapable of engaging
with deeper root causes, this can render the process of transitional justice
symbolic and limit its remedial utility (Selim and Murithi 2011; Arbour
2007; Leebaw 2005). As Gready and Simons (2019) argue, transitional justice
needs to aspire to be more transformative in its impact and to engage more
widely with the local agency of affected communities. Through a broadening
of the notion of commemoration, it becomes conceivable to transform the
nature of transitional justice interventions and to embrace a wider range of
memorial practices. Concretely, transitional justice processes and actors need
to liaise with the health and education sectors as necessary sites of com-
memoration, in order to provide a deeper and more inclusive form of redress
for the harm done in the past.
Conclusion
South Africa’s response to its legacy of human rights violations and crimes
against humanity have influenced the evolving norms of transitional justice
around the world. The implementation of the South African TRC was an
extension of the “celebratory moment” brought about by the end of apart-
heid. However, the orthodoxy that the TRC pursued meant that key issues
were overshadowed and relegated to the margins: notably a more inclusive
approach to memorialization, in terms of the nature of the crimes to be
commemorated. This chapter assessed the South African TRC’s efforts to
recover the truth of past injustices and to provide a platform for engaging
with processes of redress and memorialization. The TRC cannot be expected
to have solved the complex social, economic and political problems that
South Africa faced, but it could have endeavoured to provide a more com-
plete narrative and to promote fairer commemoration of past traumas. In
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that sense, it might have missed a historic opportunity to raise awareness and
mobilize societal and political engagement with a broader range of lasting
legacies of the apartheid system and, notably, to pave the way for a pro-
gramme to commemorate economic crimes as well as to provide concrete
reparations to the many victims of apartheid and their descendants.
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3 Commemorating genocide in Rwanda
Erin Jessee
Introduction
Today, we pause to reflect on the tragedy we experienced and what we lost,
both individually and as a nation. We will continue to educate new generations
of Rwandans about what happened to our country, and what we learned from
it.
We are putting those lessons into practice for the benefit of those who come
after us. The lessons of our history have united us. They teach us the value of
good leadership that cares for the well-being of all citizens.
Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, delivered these words to the Rwandan
public and the international community on 7 April 2020 to launch Kwibuka
26, the 26th annual commemoration of what is referred to in official parlance
as the “1994 genocide against the Tutsi”. The genocide occurred at the height
of international efforts to negotiate an end to a three-year civil war that had
been triggered when the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) – a party composed primarily of descendants of Tutsi refugees who
had fled earlier periods of political violence in Rwanda – invaded northern
Rwanda on 1 October 1990. The conflict, and broader climate of economic,
social and political upheaval, radicalized a cohort of Hutu Power extremists
close to Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana (in power from 1973–94), who
began disseminating anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi propaganda aimed at demo-
nizing the RPF and its perceived supporters, Rwanda’s Tutsi minority popu-
lation. Following Habyarimana’s unexpected assassination on 6 April 1994
by unknown parties, the Hutu Power extremist-dominated interim govern-
ment used the resulting chaos as an opportunity to attempt to eliminate
political moderates and the nation’s minority Tutsi. The genocide lasted
approximately three months, culminating with the RPF’s military victory on
18 July (Des Forges 1999; Guichaoua 2015; Kimonyo 2016). By this time, the
Hutu Power extremists and their supporters had massacred between 500,000
(Des Forges 1999, pp. 15–16; Meierhenrich 2020, p. 81; Straus 2019) and one
million (National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide 2013) Rwandans
and sexually assaulted an estimated 250,000 women, among other atrocities
(Degni-Ségui 1996; Nowrojee 1996). Most of the Hutu Power extremists’
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victims were of Tutsi heritage, but they also targeted “internal enemies”: the
Tutsi’s perceived supporters among the Hutu majority and indigenous Twa
minority (Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen 2000, p. 226; see also Laws et al.
2019; Lewis and Knight 1995, pp. 26–7).
The 1994 genocide represents one of the few examples of mass atrocity since
the Holocaust that has met the legal criteria established by the United Nations
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948). Internationally, legal accountability was partially pursued via the now-
defunct International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). However, the
RPF’s transitional government has also pursued an ambitious transitional
justice programme comprised of national trials and an adapted dispute reso-
lution mechanism known as gacaca (”justice on the grass”) (Doughty 2016;
Gahima 2013; Ingelaere 2016). Additionally, the government has increasingly
invested in a comprehensive national commemoration programme that
includes eight major genocide memorials and provides support for nearly 250
district-level genocide memorials that are maintained by local communities
(National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide 2020). These memor-
ials – the focus of this chapter – are integral to official genocide commemora-
tion in Rwanda. They have been designed to adhere to key international
transitional justice principles: providing survivors with a safe place to remem-
ber their missing and murdered loved ones; educating the public about Rwan-
dan history leading up to the genocide, including the dangers of “bad
governance” and ethnic divisionism; and providing irrefutable evidence – most
notably through the displaying of visibly traumatized anonymous human
remains and personal effects – that the violence that overwhelmed Rwanda in
1994 constitutes genocide (Jessee 2017, p. 46). The memorials thus serve as
focal points for official genocide commemoration and education.
Kagame’s speech for Kwibuka 26 cited in the opening passage similarly
aligns with many key principles of international transitional justice, most
notably by appealing to Rwandans’ sense of shared national heritage and
encouraging them to learn from those aspects of Rwandan history that made
the genocide possible to prevent future genocidal violence. However,
Kagame’s words obscure the ongoing controversy that surrounds nationa-
lized genocide commemoration in Rwanda, as commemorative sites and cer-
emonies have evolved to recognize an increasingly limited and politicized
version of events, which perpetuates a “nationalism-within-a-nationalism”
(Baldwin 2019, p. 2). Scholars have studied nationalized commemoration in
Rwanda from various disciplinary perspectives (see, for example, Burnet
2009; Friedrich and Johnston 2013; Guyer 2009; Ibreck 2013; King 2010;
Major 2015; Meierhenrich 2011; Mwambari 2019; Vidal 2004; and Viebach
2019). Anthropologist Claudine Vidal (2004) was one of the earliest scholars
to study Rwanda’s memorials, and argued that they were becoming a source
of symbolic violence that silences survivors’ lived experiences and dictates
how they interact with their murdered loved ones. Soon afterwards, transi-
tional justice scholar Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006, p. 131) found that the
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memorials and related commemorative practices were prompting Rwandans
to practise “chosen amnesia” – a survival mechanism that enables peaceful
coexistence while failing to challenge “the social cleavages that rendered the
genocide possible in the first place, and so obstructing their transformation
in the future”. Anthropologist Jennie Burnet (2012, p. 128) subsequently
argued that the official narrative upheld by Rwanda’s national com-
memorative sites and events promoted “a clear yet sometimes arbitrary
demarcation between Hutu and Tutsi” that recognizes only Tutsi victims,
while condemning the Hutu majority as perpetrators.
This critical research speaks to two key themes in the literature on official
genocide commemoration in Rwanda: the state-imposed official narrative of
the genocide and the silences that it inevitably imposes on those Rwandans
whose experiences do not neatly align with this narrative; and the ensuing
question of whether the Rwandan government’s increasingly politicized
approach to commemoration can truly facilitate genuine social repair and
long-term political stability in the region. However, a politicized approach to
commemoration is by no means unique to Rwanda (see, for example,
Drozdzewski et al. 2016; Rose 2016; Sodaro 2018; Winter 2007; see also
Chapter 2 in this volume), nor are these themes without their own critics. As
noted by peace-building scholar David Mwambari (2019, p. 2), studies of
individual Rwandans’ efforts to commemorate their experiences of the geno-
cide, using music and the arts, have been largely eclipsed by studies of geno-
cide memory “at the centre of national politics, foreign policy-making and
socio-economic programs in what has a become an authoritarian political
climate” (see also Longman and Rutagengwa 2006; Viebach 2019). Those
few studies that focus on, or include, analysis of Rwandan genocide com-
memoration “from below” reveal the “limits of a government’s ability to
shape the collective memory of a population”, highlighting the need for more
complex, multilayered analysis that goes beyond ethnic identities to consider
political, regional, gender and other salient markers of identity in Rwanda
(Longman and Rutagengwa 2006, p. 243). Indeed, individual survivors and
their narratives have been, and remain, significant actors who inform Rwanda’s
official narrative of the genocide – even in instances where they recognize the
official narrative’s inability to adequately represent the diverse experiences of
the genocide and the significant challenges it poses for promoting genuine
national unity and reconciliation in Rwanda (Jessee 2017, pp. 81–116). As
political scientist Rachel Ibreck (2012, p. 99) reminds us, “we must expect
fractured memory in Rwanda”, given people’s polarizing experiences of
genocide and related mass atrocities in the 1990s.
The first national genocide commemorations
The effects of people’s polarizing experiences, and the fractured memory that
has resulted, became evident with Rwanda’s first efforts to commemorate the
genocide. Immediately after its military victory, the RPF established a
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government of national unity led by Hutu President Pasteur Bizimungu and
Tutsi Vice President Paul Kagame. Central to their government’s platform
was the promotion of a shared national identity, which they argued should
obliterate the ethnic identities that had increasingly divided Rwandans in the
20th century (Blackie and Hitchcott 2018, p. 24; Benda 2019, p. 191). Burnet
(2012, p. 96) notes that the first national genocide commemoration in April
1995 at Kigali’s National Amahoro Stadium “promoted the ideology of
national unity through representation of both Tutsi and Hutu victims of the
genocide”. The ceremony included the burial of 6,000 anonymous victims of
the genocide, as well as recognition of national heroes such as former Prime
Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana – the moderate Hutu politician who had
been slated to succeed Habyarimana (Burnet 2019; Guichaoua 2015,
pp. 214–20) – who was murdered by Hutu Power extremists on 7 April 1994
to eliminate resistance to the genocidal interim government they were form-
ing. This first commemoration aligned with the broader tendency in official
state discourse and Rwandan popular culture to reference itsembabwoko
n’itsembatsemba (“genocide and massacres”): phrasing that not only
acknowledged Tutsi victims of genocide, but also Hutu and Twa who were
murdered during the genocide for resisting Hutu Power ideology or by the
RPF as it wrested control of Rwanda, among other forms of political
violence (Burnet 2012, p. 20).
Meanwhile, across Rwanda the government partnered with formal and
informal genocide survivors’ associations that emerged shortly after the gen-
ocide ended – the most prominent of which is the umbrella organization
Ibuka founded in December 1995 – to create genocide burial grounds and
memorials in their communities. This set an important precedent for the
creation of small-scale genocide memorials throughout Rwanda, as well as
the larger national memorials that since 2007 have been administered by the
National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG). Ibreck
(2010, p. 336) argues that while survivors gained an important political plat-
form through these institutions and associated activities, they saw this early
memory work “as a response to loss and … first and foremost an expression
of grief and a practice of mourning”, a kind of “memory-justice” (see also
Viebach 2020, p. 240). Survivors’ organizations worked with the government
to locate mass graves and related sites where the Hutu Power extremists dis-
posed of their deceased victims’ bodies, and exhume, clean and rebury with
respect the human remains they found – an important form of “care-taking”
for survivors’ loved ones (Viebach 2019, p. 278; see also Major 2015, p. 165).
Fabrice, a child survivor of the massacre at Kibuye Roman Catholic
Church in western Rwanda, remembered the process in his community as
follows:
What we did is just to collect all the human remains, clean them and
bring them to the memorials. While collecting the bones, we didn’t
identify who those people were. Everybody treated the bones as though
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they belonged to his or her family. It was participatory work, where even
those who didn’t know where their people were buried contributed.
(Jessee 2012, p. 10)1
Vidal (2001, p. 4, author’s translation) argues that while such practices
represented a “radical symbolic rupture” from earlier Rwandan traditions
associated with respectful treatment of the dead, many survivors embraced
this change because they believed it served “an existential purpose: the will to
restore the deceased’s human dignity, a dignity that the instigators and per-
petrators of the genocide had denied both with their propaganda and by the
cruelty of the suffering they had inflicted upon their victims”. Which is not
to say, of course, that these exhumations were easy for the people who par-
ticipated in them. During fieldwork I conducted between 2007 and 2012,
most of the Rwandan survivors whom I interviewed recalled these exhuma-
tions, and the memorial sites at which the exhumed human remains were
eventually reburied, as sources of significant spiritual and emotional distress
(Jessee 2012, 2017, pp. 107–9). I found that this distress often persisted
despite the underlying intent of the exhumations to prevent the “ills, troubles
and misfortunes” that Rwandans feared would come from “deaths for which
funeral rites and formal mourning practices are not possible” (Bagilishya
2000, p. 347).
Indeed, the early commemorative initiatives around which these reburials
occurred often proved controversial and painful for Rwandans and con-
tributed to heightened tensions in many communities. A key source of ten-
sion, in addition to the challenges of exhuming and anonymizing Rwanda’s
countless mass graves, related to the tendency for these events to be inclusive
of the victims of the genocide and related mass atrocities in 1994. In Butare
in December 1994, for example, Vidal recalls that the Catholic diocese asked
its community to help create a list that included the names of Tutsi and Hutu
victims of the genocide and war. In doing so, it acknowledged that many
Rwandans would find this process challenging because it required a
“renouncement of the natural inclination to seek revenge”, but stressed that
it was essential to overcome the “evil” that had overwhelmed Rwanda (Vidal
2004, p. 2). This was followed by survivor-led efforts to disinter the
anonymous dead from local mass graves and to rebury them with respect.
Unsurprisingly, the diocese’s efforts to encourage recognition of the geno-
cide and related mass atrocities encountered challenges, including a persistent
silence within some communities when people were asked to divulge the
locations of mass graves. In October 1995, the diocese claimed that “the
refusal to divulge [the location of] these [mass graves] is due to the fear of
reprisals by genocide survivors or the authorities” (Vidal 2004, p. 4). When
they found mass graves and people were able to rebury the remains that they
exhumed, in the subsequent ceremonies “verbal abuse prevailed over
mourning”, as officials condemned the Hutu as a community for perpetrat-
ing genocide and survivors publicly accused the people whom they held
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responsible for torturing and/or murdering their loved ones (p. 2). Addition-
ally, the inclusion of public discussion of Hutu victims, especially those who
were allegedly murdered by the RPF’s military arm – the Rwandan Patriotic
Army (RPA) – soon triggered official disapproval. These crimes “were so
violently denied by the RPF that their evocation became the subject of a
taboo that was dangerous to transgress” (p. 4).
Thus, the Rwandan government was compelled to take control of exhu-
mations and resulting commemorative sites and activities, circumnavigating
the questionable authority of the Catholic Church in such matters (Kubai
2007; Longman 2010; Van Hoyweghen 1996). The government’s initial
involvement, however, fuelled controversy as it began to use prisoners –
including accused génocidaires – to exhume and transport human remains to
the sites of future memorials, even in instances where survivors had already
identified their murdered loved ones and held appropriate funerals. Vidal
(2004, p. 5) argued that the government’s methods created “a climate of
revenge more than a demand for justice”, which was then reinforced during
the 1996 national commemoration. While the previous year’s ceremony had
focused on Rwandan victims of all ethnicities, during the 1996 national
commemoration a Tutsi survivor gave his testimony, after which he began
pointing to people in the crowd who he claimed had killed (p. 7). Burnet
(2012, p. 101) argues that this ceremony set an important precedent for dis-
tinguishing Tutsi genocide victims and survivors from the RPF “rescuers”
and Hutu perpetrators – a pattern that persists to the present day, even as
other aspects of national commemorations have evolved.
Towards commemoration of the “1994 genocide against the Tutsi”
To this end, when I first started conducting fieldwork in Rwanda in 2007, the
nation was on the verge of a dramatic shift in official discourse related to the
genocide, as the government was introducing the exclusive terminology
Jenoside yakorewe Abatutsi (“the genocide against the Tutsi”). Martin Ngoga
(2020) – the former Prosecutor General for Rwanda and a former Special
Representative to the ICTR – argues that use of this terminology is sup-
ported by ICTR jurisprudence, while failing to use it “is dangerous as it
feeds into an already resurgent denialist movement in the region and inter-
nationally”. Similarly, Rwandan officials and survivors’ organizations often
cite a moral argument that equates the recognition of non-Tutsi victims of
the genocide, or the discussion of the other forms of political violence that
occurred around the 1994 genocide, with a kind of genocide denial (see, for
example, Rugira 2020).
This resulting shift in discourse was documented by Ibreck (2012, p. 103),
who concluded that it “alters the context in which the commemorations take
place and means that Tutsi victimhood is now securely established in public
discourse”. This was followed in 2009 by the CNLG’s decision to name the
annual official commemoration ceremony Kwibuka (“to remember”),
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accompanied by appropriate branding for the event. The associated activities,
and form and phrasing of the resulting signage and related souvenirs is
strictly controlled by the CNLG, which removes any materials that do not
conform. The effect is that “visual and aural reminders of ethnicity and vio-
lence appear overnight on 7 April and disappear just as quickly overnight on
3 July” (Baldwin 2019, p. 11).
The years immediately surrounding these amendments to the national
genocide commemoration in Rwanda were tense. As the Rwandan govern-
ment began use the media to sensitize Rwandans and the international com-
munity as to why the official label was more appropriate, Rwandans from a
range of backgrounds relative to the conflict expressed concerns. They feared
that this label obscured recognition of the Hutu and Twa political moderates
who were murdered from 6 April onwards, as well as the Hutu and Twa
civilians who were murdered for trying to resist the genocidal violence. It was
felt that such details ought to be highlighted rather than obscured if the goal
was to promote genuine national unity and reconciliation (Jessee 2017, pp. 51–
2). This concern arose amid the broader tensions people noted as the state
exercised increased authority over national commemorative sites and activ-
ities across Rwanda. For example, Consolée – an employee at one of the
national memorials – was initially dismissive of questions about the level of
public support for the memorials, arguing:
We [survivors] prefer our people to stay at memorials as physical evi-
dence of the genocide, and also we want people from abroad like you to
tell others what happened. We want our history to be remembered by the
younger generations of Rwandans and also by the entire world.
(p. 107)
However, Consolée later acknowledged that displaying human remains or
burying genocide victims in mass graves was culturally inappropriate and a
source of tension within her community, because these practices had been given
priority over even tentatively identifying the victims. She claimed to know many
people who believed that they were haunted by the disrespected spirits of family
members who had gone missing during the genocide, or were distressed by the
possibility that their loved ones might still be alive somewhere:
The harms come when a survivor thinks that maybe his or her people
have been eaten by wild dogs or have been buried in a disrespectful way,
or maybe they are still alive and are living somewhere else since you are
not really sure where they are buried … It happens to some people: you
may hear someone speaking to his or her relative who died. Most of the
cases are traumatized people. And also there are some people who
dream while they are awake. When you talk to them, they say they were
talking to their dead relatives.
(p. 108)
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Consolée concluded that if the government dedicated resources to locating,
identifying and allowing survivors to repatriate the anonymous victims of the
genocide according to their preferences – whether in single burials on ances-
tral land according to tradition or in the memorials – it would go a long way
towards repairing some of the psychological and spiritual damage endured
by genocide survivors.
Other memorial staff whom I interviewed were similarly divided on the
subject of the memorials’ prominent displays of human remains, though all
of them acknowledged its negative potential for those survivors who asso-
ciated “traditional” burials by their family’s standards with closure and
demonstrating respect for deceased loved ones. For example, Solange – a
young survivor who interpreted her work at a genocide memorial as essential
for preventing future bloodshed – was conflicted about the site’s graphic
displays of human remains. She maintained that it was important to show
visitors physical evidence of the genocide, noting that “I want people to
understand that genocide really happened, because some people doubt it ever
took place or deny it. My aim is to make them realize the enormity of what
happened” (Jessee 2017, p. 108). She defended the government’s decision to
display genocide victims’ remains or to inter them in mass graves, explaining:
In our tradition, when somebody dies, family and friends gather for the
burial ceremony. There is a specific number of days of mourning. Once
this period is past, the family returns to everyday business. It’s over. But
following genocide, you bury a person you are not even sure is your
relative. Sometimes you are told that your loved ones were thrown or
buried in a particular place and when you search, you don’t find them.
Sometimes you find body parts scattered all over, and you collect the
head here, the legs there … So what we do is we collect all remains and
bring them to the memorial. In essence, we are not in opposition to
tradition. We are just being practical, adapting to the special situation of
genocide.
However, Solange admitted that the government’s treatment of the anon-
ymous dead at the memorials had alienated the wider community where she
worked, particularly following the 2008 entry into force of a law that
required all genocide victims’ remains to be reburied at a local memorial
(Government of Rwanda 2008). For this reason, Solange alternated between
respecting the government’s decision to prioritize displaying human remains
as physical evidence of the genocide, and empathizing with those survivors
for whom the memorials had become a source of anguish, for forcing them
to interact with their dead in a manner that defied individual preferences for
the respectful treatment of the dead. Solange claimed she had, on occasion,
seen survivors take small bones and pieces of clothing from the memorial,
presumably with the intention of reburying them on their ancestral lands as a
means of facilitating closure or appeasing the angry spirits of their dead.
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And while she acknowledged that people were not supposed to speak about
such things, she also admitted that many members of her community,
regardless of ethnicity, were angered by the thought of Tutsi victims of the
genocide being buried alongside Hutu victims of RPA atrocities – particu-
larly alleged génocidaires who had been murdered by RPA troops – at the
memorials (see also Des Forges 1999, pp. 701–35).
Similar concerns emerged from the countless unrecorded casual conversations
and related ethnographic encounters that I have had with Rwandans from dif-
ferent ethnic backgrounds since 2007. A central theme within these conversa-
tions related to the possible negative impact that the displays of anonymous
human remains could have on the lives of the people who came into contact
with them. While over the years most of these displays have been protected
behind clear plastic or glass, prior to 2012 it was still common for bones to be
stacked on open shelves at the genocide memorials, so that visitors could pick
them up and examine them as evidence. When speaking with Rwandans about
Kwibuka, several people admitted that they feared the memorials because they
were worried about the consequences of coming into contact with the remains
of people whose blood had been shed in violence. I was frequently told that the
spirits of people who had died violent deaths were particularly dangerous,
because these angry spirits would lash out at anyone with whom they came in
contact – including their own surviving family members – if they felt their
remains were being treated disrespectfully. This belief seemed particularly pre-
valent among the convicted génocidaires I interviewed, who frequently refer-
enced the belief that the blood of their victims was capable of “chasing them”.
Three convicted génocidaires whom I interviewed in the prisons where they were
serving sentences for genocide-related crimes spoke at length about nightmares,
unpredictable mood swings and other psychological symptoms, which they
attributed to having come into direct contact with the blood of their victims
(Jessee 2017, p. 168).
I similarly encountered many Rwandans who avoided going to their local
memorials because they perceived these sites to be spiritually dangerous.
Such concerns were widespread across Rwanda, but seemed particularly
common among the people I encountered around Bisesero – where Tutsi
civilians launched a famous resistance against the Hutu Power extremists
during the genocide (Gasana 2019). There, I met several people who claimed
to have seen or experienced the negative effects of living alongside the angry
spirits of people who had died in the resistance. Boniface, a Hutu man who
had grown up in Bisesero, recalled that many people were afraid to go to
Bisesero because “maybe the ghosts of dead people [referring to the victims
of the genocide and related mass atrocities] would attack us”. However, he
also acknowledged that people sometimes feared these places because “after
the genocide, we though there were some killers [referring to Hutu Power
extremists] who were still killing people inside the forest, and also survivors
[referring to RPA combatants and genocide survivors] who wanted revenge
against us [referring to the local Hutu]”. When speaking with other
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community members, however, concerns regarding angry spirits seemed more
prominent than the risk of violence from Hutu Power extremists or vengeful
survivors, perhaps because these risks had dissipated over the years. Con-
versely, the threat from angry spirits seemed ongoing, inflicting a range of
mental and physical illnesses on community members who farmed in places
where victims’ bodies had been left, as well as allegedly causing infertility
among the cattle and goats that the locals attempted to rear. Some people
had continued farming in the area out of necessity. However, it seemed that
they had negotiated a fragile peace with the angry spirits, whom they were
quick to blame for any undue suffering.
These casual conversations touched upon an additional source of tension
associated with the memorials, namely the prospect that due to the absence of
definitive identification of the anonymous dead interred at the memorials, it was
likely that Tutsi victims of the genocide had been interred alongside the Tutsi,
Hutu and Twa victims of the mass atrocities perpetrated in the region in the
1990s, as evidence of the “1994 genocide against the Tutsi” (see also Guichaoua
2020, pp. 130–6; Straus 2019). Related concerns were shared with me by Rwan-
dans from a range of ethnic and political backgrounds in unrecorded conversa-
tions. Several survivors expressed overt horror at the idea that their missing and
murdered loved ones might be interred alongside the same people who mur-
dered them, and cited concerns that this might prevent the genocide’s “real vic-
tims” from finding peace in the afterlife. Interestingly, I found that several
bystanders and convicted génocidaires of Hutu heritage or mixed ethnicity
shared similar beliefs, but with anguish and resentment emerging from their
perception that their loved ones, who had died in the broader political violence
that occurred in the region in the 1990s, would never receive the same recogni-
tion afforded to Tutsi genocide victims. Indeed, the arrest and conviction of
Victoire Ingabire – a woman of mixed Rwandan heritage and a prominent
member of Rwanda’s political opposition – for minimizing the genocide, among
other allegations, was probably prompted by her 2010 speech at the Kigali
Genocide Memorial, during which she noted,
if we look at this memorial, it only stops at people who died during the
Tutsi genocide. It does not look at the other side – at the Hutus who
died during the genocide. Hutus who lost their people are also sad and
they think about their lost ones and wonder, ‘When will our dead ones
be remembered?’.
(Ingabire 2010; see also Al Jazeera 2018; BBC 2012)
Conclusion: the challenges of commemoration in authoritarian contexts
Unsurprisingly, given the myriad tensions that surround genocide com-
memoration in Rwanda, the nation’s state-funded memorials and com-
memorative activities remain in a state of flux. Some changes are in direct
response to feedback – both positive and negative – that the CNLG and the
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Rwandan government more generally has received from survivors. For example,
in response to concerns that working at the memorials was too challenging
for people who had survived, or whose loved ones had been murdered, the
Rwandan government introduced a training programme that provides mem-
orial staff with coping strategies for handling the negative psychological
consequences of long-term work at these sites (Jessee 2017, pp. 87–8). The
government has also increasingly funded improvements and/or renovations
of the nation’s smaller and more remote memorials, to ensure that evidence
of the genocide is preserved. This has typically included placing small dis-
plays of anonymous human remains behind clear plastic or glass, and
interring all other remains in coffins placed in cement-covered mass graves or
crypts, so that people no longer come into direct contact with human
remains. Where such improvements are impossible, smaller memorials are
incorporated into larger, more sustainable sites. These measures are informed
by the Rwandan government’s efforts since 2017 to promote agaciro (dig-
nity): a concept that also expresses state ambitions for Rwanda’s future
beyond commemoration (Bolin 2019). Simultaneously, policy analyst
Gretchen Baldwin (2019, p. 10) argues that, since 2014, the Rwandan
government has facilitated a shift “from larger, state-performed
commemoration events to more intimate community-based events”. This
allows people to engage with national commemoration in accordance with
their personal preferences, facilitating a more multilayered and dynamic
Kwibuka period. These changes support Ibreck’s (2012, p. 99) argument:
[T]he government cannot impose its authority through commemoration,
which necessarily is an opportunity for other voices to be heard. Official
efforts to cultivate a selective memory are successful only in part …
public memory serves as the focus for popular demands for justice and
rights and therefore acts as a channel for posing challenges to the regime.
However, concerns persist that, amid these important changes in com-
memorative practices, the Rwandan government continues to prioritize its
political interests at the expense of genuine national unity and reconciliation.
The state’s ongoing efforts to lobby the international community to adopt its
official label for the “1994 genocide against the Tutsi” continue to encounter
resistance, even as it meets with significant success. As part of these efforts, in
2012, the Rwandan government nominated the genocide memorials at Nya-
mata, Murambi Bisesero and Kigali to the UNESCO World Heritage List,
though UNESCO continues to deliberate their addition (Bolin 2020, p. 200;
UNESCO 2012). Extensive international lobbying by the Rwandan govern-
ment and various Rwandan survivors’ organizations subsequently prompted
the United Nations General Assembly, in 2018, to rename 7 April “the
International Day of Reflection on the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in
Rwanda”, even as it encourages participants to acknowledge the Hutu and
Twa who died in opposition to the genocide (United Nations 2018). Various
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nations are now debating whether to adopt this language in state discourse:
for example, in 2019 the Belgian government set an important precedent by
criminalizing denial of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi (Bizimungu 2019).
However, concerns persist internationally that uncritically adopting this label
contributes to obscuring non-Tutsi victims of the genocide, and silencing
people’s experiences of the broader human rights violations that surrounded
the genocide in the 1990s. For example, Baldwin concluded that the Rwandan
government’s current approach to commemoration reinforces “a survivor
nationalism diametrically opposed to the homogeneity of the rest of the year”,
by which she means official efforts to facilitate a shared national identity among
Rwandans through eschewing divisive ethnic labels (2019, p. 3).
The case of Rwanda thus raises provocative questions about the potential
for genuine social repair – a key intended outcome of transitional justice – to
be realized through official commemorative activities and sites, especially
when commemorations are informed by regimes that see no benefit to
acknowledging the complexity of people’s experiences surrounding genocide,
as well as broader atrocities that might have occurred in addition to genocide.
In other contexts, such as post-civil war Uganda, transitional justice scholars
have argued that creating culturally appropriate public spaces in which people
can talk about their complex first-hand experiences of violence allows story-
telling to restore social equilibrium (see, for example, Baines and Stewart
2011). More generally, anthropologists Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman
(2001, p. 6) have maintained that “[f]inding one’s voice in the making of one’s
history, the remaking of a world … is also a matter of being able to re-con-
textualize the narratives of devastation and generate new contexts through
which everyday life may become possible”. However, in considering the pos-
sibility that creating space for people to speak earnestly about their complex
experiences of genocide and related mass atrocities, it is important to heed
anthropologist Kirstin Doughty’s (2015, p. 432) warning that, while it might
be tempting to imagine that there are some post-conflict contexts “where a
kinder, gentler reconciliation can occur, absent power relations of age, gender,
class, or other forms of silencing”, in many contexts “the work of building
and rebuilding social networks among “intimate enemies” … is contentious,
suffused with hostility and instrumentality”. Thus, it is unlikely that official
commemorations and other collective forms of remembering mass atrocities,
whatever form they may take in future, will ever prove satisfying to every-
one – a point that transitional justice scholars and practitioners would do well
to remember in evaluating the “success” of efforts to promote social repair in
post-genocide contexts.
Note
1 All interviewees’ names have been replaced with pseudonyms in accordance with
their individual preferences and the terms of the informed consent process
underlying the author’s fieldwork in Rwanda.
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4 Victory celebration and the unmaking
of diversity in post-war Sri Lanka
Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
Eleven years after the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE or Tamil Tigers), the movement towards transitional justice in Sri
Lanka has been, at best, minimal. An Office of Missing Persons and an Office
for Reparations have been established, largely as a consequence of interna-
tional pressure. However, the narrative, in the main, has been one of continued
militarization of the civilian space and the shrinking of space for civil society
activity, the appointment of past and serving military officers in key civilian
positions, the acquisition of land in the minority provinces of the north and
east and the continued use of the Prevention of Terrorism legislation (Human
Rights Watch 2021; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
2021; Centre for Policy Alternatives 2021). Sri Lanka continues to be in a
post-war situation in which the guns have fallen silent, rather than in a post-
conflict situation in which the sources of conflict are no longer sustained and
reproduced. With the opening up of a new Sinhala-Muslim fault line, the
complex roots of conflict are being further nurtured and sustained.
What lies at the heart of the seeming intractability of conflict and the
daunting challenge of conflict transformation in Sri Lanka? The argument
has been advanced that one of the key outcomes of the government of Sri
Lanka’s military victory over the Tamil Tigers in the almost 30-year-long civil
war that ended in 2009 is the triumphalist assertion of the ethno-religious
political identity of the majority Sinhala community (Fernando 2013; Peiris
2018; Governeur 2010). In this chapter, I will argue that while this happened,
the assertion of this majority identity of Sinhala Buddhism has not been dis-
covered or invented on the heels of the military victory in 2009, but it has
been nurtured over a longer period. It has progressively come to reside at the
very heart of the majority community’s self-perception and, consequently, it
has become a key contributor to conflict and the sustenance thereof.
The triumphalist moment
The almost 30-year-long civil war came to an end in May 2009 with the
military victory of the Sri Lankan armed forces over the LTTE. However, at
this point, even the government maintained that the victory was a military
DOI: 10.4324/9781003167280-5
one and not a conclusive end to the ethnic conflict, which was a political
issue warranting a political settlement. Therefore, in May 2009, when the
guns fell silent, Sri Lanka did pass into a post-war phase but not a post-
conflict situation in which the roots of conflict could have been addressed
and overcome.
Irritated by frequent accusations of wartime human rights violations and
war crimes, the Rajapakse government adopted a triumphalist and assertive
role, both internationally and domestically. It was eager to present Sri Lanka
as one of the few countries, perhaps the only one – and what is more, a
country from the global South – to have defeated terrorism. Back at home
the government defined for itself the role of the defender of national sover-
eignty, security and territorial integrity, and the defender of all those who
were involved in the defeat of the LTTE.
The news that the LLTE had been defeated was greeted with an out-
pouring of relief and celebration in the south of the country where the Sin-
halese form the majority, with festive milk rice being served on the streets
and fireworks set off. Annual independence celebrations in the wake of the
defeat of the LTTE prominently include a march featuring the military
technology and hardware that were procured in order to win the war, as well
as the singing of the national anthem in Sinhala.1 Both major political par-
ties – the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and its allies, as well as the rival
United National Party (UNP) and theirs – shared in the main the position
that no one was going before any tribunal or court to face charges of war
crimes. Politicians from both sides vied with each other to proclaim their
nationalist credentials and offered to face any tribunal themselves on behalf
of the members of the security forces (International Crisis Group 2017).
There were attempts by the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime to consider the
initiation of a truth and reconciliation commission and discussions were held
with the South African government about how and why it should be estab-
lished. The South African President Jacob Zuma appointed his deputy, Cyril
Ramaphosa (now president of South Africa), as Special Envoy to Sri Lanka.
Ramaphosa visited Colombo in July 2014 and met with government leaders
and the Tamil National Alliance, but to no avail. The (hesitant) Sri Lankan
interest in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
might have been motivated by the TRC’s approach to amnesty, as the Sri
Lankan government sought to emphasize restorative justice rather than
retributive justice (Jayasuriya 2014; Anketell 2013) Perhaps there was a mis-
understanding of the South African process: in effect, the TRC had granted
amnesty only to 849 out of 7,112 applications, after full confession and tes-
timonies by both the perpetrators and the victims (Anketell 2013). The South
African position with regard to Sri Lanka was that the TRC could not be
cherry-picked from a series of recommendable measures for a political
settlement and reconciliation.
While ethno-religious nationalist fervour gained salience, the political
opposition of the UNP, its allies and sections of civil society were painted as
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being on the wrong side of the patriot/traitor divide and beholden to Western
politicians, who were assumed, in turn, to depend on the Tamil diaspora for
votes in their respective countries. In addition, the argument was made that
the West was envious of Sri Lanka for defeating terrorism. Even as it main-
tained this position, the Rajapaksa regime could not, however, ignore inter-
national opinion and responded in 2010 with the establishment of the
Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) (Groundviews
2011). However, the tardy implementation of its recommendations formed
the basis of the first US-sponsored resolution on Sri Lanka at the Geneva-
based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2012. From then
on, the UNHRC, where several US-sponsored resolutions on Sri Lanka were
presented during the 2012–14 sessions, became the site of increasing inter-
national contestation. The regime was not able to muster the majority it did
in 2009 to see off a critical resolution in the following years, except when it
co-sponsored the resolution in 2015. Opposition to it in Geneva gave the
Rajapaksa regime the grounds for renewing the claim that Sri Lanka was
being besieged internationally and therefore had to close ranks nationally.
A short window for transitional justice
By passing an 18th Amendment to the Constitution, Mahinda Rajapaksa
removed the two-term limit on the presidency, thereby allowing him to con-
test an unprecedented third term in 2015. The opposition parties settled on
Maithripala Sirisena, the Minister of Health and General Secretary of the
SLFP, as their joint candidate. Sirisena had unimpeachable Sinhala Buddhist
credentials and could bank on the votes of the minorities as well. Ranil
Wickremasinghe, the UNP leader and Leader of the Opposition, was held to
be too urban and insufficiently nationalist to hold a candle to Rajapaksa,
despite allegations of corruption and nepotism against Rajapaksa and his
family. The political space in this respect was bounded by the key require-
ment of the dominant ideology of the day – that the candidate had have
strong Sinhala Buddhist credentials.
Siresena defeated Rajapaksa in January 2015 and appointed Wickrema-
singhe as his prime minister. Rajapaksa, however, still garnered a consider-
able number of votes from the majority Sinhala Buddhist community. From
the outset, the differences in ideology, background and approach to govern-
ance between Siresena and Wickremasinghe made for an unstable and inde-
cisive government. This, along with Rajapaksa’s hold on the majority
community vote base, facilitated his re-entry into parliament in the general
election that followed in August of that year along with the founding of a
new party, the SLPP, under his leadership.
The Yahapalanaya (Good Governance) government that was in power
from January 2015 to November 2019 nevertheless marked a relative excep-
tion from the assertive Sinhala Buddhism promoted by the state. The Sir-
isena-Wickremesinghe government opened up a front for transitional justice
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and made a commitment to it at the UNHRC in late September 2015. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mangala Samaraweera, proposed to the Council
that the Sri Lankan government would establish four mechanisms of
transitional justice, namely the Office for Missing Persons, the Office for
Reparations, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and an
accountability commission headed by a special prosecutor, which would
include the proactive participation of foreign judges. The latter proposal was
met with a storm of protests about national sovereignty and of turning war
heroes into war criminals. It gave the Rajapaksas in opposition the argument
that they were the only political actors both willing and capable of defending
the national interest – defined, yet again, in relation to the interests of the
majority community.
In 2016, the government did, however, establish a Consultative Task Force
(CTF), composed entirely of civil society representatives, to ascertain the
views of the public on transitional justice and the four mechanisms it pro-
posed for its achievement. The CTF asked the government first to address
the people, share its vision of transitional justice and reconciliation and
explain why it was proposing these four mechanisms. The CTF did in fact
draft a speech for the president along these lines but it was never delivered,
perhaps because of the political environment of populist nationalism that
was prevalent at the time.
As part of the consultative process, the CTF sought to speak to key sta-
keholders and their representatives. However, attempts to consult the All
Ceylon Buddhist Congress were unsuccessful, although a number of monks
attended sessions of the CTF at the local level and spoke in particular about
the fate of hundreds of monks during the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(People’s Liberation Front) insurgencies that took place in the south of the
country in 1971 and 1988–90. Others were sympathetic to those who sought
to disrupt the activities of the CTF, fearing that it would disregard the con-
cerns of the Sinhala Buddhists and report back with preconceived recom-
mendations, or projected that going before the CTF was a waste of time and
energy.
The CTF eventually produced a 900-page report and over 45 recommen-
dations, in general and for each of the four mechanisms proposed. The final
report of the CTF was to be presented to President Sirisena, but this did not
happen and he did not attend the planned handover event. In its recom-
mendations based on consultations with the public – some 7,500 submissions
were received in all – the CTF recommended the development of an
accountability mechanism with at least one international judge sitting on the
bench, on account of the lack of trust and confidence in the Sri Lankan
judicial system. This was in conformity with Resolution 30/1 at the UNHRC,
which the Sri Lankan government co-sponsored. This recommendation was
picked out from among the 40 or so recommendations of the report and
rejected. Despite co-sponsoring the resolution in Geneva, the president and
prime minister, alongside other leading Sri Lankan politicians, were quick to
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make the point that no member of the armed forces would go before a court
or tribunal with foreign judges. This would be a blatant violation of Sri
Lanka’s sovereignty and national interest. Populist majoritarianism tri-
umphed. However, the Office of Missing Persons was established, as well as,
subsequently, an Office for Reparations.
In the 2018 local government elections, the SLPP swept to power in the Sin-
hala-dominated south. Following the Easter Sunday attacks on churches and
luxury hotels by an Islamic group in April 2019, and the government’s mis-
handling of the crisis, the coalition rapidly lost popular support. As the Sirisena-
Wickremasinghe government had restored the two-term limit on the presidency,
Mahinda Rajapaksa could not run for office although he was arguably the most
popular politician in the country, with political support accruing to him from
the disunity and indecisiveness of the Yahapalanaya government. Gotabaya
Rajapaksa, former Defence Secretary, brother of Mahinda Rajapakse and a key
architect of the victory against the LTTE, was the SLPP presidential candidate
in the election of November 2019, which he won with 52% of the vote. A gen-
eral election followed in August 2020, in the context of the coronavirus disease
(COVID-19) pandemic. The SLPP coalition secured a two-thirds’ majority in
parliament, dealing a final blow to the country’s short-lived experience of
considering transitional justice as a societal project.
New fault lines opening up: the Sinhala Buddhist–Muslim conflict
Apart from the massacre of Buddhist monks in Aranthalawa in 1987 and the
attack on the Dalada Maligawa (Temple of the Tooth) in 1998, aimed at
severely disrupting the 50th anniversary celebrations of independence, the
war between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE did not have an explicit
religious dimension to it. Most Sinhalese and Tamils are pantheists and Sri
Lankan Buddhist temples typically accord a place of veneration to Hindu
gods.
During the post-war period, however, another site of conflict opened up,
this time between the majority Sinhala Buddhist and Muslim communities.
This is encapsulated by the rise of the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS – Buddhist
Power Force) and its leader, the Venerable Galabodaaththe Gnanasara, and
the apparent sponsorship of the BBS by the Rajapaksa regime and the
Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa. The impunity afforded to the BBS,
despite laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Penal Code and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act available for
indictments in respect of hate speech and the incitement to violence, indicate
the regime’s belief in the notion of Sri Lanka as primarily a Sinhala Buddhist
country (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2015, 2018; Wickremesinhe and
Hattotuwa 2016). The idea of “unity in diversity” – of the country being
made up of a variety of communities different in their own way but wedded
to being integral to Sri Lanka – in fact a combination of autonomy and
interdependence, was abandoned by state officials. Indicative of this stance is
Victory celebration and the unmaking of diversity 55
that, in September 2014, notwithstanding violence perpetrated against Mus-
lims in Colombo, along the southern coast in Aluthgama and in the Central
Province – and despite protests against this violence – the Rajapaksa regime
allowed the BBS to invite the incendiary monk Ashin Wirathu from Myan-
mar to its convention in Colombo (South China Morning Post 2014; Srilal
2014; Schonthal and Walton 2016).
This anti-Muslim sentiment was exacerbated by the Easter Sunday bomb
attacks carried out by Muslim extremists, which cost over 250 lives. Sim-
mering tensions were blatantly manifested in the propaganda about Muslim
birth rates, halal certification of meat and other products, the reform of the
Muslim Marriages and Divorce Act and, most importantly after the Easter
Sunday carnage, the issue of wearing the hijab. Although the Easter Sunday
bombings were the work of a relatively small number of extremists and the
incompetence of the government of the day to act despite having been given
clear prior warning and evidence, the issue soon turned into an investigation
into the lifestyles and cultural practices of the entire Muslim community. A
fast to death by one monk, who had been a member of parliament, was
halted when the demand that Muslim ministers resign from the government
was met. Attempts by the opposition to keep alive the argument of unity in
diversity were grossly inadequate and insufficient, in a context in which the
notion of “One Sri Lanka”, united and undivided, was given overarching
prominence. That “One Sri Lanka” was defined, of course, according to the
terms and narrative of the majority Sinhala community.
During the COVID-19 pandemic the issue of the burial or cremation of
those who died from the virus arose and caused considerable concern within
the Muslim community. Up until March 2021, Sri Lanka did not permit the
burial of those who had died as a result of COVID-19 on the grounds that
this practice could affect groundwater levels and spread the virus. This stance
was contrary to World Health Organization guidelines and flew in the face of
local and international scientific opinion. The UN and other international
actors called upon the Sri Lankan government to reconsider its position.
Governmental committees were set up to resolve the issue and at the time of
writing, even though burial was permitted, controversy remained over the
location of such burials, leaving the Muslim community convinced that it
was being targeted and discriminated against yet again.
The politics of commemoration
As liberal influences within Sri Lankan politics have waned, Buddhism and
the Sangha (priesthood) has gained in salience as legitimizing and galvaniz-
ing agents of political affirmation and protest. Consequently, from the belief
that those in possession of the Sacred Tooth Relic of the Lord Buddha
should rule the country, each decade has seen the further legitimization of
Buddhism. This includes the Sangha’s participation in the Pancha Balave-
gaya (Five Great Forces) of the indigenous teachers, farmers, ayurvedic
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doctors, workers and monks that led to the victory of these forces espousing
“Sinhala Only” as the official language in 1956, and the monthly calendar
based on the full moon (which has significance in Buddhist texts), under
which all full moon days were made public holidays in the 1960s by the
Dudley Senanayake government. It also includes taking the presidential oath
of office in the Padirruppuwa (octagon) of the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy
in 1988 by Ranasinghe Premadasa and Gothabaya Rajapaksa’s inauguration,
just over three decades later, at the Ruvanveliseya, the iconic Buddhist temple
built by the legendary Sinhala hero Dutugemunu. Each of these, together
with the coupling of the offices of the president or prime minister with the
portfolio for the protection of the Buddha Sasana, attest to the political
perception of the indistinguishable nature of the interests of the Sinhala
community and Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Every attempt at constitutional
reform – even hints at reforming Article 9 of the Constitution which gives
Buddhism the foremost place and of declaring Sri Lanka to be a secular
state – has always been met with a storm of protest.
During and after the war, in the wake of allegations of war crimes and
crimes against humanity by the overwhelmingly Sinhala Buddhist Sri
Lankan government armed forces, there was also the belief that the Sinhala
Buddhists were the victims of an international conspiracy fuelled by the
Tamil diaspora (Rajapaksa 2011; Alagiah 2013; Athas 2009). This sustained
and nurtured a strong sense of beleaguerment on the part of the Sinhala
Buddhist majority (DeVotta 2016). In turn, this perception underpinned the
victories of Mahinda Rakapaksa in the presidential elections of 2005 and
2010, and of his brother Gotabaya in the presidential election of 2019, as the
only leaders who could resist Sinhala Buddhist victimization and protect the
majority community.
Apart from a few monks, the vast majority of the Buddhist Sangha did not
publicly state their aversion or condemnation of the war or the human rights
violations it spawned, but argued instead that it was a just war against ter-
rorism and the attempt to secede (see Zuhair 2016).2 Accordingly, following
the military victory against the Tamil Tigers in May 2009, President
Mahinda Rajapaksa was conferred the honour of Vishwa Keerti Sri Sinha-
ladhishwara (Universally Renowned Overlord of the Blessed Three Sinhala
Regions), jointly by the Karaka Sangha Sabhas of the Malwatta and Asgir-
iya chapters of the Siyam Maha Nikaya.3 Accepting the honour, the Pre-
sident noted that he considered himself most fortunate to receive such a high
accolade. He stated:
[T]he intention of the Maha Nayake Theras in conferring this honour was
to ensure that the united Motherland would be preserved and safeguarded
and I solemnly pledge before the Sacred Tooth Relic that I would never allow
the bifurcation of the united Motherland. [The distinction was bestowed on
me] for once again unifying my country under our National Lion flag.4
While the treatment of Tamils and Muslims after the war displayed no
predisposition towards reconciliation – with continuing disappearances and
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violation of human rights, land grabs, the engagement, if not the domination,
of the civilian economy in the north and the continued insistence on the
innocence of the military in respect of allegations of war crimes and crimes
against humanity – the affirmation of Sinhala Buddhist identity and its
dominance continued apace. The Rajapaksa regime decided to update the
historic Sinhala chronicle and epic poem about Sinhala rulers of the island
written by the monk Mahanama in the late fifth to early sixth century, the
Mahava-msa, with six new chapters, three of which were to be devoted to the
presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa (Adaderana 2011).
While public commemorations by the families of Tamils who had died in
the north and east of the country were banned on the grounds that they
constituted celebrative tributes to the LTTE dead, the stationing of the
security forces in the north and east, and the building of temples for their
worship, was a key part of post-war “reconciliation” by the Rajapaksa
regime (Fernando 2010). In June 2013, President Rajapaksa enshrined treas-
ures in the Sandahiru Maha Seya (Triumphant Pagoda), one of nine new
pagodas erected in each of the provinces of the island to commemorate the
war victory and the heroic soldiers who gave their lives to achieve it. Tamil
objections to the erection of Buddhist temples in the predominantly Hindu
part of the country were not heeded. In response, Tamils constructed Hindu
temples in the north on the grounds that the region was a predominantly
Hindu part of the country and had to be appear as such.
Most recently, in June 2020, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa established a
Presidential Task Force for Archaeological Heritage Management in the
Eastern Province, headed by Archaeological Aryachakravarthi Venerable
Ellawala Medhananda Thero, a Buddhist monk.5 The Task Force was nota-
bly mandated to identify sites of archaeological importance, restore identified
sites and antiquities, identify the land that should be allocated for archae-
ological sites, preserve the cultural value of archaeological sites and promote
the country’s heritage. No Tamil or Muslim members were appointed to the
Task Force in this multi-ethnic province. The assertion of the majoritarian
ethno-religious identity was clear, with the agenda of creating the appropriate
conditions for the marginalization of the minorities in the Eastern Province
and thereby securing it, politically, for the regime. The Venerable Medha-
nanda Thero stated that the goal of the Task Force was to examine and
identify some 2,000 sites of Buddhist heritage.
Conclusion
Transitional justice is unlikely to be delivered anywhere in full in the wake of
a military victory. In the Sri Lankan case, the question arises as to whether
any significant process of transitional justice can be instituted in the face of
the majority community’s deep and solid resistance to accountability in par-
ticular. While the Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency affirmed that the military
victory should be followed by a political settlement of the conflict, it became
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clear that the regime believed otherwise and looked to economic develop-
ment at best as the substitute for such a settlement. The process of transi-
tional justice was set aside. At the time of writing, following the victory of
Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the 2019 presidential election, key positions in gov-
ernment were staffed by serving and former armed forces personnel, some of
whom had allegations of war crimes against them. Those measures of tran-
sitional justice that had been instituted were largely a consequence of inter-
national pressure from the UNHRC and, apart from the period 2015–19,
served the purpose of buying time rather than a making a firm commitment
to transitional justice.
Buddhism provides an unimpeachable and otherworldly justification for
the privileging of Sinhala Buddhist identity in Sri Lanka. This, however,
belies some very secular concerns and fears that lead the majority commu-
nity to espouse it so stridently. In effect, Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism is
also a reaction and backlash against globalization, about the loosening of
identities and therefore of the threat to the distinctiveness of a community. It
provides a rationale and cover for holding onto economic power and
resources.
The new post-war conflict with the Muslim community, prior to the Easter
Sunday carnage of 2019, was largely targeted against its economic power and
resources. It was mainly Muslim-owned businesses that were targeted, and
the propaganda too was aimed at ensuring a boycott of Muslim business
establishments. The Muslim stake in the retail trade was at the heart of the
attacks about their distinctive cultural practices and of the hysteria about
reproductive rates, which were alleged to be the means to replace the major-
ity Sinhala Buddhist community with a Muslim one. It was not a fear of
secession, but rather of the usurpation of the majority community’s position
at the apex of the power hierarchy in the country.
As for the government’s annual commemorations of the military war vic-
tory, they serve to demonstrate the apex position of Sinhala Buddhist iden-
tity within the power hierarchy of the country. Everything else is to follow
from it and everything else is possible only to the extent that this apex posi-
tion is not disturbed but continues to be enshrined and acknowledged. As
Suren Raghavan, a scholar of the politics of Sinhala Buddhism, a former
governor of the Northern Province and an SLPP member of parliament
points out:
It is a sociological and psychological fact that Sinhalas, especially the
Saṅgha, are looking for a point of pride after three decades of humilia-
tion under a homegrown Tamil-armed rebellion led by a school dropout.
The LTTE not only came close to dividing the state, it was nearly suc-
cessful in permanently dismantling the majoritarian hegemonic mindset
of the Sinhala polity. Sinhalas as a regional and global minority take
pride in their steadfast resilient to hold Lanka as a Sinhala majority
Buddhist state even after some 450 years of harsh European
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colonization. What the LTTE – with its terror politics – tried to change
was not merely the unitary nature of Lanka but also the historicized
Sinhala Buddhist ethnoreligious national pride. Saṅgha as direct reci-
pients and beneficiaries in overcoming such ontological insecurities have
become the natural champions of a new order that will not only wipe
away such shame but also re-establish overarching control.6
What the military victory has done, with its dominant Sinhala Buddhist
idiom of celebration and commemoration, is to openly challenge and jettison
the idea of Sri Lanka as a plural, multi-ethnic and religious society founded
on the notion of “unity in diversity”. It has now been replaced by the idea of
a majoritarian society of Sinhala Buddhist primacy, with all the authoritarian
impulses and attitudes that it entails to secure and consolidate this idea.
Notes
1 Following the war, only in the latter years of the Yahapalanaya (Good Govern-
ance) government in power from 2015–19 was the national anthem sung in both
official languages, Sinhala and Tamil.
2 The scholarly monk Ven Walpola Rahula wrote with reference to the battle
between Sinhala Prince Dutugemunu and the Tamil Chola King Elara: “From this
time the patriotism and the religion of the Sinhalese became inseparably linked …
and assumed such overpowering proportions that both bhikkus and layman con-
sidered that even killing people in order to liberate the religion and the country
was not a heinous crime.” (Rahula Walpola 1946 and quoted in Zuhair 2016).
3 The title translates as the Universally Renowned Overlord of the Blessed Three
Sinhala Regions – the latter regions being Ruhuna, Pihita and Maya, each of
which was ruled by a separate king at the time of the Portuguese invasion in 1505.
The Malwatte and Asgiriya chapters are the two main “chapters” of the Sangha or
priesthood. The monasteries of the two main chapters have enjoyed the right,
upheld by the British colonial government, to make appointments to the major
Budddhist centres in the country.
4 Quoted in the Daily News, on Monday 25 May 2009 and in the Asian Tribune, on
Sunday 24 May 2009.
5 Suren Raghavan, “Sri Lanka: Towards a militant Sangha state”, 23 November
2013, www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/sri–lanka-towards–a–militant-sangha
-state.
6 Raghavan, Suren. “Sri Lanka: Towards a militant Sangha state”. Colombo Tele-
graph, 23 November 2013, www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/sri-lanka-towa
rds-a-militant-sangha-state.
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5 Social justice and the persistence of
racialized segregation
Kevin Durrheim and Amy Jo Murray
When the heady days of social transformation begin to recede into history,
they often leave behind a sense of bitter disappointment over lost opportu-
nities. This has certainly been the case in South Africa. The struggle for
change had been informed by cultivated ideals of justice, equality and non-
racialism, as expressed in the Freedom Charter of 1955. The process of
change was glorious: the liberation movements were unbanned; leaders
including Nelson Mandela were released from prison; joyous protests erupted
nationwide and democratic elections followed; resulting in the formation of a
representative government and the scrapping of apartheid legislation. There-
after began the gradual process of reshaping the ideology and demography of
the economy, the social body, and public and private institutions.
But the post-apartheid reality has continued to be marked by deep injus-
tices, inequalities, violence, racial division and conflict (Tshishonga 2019).
The murmuring of discontent is as loud as ever. It is carried through the air
via disparate voices of protest: fallist movements,1 factionalism, taxi wars,
service delivery protests and the resurgent right, to name but a few. The
murmuring is also felt in the ground, reverberating through the reality of
unemployment, murder, gender-based violence, racist attacks, hate speech,
unequal access to health, education and social services, income inequality,
xenophobia, and so on. Pain, anger, guilt, shame, desperation, disappoint-
ment and insecurity make a toxic brew of post-apartheid affect (Nyamnjoh
2016).
This chapter sets out with the ambition of explanation. What went wrong?
South Africans had good leaders, international support, good economic
years and a majority who were genuinely committed to change. How was it
possible to fail so badly? One avenue of enquiry, we propose, is the way new
patterns of segregation emerged from the ruins of apartheid. These took
shape from the substance of apartheid. Townships remained poor and
black – albeit with newly acquired municipal services in many instances.
Mushrooming informal settlements on the urban periphery also remained
deeply poor and black, and became increasingly pan-African. The old urban
centres, once the high-value real estate of capital and consumption, fell into
ruin and decay as the white inhabitants withdrew their persons and
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investments. At the same time, in the greatest collective investment and
expenditure of wealth in the history of the country, new sites of exclusivity
were built from the ground up. Exclusive estates and gated communities,
shopping malls, wine farms, office parks, and edge cities created new spaces
of residence, consumption, labour and leisure. The geography is not a replica
of the rigidly partitioned atlas of apartheid (Christopher 2000), but it echoes
the major themes. The post-apartheid geography offers many sites and
opportunities for inter-racial contact and exchange, but the reality is that
segregation persists both in structures and micro-ecologies.
In this chapter we briefly review the literature that shows why intergroup
contact can be a powerful vehicle for change, but why this potential is not
realized in persistently segregated contexts. We then focus on forms of
migration by which patterns of segregation are re-laid in contexts of trans-
formation. Migration and segregation create new spaces of exclusivity with
barriers to entry that help to preserve and re-establish (racialized) inequality.
They also help to produce a new aspirational and symbolic order that
undermines transformative justice.
Contact theory and the problem of segregation
Social scientists have long touted desegregation as a mechanism of social
change. As early as 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois (1903 p. 32) proclaimed that “the
problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line”. In his
haunting account of the colonial “European sector” and “Native sector”,
Fanon (1961) showed how inequality and a psychology of oppression took
shape around spatial segregation. Later, Pettigrew (1979 p. 122) described
segregation as a “structural lynchpin” of intergroup relations, which held
together prejudiced attitudes, discriminatory practices, norms of exclusion
and a slew of economic inequalities. Around the world, forms of segregation
based on ethnicity, religion, autochthony and class have evolved together
with racial segregation into a global tapestry of “color-lines” that have
persisted well into the twenty-first century.
Given the universality of the problem of segregation, it is unsurprising that
a substantial body of work within the social sciences has held desegregation
as an objective and ideal of transformative justice (Dixon et al. 2017). This
work gathered momentum during the civil rights movement in the USA in
the 1950s. Social scientists provided evidence to support the legal challenge
to school segregation in the US Supreme Court, showing the negative con-
sequences of segregation and potential positive effects of desegregation for
challenging racist attitudes (see Clark 1953). The message was clear: trans-
formative justice would only be achieved by desegregation – and the Supreme
Court Justices agreed!
A great deal of research over the past 70 years has supported the hypoth-
esis – formulated by Gordon Allport (1954) as the “contact hypothesis” –
that intergroup contact under optimal conditions (such as equal status
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cooperation) reduces intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Kende
et al. 2018). This work has progressively clarified the underlying mechanisms.
Contact is effective in reducing prejudice when it leads to common identifi-
cation (Gaertner et al. 1996), when it fosters intergroup empathy and reduces
anxiety (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008), and when it allows intergroup friend-
ships to develop (Turner et al. 2007). We also now understand that direct
contact is not necessary but that indirect contact with ingroup members who
have contact with outgroup members (Wright et al. 1997; Zhou et al. 2019),
or even imagining contact (Crisp and Turner 2009) with outgroup members,
can also have the effect of reducing prejudice. A recent meta-analysis con-
firms that contact interventions are effective for reducing prejudice in real
world settings outside of the lab (Lemmer and Wagner 2015).
However, over the years there have also been persistent nagging concerns,
especially for the efficacy of contact interventions in segregated societies and
societies in conflict (Dixon et al. 2005; Maoz 2011). First, negative contact
appears to be more powerful in promoting prejudice than positive contact is
in reducing it (Barlow et al. 2012). Second, although effective in reducing
prejudice, positive contact can also have a “sedative effect” undermining the
resolve of oppressed groups to engage in collective action and promote
change (Cakal et al. 2011; Dixon et al. 2007). This is especially important in
contexts like transformed South Africa, where new elites from the former
oppressed groups now have full access to racially integrated places and
institutions of economic privilege. Third, and most fundamentally, although
friendship and positive contact can promote positive change, the problem in
many societies is that such contact is hardly ever attained. Even when it is, or
when one experiences extended or imagined positive contact, its affects risk
being drowned by the negative experiences, stories and threats that pro-
liferate in socially, economically and institutionally conflicted and segregated
societies (Bettencourt et al. 2019).
Pettigrew and Hewstone (2017) have advocated for more sophisticated
technical and statistical solutions to these problems. They argue that better
studies, and multilevel analyses that take into account the effect of contextual
factors (e.g. structural, economic and political), will more clearly identify the
individual-level effects of contact on prejudice reduction. They believe that
such work will show that contact works and is an even more powerful
change agent than previously thought. However, this still leaves an open
question about how to promote social change in segregated societies. The
original impetus of contact research was societal transformation in the pur-
suit of social justice (Durrheim and Dixon 2018). Taking contextual factors
into account when modelling the effect of contact on attitudes is good sci-
ence but it is not sufficient in itself to address the political, economic,
geographic or psychological solutions to the problem of segregation.
With this objective in mind, we will consider how patterns of migration
and segregation work to set up broader attitudes and intergroup relations,
and when social change sets in motion practices of migration that undermine
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the creation of more social justice. We will use the work of I.D. MacCrone
(1933) to demonstrate the importance of migration and to paint a historical
background to the South African case. Our main message is that transfor-
mative justice (Evans 2016) is not accomplished by prejudice reduction –
although this would be ideal and contact can help – but by changing patterns
of migration which help to constitute the intergroup context.
Migration and race attitudes on the colonial frontier and beyond
MacCrone (1933) developed a historical and functional analysis of group
prejudice that underpinned apartheid. White prejudices fulfilled functions of
group preservation in the context they found themselves in as a minority in
Africa, and helped them to preserve their unity, identity and economic
interests (MacCrone 1933). These attitudes, he argues, had developed in a
specific context of intergroup contact between European settlers and African
autochthons. When the Dutch arrived to set up a fort and garden in the
Cape in 1652, under Dutch law, they were to leave the native people “undis-
turbed in their liberty and never enslaved” (p. 47). Nonetheless, the contact
situation of exploitative trade and land encroachment fostered an attitude of
“increasing dislike and contempt” (p. 47). Within 50 years, the local clans
had become so impoverished through their interactions with the European
settlers that they needed to be “supplied by the Company with cattle to tend
on shares” (MacCrone 1957, p. 82).
Later, in a quest for grazing land and independence, the settlement began
expanding outward as Europeans migrated into the interior. In the process, a
frontier was established. The frontier was less a boundary line than “the
outer edge of the wave – the meeting point between savagery and civiliza-
tion” (Turner, cited in MacCrone 1957, p. 99). It was here that the psycho-
social situation of the settler community developed. The frontier was a site of
ongoing expansion and disposition that produced an “atmosphere of war” in
which race attitudes assumed “extreme or exaggerated forms of expression”
(p. 125). The meaning of the racially charged slur “kaffir” was formed in this
context to refer to Africans as “savage, subhuman, treacherous, thieving,
indolent, merciless” (Arndt 2018, p. 74).
MacCrone argues that this psychosocial situation extended into the twen-
tieth century, carrying along its racist attitudes. Migration shifted from the
frontier as economic opportunities were found in towns and cities. As was
always the case, colonizers were dependent on the African population for
labour, but now the whites who settled in towns and cities attempted to reg-
ulate the migration of Africans into and out of cities. This culminated in the
“highest stage of white supremacy” (Cell 1982) – the apartheid system
(implemented from 1948 at the election of the National Party) – of pass
control, forced removals and rigid, universal de jure racial segregation. This
situation prompted something of an attitudinal inversion. In contrast to the
hostile frontier, apartheid discourse portrayed idyllic images of rural Africa
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and contented Africans, but viewed city life as a contaminating site for
Africans, and “dressed natives” as corrupted (Packard 1989).
The post-apartheid case
With the end of apartheid in 1994, through South Africa’s first fully demo-
cratic elections, came a process of transformational justice. Discourses of a
“Rainbow Nation” were promoted, presenting hopes of all South Africans
moving forward and working together to form a new, post-apartheid South
Africa where diversity, justice, freedom, equality, unity and inclusion would
become celebrated norms. South Africa would be transformed, especially in
the arena of social justice which had largely been undermined through
apartheid’s system of racial segregation and exclusion. Places of work, edu-
cation, leisure, commerce and residential communities were officially accessible
and open to all citizens.
However, the transition from apartheid through free and fair elections, and
mechanisms such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), did
not lead to social justice. As is discussed by Tim Murithi in Chapter 2 in this
volume, while the TRC succeeded in creating a platform for (some of) the
victims and perpetrators of apartheid horrors to speak out, it fell short of
instituting material changes in the fabric of South Africa’s profound social
inequalities, divisions and injustices. Its individualistic emphasis on perpe-
trators and victims, as well as the Commission’s commitment to steering
narratives towards peace and forgiveness, and away from anger, revenge or
outrage (Statman 2000), constrained the TRC from pursuing wider societal
reformations and re-imaginings. Today, South Africa remains a deeply
segregated, unjust society.
Migration in post-apartheid South Africa
Although forced segregation is a thing of the past, South Africa continues to
maintain informal racialized spaces through patterns of migration that
maintain privilege and exclusion. The right to freedom of movement in
public spaces after apartheid made it (theoretically) possible for all citizens to
migrate to and within urban centres, rapidly changing the racial profile of
South Africa’s towns and cities. Areas that had once been reserved for the
white minority were open to all. Apartheid government mechanisms that had
controlled the flow and subjects of migration were dismantled and new flows
and subjects emerged. Yet this migration into (previously) white spaces has
not always led to integration (Lemanski 2006).
As previously excluded groups entered public spaces, whites began a par-
allel migration, abandoning business and residential urban centres in favour
of suburban enclaves (Ballard 2004; Christopher 2000). These migrations (re)
produced patterns of segregation and inequality that were familiar elsewhere,
such as Farley’s (1978) depiction of the “chocolate city, vanilla suburbs”
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shows. “White flight” and the flight of capital are not uniquely South African
phenomena, but they have arisen from the specific context of colonization
and apartheid.
Material and institutional walls and violence that had previously kept the
constructed black “other” from entering the city limits were removed. But as
Africans now migrated into historically whites-only places and institutions,
they were confronted with racist attitudes that echoed the frontier. Employ-
ing discourses of crime, fear and increased ambiguity and insecurity (Dur-
ington 2009; Lemanski 2004), primarily (though not exclusively) white South
Africans have established measures to ensure improved safety and security in
the midst of perceived and actual urban municipal mismanagement (Ballard
and Jones 2015).
Soon these individualized practices produced more extreme forms of col-
lective control through the formation of and migration to gated communities
(Ballard and Jones 2015; Durington 2009; Lemanski 2004). Gated commu-
nities range from fortified and enclosed pre-existing neighbourhoods with
restricted street access through to the development of new residential com-
munities, in the form of eco-estates, golf estates and other lifestyle-themed
estates. In South Africa, luxury residential estates are the only residential
properties that have increased in value over the past ten years (New World
Wealth 2019a), making them very highly sought after among the elite. In
fact, only the USA has more residential estates than South Africa (New
World Wealth 2019b).
Gated communities are a worldwide phenomenon of middle- to upper-
class citizens retreating into enclaves for increased security, improved services
and decreased engagement with wider society, especially the urban poor
(Blakely and Snyder 1997; Blandy and Lister 2005; Low 2003). Yet these
fundamental features of gated communities take on particular meanings in
societies that have undergone political and socio-economic transformation,
as in the case of post-apartheid South Africa (Hook and Vrdoljak 2002;
Lemanski 2004). Indeed, there are concerns that gated communities “effec-
tively recreate the apartheid city and thwart post-apartheid goals of urban
integration and inclusion” (Lemanski et al. 2008, p. 135), especially in light
of the fact that more that 40% of South African individuals with a net worth
of US $1 million reside in some form of gated community or lifestyle estate
(New World Wealth 2019b). For many wealthy (primarily, but not exclu-
sively, white) South Africans, migration to gated communities is a symbolic
and material exercise of control and power in the face of ambiguity and
insecurity since the transition from apartheid (Ballard 2004; Hook and
Vrdoljak 2002; Lemanski 2004). The privatized regulation of such residences
through body corporates has facilitated a system of effective and insular
private governance that is perceived to contrast starkly with the municipal
(mis)management and politics of the outside world (Ballard and Jones 2014).
It also allows members of gated communities to divorce themselves from
civic responsibilities and engagement (Hook and Vrdoljak 2002). This leads
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Lemanski et al. (2008, p. 136) to argue that “gating in South Africa is per-
ceived as a means to wield one’s own power, as a private property owner,
rather than submit to the state, as a citizen”.
The new frontier
Socially, restricting access to gated communities enables “the exclusion of
strangers, often racially defined” (Ballard and Jones 2014, p. 297). In addi-
tion, “enclaves do not just respond to difference and fear, but actually deepen
segregation and reinforce fear by excluding difference and limiting social
mixing” (Lemanski 2004, p. 108). This racial and economic migration has
reinforced old privilege and exclusion, leading some to label the system of
gated communities as “the new apartheid” (Lemanski 2004). Within these
walls, the fear of crime, criminal others and outsiders has become even more
entrenched in their inhabitants’ social imagination. From the outside, those who
are excluded view migration behind walls as yet another rejection, another
form of distancing. It is a new frontier.
In addition to the migration of people, post-apartheid cities have seen a
movement of capital from urban centres that have largely been abandoned by
white residents, investment and business. This migration is exemplified by the
relocation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange from downtown Johannes-
burg to Sandton in 2000. While policies such as Black Economic Empower-
ment (BEE) have aimed to shift economic power from the minority white
elite to the black majority by giving Africans investment and employment
opportunities, this policy intervention – much like the TRC – has focused
largely on individuals and has not reached its goals. In implementing this
policy, the post-apartheid government held a tension between rapid economic
growth, which was largely controlled by white financial investment, and
economic redistribution through BEE or similar policies (Tangri and South-
all 2008). Corporate investment, which was largely driven by white interests
and capital, was given more prominence than policies such as BEE – which
has been described furthermore as impacting only a few well-connected
individuals instead of changing the underlying factors of socio-economic
inequality (Tangri and Southall 2008).
This has allowed white privilege to persist in an ostensibly desegregated
society. Symbolic and material luxury attached to capital have become bound
up with new spaces where the elite live and work: gated communities, office
parks and edge cities that are largely self-contained and separate from the
perceived disorder of city centres (Beavon 2004; Michel and Scott 2005). The
new decentralized urban spaces outside the old urban centre (Garreau 1991)
are vividly portrayed by Kitchin’s (cited in Michel and Scott 2005, p. 106)
description of La Lucia-Umhlanga Ridge (an edge city outside of Durban)
as “island(s) of wealth surrounded by a sea of poverty”.
While the migration of individuals to spaces that ensure greater safety and
security can be viewed as an exercise of free will, “its collective consequences
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produce a divided city, at odds with post-apartheid ideals of unity and
equality” (Lemanski et al. 2008, p. 133). Places such as gated communities
and edge cities are infused with migrations that lead to racialized segrega-
tion, which is highly consequential in a post-apartheid context. These are
places where the elite shop and the disempowered serve; where the elite live
and the subaltern clean; where the elite buy and own expensive cars and
the racialized poor use public transport to commute to and from places of
wealth and privilege where they work but do not seem to belong. Poor South
Africans migrate daily in and out of these spaces, while the wealthy (usually
white) residents retreat further into their enclaves to which they have per-
manently migrated, behind symbolic and material walls of exclusion and
privilege. All of this tends to more deeply segregate a society that is now a
mere shadow of what it had hoped to become.
Conclusion
South Africa’s history has been a story of divisions, as social groups have
created and contested frontiers that (re)inscribe power, privilege and prop-
erty. Although this has reproduced segregation – which is often the point of
interest for policymakers and researchers – in this chapter we have shifted
our focus from segregation to migration, the dynamic process by which
South African society and social attitudes have been formed. Segregation is a
snapshot of socio-spatial relations at a specific point in time, whereas
migration considers the ever-changing push and pull that keeps people
moving towards and away from each other. Migration describes a flow of
people, and the movement of social groups who act in relation to their social
worlds, establishing and maintaining frontiers that allow, restrict and avoid
contact.
The latest stage of this migration has (re)produced forms of segregation,
exclusion and distance that fly in the face of the founders of South Africa’s
new democracy. In the current post-Rainbow Nation era, we continue to
confront the realities of (racialized) privilege that migration instantiates and
that make social justice so elusive. Despite the transitional goals of unity and
integration, we continue to migrate away from racialized others as we live
and move in ways that echo the colonial and apartheid patterns of our his-
tory. As Rainbow Nation dreams become shadows, property laws and con-
stitutional values are continually circumnavigated by elite citizens as the
subaltern are left in slum-like conditions.
Any intergroup contact that occurs in South Africa necessarily occurs
within the broader assemblage of racialized privilege. Rather than looking to
inter-individual contact at specific moments, we have argued that we need to
look to histories of inter-group contact, which in the South African context
are embedded in a series of migrations. Social change – and social justice –
depend then on the ability to intervene in the forces that constrain intergroup
contact as patterns of daily lived experience. It might only be through radical
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economic reforms that the current flows of migration can be redirected.
Investment that is aimed at places and people who have been excluded from
social justice so far needs to be seriously considered, as an alternative to
investment into capital flows that only shore up more privilege, power and
property for racialized elites. The redistribution of capital on a broad scale,
not just among individuals but at community and corporate levels, is neces-
sary. If investment continues to focus on creating spaces of increasing luxury,
safety and security that only a few elites can enjoy, we risk recreating and
reproducing the apartheid era that continues to haunt us. We will essentially
become a society that has migrated away from social justice.
Note
1 Fallist movements are protest and awareness movements calling for the decoloni-
zation of education to illuminate the deep roots of white privilege in South Africa.
The fallist movements are led by predominantly black students and include
protests such as #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall (see Lishivha 2019).
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Transitional justice was born as a temporally limited, extraordinary measure
of justice that responded to catastrophic events. Over time, it has become
applicable to a variety of political conditions (Teitel 2003). In its current
manifestation, however, transitional justice still carries some of the aspects
that shaped its birth as an extraordinary form of justice that is time- and
context-bound. Given the particularity of its interventions, and their limited
and limiting temporal relevance, it is unsurprising that transitional justice
measures often draw on existing fault lines that remain entrenched in the
context within which they operate. This chapter speaks of the direct and
implied transitional justice measures prevalent in post-war Sri Lanka.
The three-decade-long civil war that unfolded in Sri Lanka was fought largely
between the Sri Lankan armed forces, generally seen as representing the Sinha-
lese ethnic majority group, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
which proclaimed itself the representative of the second largest community in
the country, the Tamils. Noting the discriminatory treatment of Tamil citizens,
the LTTE waged a guerrilla-type warfare against the state demanding territorial
and institutional autonomy for Tamils. Following several attempts at negotiated
settlements, the war was finally brought to an end in May 2009 through brutal
military action, which left many displaced, disabled, missing or dead. While
issues such as gender and class remain embedded in social structures, ethnicity
became the overdetermining factor of analysis, especially of the war (see Guna-
singhe 1984/1996). Fault lines that became socially entrenched in the context of
war took the form of particular ethnic cleavages. War-related issues faced by
Muslims, who are classified by their religious identity in a country in which
ethnicity takes centre stage, were largely ignored (Haniffa 2007; McGilvray and
Raheem 2007). Transitional justice measures largely focused on the two major
ethnic groups, Sinhalese and Tamils, often overlooking Muslim communities
affected by war (Haniffa 2015).
Communities that emerge during prolonged war are often forgotten during
the planning of the transitional justice processes. In long-term, large-scale dis-
placement for example, fresh relations are formed, and existing ones are
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reshaped, as groups abandon their homes and either continue to journey from
place to place or settle in surroundings different to their origins (on diaspora
communities see Orjuela 2020; see also Chapter 8 in this volume). The com-
munities that emerge from these relations are often ignored, and even if con-
sidered, are accounted for simplistically, erasing the complexity that their
social relations contain. All too often, architects of transitional justice
measures overlook how different generations experienced the war and how this
shapes their post-war demands. Sometimes these demands overlap across gen-
erations; at other times they deviate and complicate transitional justice
measures that are envisioned superficially with only one generation in mind.
In Sri Lanka, transitional justice has a contentious history, which can be
traced to the development of a troubled Sinhala Buddhist public conscious-
ness during and after the late stages of the war (Dewasiri 2020, see also
Chapter 4 in this volume). Post-war transitional justice has been marked by a
series of actions, including local and international commissions and reports
focused on wartime injustices, United Nations resolutions on Sri Lanka (co-
sponsored by the Lankan government for a short period of time from 2015–19),
attempts at amending the Constitution in ways that guarantee non-recurrence of
the conflict, alongside post-war development projects, with a focus on urban
regeneration and the tourism industry. All these were touted by local and
international state and non-state actors as panaceas to post-war recovery.
Directly related to transitional justice measures was the establishment of the
Office of Missing Persons in 2016 and the Office of Reparations in 2018.
These offices, however, are largely symbolic measures. Justice, truth-seeking,
accountability, reparations and institutional reform remain distant and
obscure to local communities, also because the very terms associated with
transitional justice that index particular legal procedures are reinterpreted by
both the state and local communities to fit specific imaginations of justice
(on reparations see de Mel and Kodikara 2018).
This chapter draws on fieldwork conducted in the Puttalam district, with
the Northern Muslims of Sri Lanka, to discuss the complexity of justice
measures in post-war settings. The case of the Northern Muslims is embed-
ded in the history of war but also has its particularities. The community
emerged during wartime, following the expulsion of Muslims living in the
Northern Province. In October 1990, all Muslims living in the northern
regions under LTTE control were expelled from the province on LTTE
orders, with some being permitted only two hours to vacate their homes
(Hasbullah 2001). Being formed into a community through the LTTE, rather
than through the aggression of the Sri Lankan state, Northern Muslims
trouble the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic binary along which the war is generally
articulated and analysed. Following their expulsion, a number of Muslims
from the North gravitated towards and settled in Puttalam, a coastal district
in the North-Western Province. Many of them continue to reside there. Over
time, the identity of displaced families who hailed from different regions and
villages in the North became sedimented into a communal Northern Muslim
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marker. As Thiranagama (2011) observes, the eviction order transformed the
Muslims of the North into the Northern Muslims. This marker also formed
a distinct socio-political identity through which this group’s collective
demands are articulated. For the Northern Muslims who have lived away
from their homes for over 30 years, displacement has become an orientation,
“a way of inhabiting the world” (Thiranagama 2011, 129). The prolonged
nature of their displacement means that second and third generations have
been born into the community. These generations make Northern Muslims’ call
for justice and redress complex and multidimensional. Thus, the very factors
that mark them – a community that was born of the specific event of wartime
expulsion, and lives in prolonged displacement with multiple generations –
often obscure Northern Muslims in transitional justice processes.
Following their expulsion, Northern Muslims were granted assistance by
host communities, donor organizations and, to a limited extent, the state. As
the Citizen’s Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern
Province by the LTTE in 1990 (2012) reports, the state provided dry rations
for this group until late 2010. Under the Unified Assistance Scheme, it
facilitated assistance to purchase land and housing on return but also, fol-
lowing an amendment to the scheme in 1995, upon relocation in Puttalam.
Later, the state worked alongside a World Bank project that commenced in
2007 to further facilitate housing schemes in Puttalam. Such assistance was
generally directly connected to access to state resources through ministerial
portfolios held by Muslim politicians. Therefore, the Commission report
notes the assistance provided to Northern Muslims alongside the political
affiliations of Muslim ministers and their relations with governments in
power. Yet, following the end of war in May 2009, as the needs of those
affected by the later stages of the war became urgent and pressing, Northern
Muslims were forgotten and marginalized as aid recipients (Haniffa 2015).
Where injustice such as expulsion has taken place decades ago, memory
becomes a form of validating the demand for rights and, in certain cases,
reparations. However, when memory is bound to justice in this way, the
transmission of memory onto the next generation can reinforce the duty to
remember for the sake of justice. This complicates the articulation of specific
needs and aspirations rooted in the complex experiences of new generations.
Inspired by Hirsch (2012), in this chapter I refer to generations that did not
directly experience expulsion yet live in its shadow as “postgenerations” (p. 4).
Such reference does not intend to collapse into one the experiences of all
successive generations. Instead it shows that, although postgenerations did
not face expulsion as a direct order, the impact of expulsion continues to
inscribe itself down the generations. I will also critique the assumed demar-
cation of postgenerations’ views from those of the first generation. For those
who experienced expulsion directly, it has become a temporally distant event,
overlaid by their everyday life in prolonged displacement. As the difficulty of
return confronts both those from first and successive generations, first gen-
erations too voice complex perspectives that overlap with those of
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postgenerations. Hence this chapter speaks of justice as inter-generational, as
located in the in-between spaces of generations.
Drawing on the concept of postmemory pioneered by Marianne Hirsch, I
will reflect on three selected sources of data, gathered during my larger
fieldwork between 2014 and 2016 in Puttalam, in and around the area of
Palavi, among resident Northern Muslims: (a) an interview with Abdullah
(pseudonym), a first-generation Northern Muslim above the age of 60; (b) a
four-part focus group discussion (FGD) with mainly women participants
from a range of ages, which concluded in the design and implementation of a
community-led artwork competition on the expulsion among postgeneration
children of school-going age; (c) a FGD with a group of six second-generation
Northern Muslim young adults, which explored the idea of home and the
option of return to the North. Reflecting on these three sources and partici-
pant observation from limited ethnographic work conducted at the field site,
this chapter first highlights postgenerations’ resistance to the expulsion as
their sole dominant postmemory. It then shows that these memories cannot
be completely displaced either, as they result in social, political and economic
consequences that could limit access to justice. I will argue that postgenera-
tions hold a variety of memories in tension, recognizing the interwoven
nature of remembering while resisting singular memories as definitive
descriptors of their community. This analysis highlights the complexity that
emerges when memory and justice are coupled across generations and sus-
tains the case for a nuanced understanding of how these elements play out in
transitional justice processes.
The concept of postmemory
In her most recent iteration of the concept, Hirsch defines postmemory as
follows:
Postmemory describes the relationship that the ‘generation after’ bears
to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma or transformation of
those who came before – to events that they ‘remember’ only by means
of the stories, images and behaviors among which they grew up. But
these events were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to
seem to constitute memories in their own right. Postmemory’s connec-
tion to the past is thus not actually mediated by recall, but by imagina-
tive investment, projection, and creation … To grow up with such
overwhelming inherited memories is to risk having one’s own life stories
displaced, even evacuated, by our ancestors. It is to be shaped, however
indirectly, by traumatic fragments of events that defy narrative recon-
struction and exceed comprehension. These events happened in the past,
but their effects continue into the present.
(2019, p. 172)
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For Hirsch, postmemory is distinct from the memory that stems from first-
hand experiences of trauma. She states that it is important to distinguish
between these two forms of memory so as to avoid appropriating experiences
of the first generation while not invalidating memory by proxy. Critiques of
her conceptualization of “generation” and the theorization of intergenera-
tional transfer of memory confined to family (Çalışkan 2019) urged a revised
definition of postmemory. Hirsch thereafter began to distinguish between
familial and affiliative postmemory, where the latter is not confined to
familial transfer but “can encompass a larger collective in an organic web of
transmission” (Hirsch 2019, p. 173). Affiliative postmemory therefore extends
the scope and reach of postmemory.
Of importance is not only Hirsch’s argument that postmemory can be so
powerful that it constitutes memories of one’s own, but also the idea that
these memories are sustained by “imaginative investment, projection, and
creation”, which is a deliberate form of remembering. For postgenerations,
especially when memory becomes an imperative for justice, memories of
previous generations can become a burden they are obliged to bear. Their
own hesitancy to remember or carry on certain memories may be margin-
alized. Postmemory can thus become a duty, which subsumes the complexity
of postgenerational experiences in its bid to remember a singular past.
Tied to Hirsch’s concept is Hoffman’s discussion of loss and its connection
to postgenerations. For Hoffman, it is “[t]ransferred loss, more than
transferred memory … [that] children of survivors inherit” (2010, p. 411).
She posits that the affective components of experiences – “the imprint of
various personal and historical experiences, as these are traced on individual
psyches and sensibilities” (pp. 407–8) – are transferred to successive genera-
tions. Condensations of loss that are transmitted through survivors’ psycho-
logical states become, for Hoffman, a second-generation condition. Drawing
on Freud, she also argues that, in order to move on from loss, one must first
know what was lost. Although second generations do not have an experience
of what was lost, dealing with transmitted loss can be all-consuming – which
is reminiscent of Hirsch’s argument. However, such experiences also hold
heuristic and educational potential. For Hoffman, the second generations’
condition offers a way forward that does not diminish or disregard loss, but
incorporates it into envisioning a transformed (collective) way of life.
Memory as connection and burden
The expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka by the
LTTE was a form of violence against a community. The eviction order
implied that Muslims did not belong in the North, in the Tamil nation-state
for which the LTTE claimed they fought. Reactions by expelled Muslims to
this extreme measure by the LTTE focused on emphasizing their right to
return to and live in the North. Over time, these reactions solidified as a need
to show binding connections to their origins. Memory – of expulsion, but
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also of harmonious, tolerant lived experiences in the North prior to expul-
sion – served this purpose. During interviews that I conducted in Puttalam
with respondents from the first generation of expelled Muslims, memories of
living on the land (the North) animated conversations about the past. Of
particular interest is the interview with Abdullah, who was a retired educator
and leader in the community. He was resident in Puttalam although he ori-
ginally hailed from the Mannar District of the Northern Province. Abdullah
spoke of some personal experiences, but during most of the interview he
adopted the perspective of a spokesperson for the community. Consequently,
this interview took the shape of a vehicle for communal memories. Abdul-
lah’s use of the word piLLai (“child”) in Tamil, to address me or to tag his
sentence, gave an added veneer to the transmission of memories, as Abdullah
saw in me a younger woman migrant from a different community, a person
interested in the histories and experiences of Northern Muslims unlike most
youth from the postgenerations he encountered in Puttalam.
In reference to return and postgenerations, Abdullah says:
After ’90, it is the children born here [in Puttalam] who are getting married
now. Those children have no thought for that village [in Mannar]. They
think only of this village, the facilities and opportunities in this village … I
don’t also criticize them. But … we go there [to Mannar] … our goods are
there – our goods are all there, right? Our coconut fields, paddy fields are all
in that place. It is people like us [from the first generation] who go and tend
to it [property] or look after it … These children … they ask “where are
you taking us?” As soon as we came here if we asked “shall we go to
Kandy?”, they say “yes”, if we ask “shall we go to Mannar?”, they ask
“what is there?” … It [Kandy] has an attraction to those who go there.
What attraction does it have for us? Our interest lies in seeing our village,
we go to the area of our village as we have our lands and properties, we will
see those things. Now my goods, thank God, still remain, it is hereditarily
ours. None of my sons are interested in it … They were married there, have
had children here and if our grandson is sitting for the G.C.E. O/L here in
the English medium, what interest will he have in it? Is it the village he was
born in? No, right! So if Appa [reference here to grandfather] was born
there, Appa was born there, that is … history. That is history … They are
not personally interested, no?
For Abdullah, postgenerations have no vested interest in their origins. Yet he
provides a nuanced understanding of the circumstances under which such a
lack of interest is displayed. For the first generation, continued ties to the
land lie in their memories and assets that remain. For postgenerations, the
same memory cannot animate rootedness in the North. When memory serves
as a connection to what was left behind, postgenerations struggle to relate
their own experiences to the loss experienced by those who precede them, as
they themselves have no tangible memory of living in the North. As Hirsch
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argues, memories of the first generation tend to displace one’s own memories
in postgenerations and replace them with ones that were transferred by the
first generation. What we see here, however, is a resistance to such memories,
and the acknowledgement of this resistance by the first generation.
If those of the first generation recognize that their memories are burden-
some to later generations, why is their renunciation by postgenerations pro-
blematic? Often, resistance to postmemory is understood as willful
“forgetting”: that is, a deliberate displacement of memories from the past. The
sections that follow question this simplistic understanding, by bringing into the
picture two factors that complicate Northern Muslim postgenerations’ resis-
tance to postmemory: they remain socially marked by the experience of pre-
vious generations and they hold a transgenerational right to redress. These
factors highlight the complex subject positions articulated by respondents
when dealing with postmemory and problematize “moving on” as supplanting
past memories. They also challenge an understanding of remembering and
forgetting as a binary opposition. Engaging with these factors therefore urges a
deeper conceptual engagement with justice and memory.
Social markers of trans-generational experiences
Even if postgenerations may wish to move away from remembering expulsion
as a dominant narrative, they remain socially marked by the experiences of
their ancestors. This is apparent in interviews with respondents, but also in
the four-part FGD that concluded in the community-led intervention of an
art competition. In the first of the FGDs, participants discussed whether the
intervention should be about remembering the past or “moving on”. During
this conversation a female participant voiced the following opinion:
We were displaced in ’90 and came [here]. We are the refugees. Our
children are not refugees … they resist the “refugee” label. They don’t
fear as much as we do. Because from their birth certificate onwards,
everything is [registered] here.
This participant voices an important tag that continues to haunt post-
generations – ahathi (refugee). Used indiscriminately in Tamil to refer to both
the internally displaced and the stateless, this label is complex. On the one hand,
it enables a political and humanitarian demand that forces the state to
recognize Northern Muslims’ right to return (Surenthiraraj and de Mel
2019). On the other hand, it hinders meaningful social integration of the
Northern Muslims and their postgenerations who wish to remain in
Puttalam into the district’s populace (Brun 2003, 2008). In the extract above,
the continued use of the word “refugee” to label postgenerations is resisted
by a first-generation participant. A similar sentiment was echoed by another
woman during the second of the four-part FGDs:
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But from now onwards it should be [our goal] to eliminate that refugee
label. It is not an issue for us, but we have children. They are registrants
of Puttalam. They didn’t come [here] as refugees! They were born in
Puttalam, studied and grew up all in Puttalam. When they go some-
where there is no necessity to inquire if they are refugees [or not]! …
Though [those] children are born in Puttalam – when they go somewhere
and are asked “where are you from?” those children say “Puttalam”.
[When they are asked] “then where are your mother and father from?”
they say “Mannar”, [then they are asked] “then are you a refugee?” The
label returns, the refugee label.
Both of these women who resist the social marking of postgenerations as
“refugees” are first-generation Northern Muslims. Here we find an acknowl-
edgement by them that the experiences of their descendants are different to
their own. Yet in social settings postgenerations carry this weight which
places their own experiences in the shadow of those of their predecessors.
Second-generation Northern Muslims offered a complementary narrative to
the sentiments expressed. In an FGD conducted with a group of six second-
generation respondents, when the question of home emerged, two women
expressed the following thoughts:
E: We are not in the state of mind yet to accept Puttalam as our home-
town … although [I was] born and raised here, I cannot accept this [as
my home].
B: But when we are outside [the district], we say [we are from] Puttalam.
There is some attachment in saying [we are from] Puttalam. Inside [the
district] there are confrontations with Puttalam people.
Second-generation Northern Muslims typically experience oscillation
between two locations. For them, postmemory remains strong enough that
they still acknowledge the North as their home, in spite of being born and
raised in Puttalam. However, they also display a firm attachment to Putta-
lam, given that their experiences are rooted in this locality. Their experience
nuances an outright rejection of postmemory, and offers instead a spectrum
of responses that holds multiple memories that are in tension with each
other. They refuse a binary reaction to remembering or forgetting the
experiences of their predecessors, asking instead for a nuanced process of
remembering the distant past while not overlooking the more recent one.
Memory and right to redress
Returning to the question of resisting postmemories, a second source of
complication is that justice in the present remains connected to the past. In
this sense, it is important that memories are transmitted and retained actively
as pathways to reparations. Redress can be material or symbolic, and
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accessible whether one chooses to return to the North and/or remain in
Puttalam. Materially, it can be compensation for loss of assets, and
symbolically it can mean belonging and therefore having the right to return.
During the interview with Abdullah he articulates the dilemma of
remembering as follows:
Now everyone has put up [settled] here [in Puttalam], has gone to school
here, has friends here, has married here. After this it has come to a state
where they ask is there such a village [in Mannar], is there such a place.
But at the same time we cannot lose the land on which we were born [in
the North]! Cannot lose our heritage!
Here, Abdullah formulates a link between remembering and land. Land was
a symbol of autonomy in the war between the LTTE and Sri Lanka govern-
ment armed forces, and the demand for a geographic territory for Tamils
became a significant demand of the LTTE. Post-war, it continues to occupy
discussions in relation to Sri Lanka’s constitutional amendments. Land
remains a symbol of belonging and a path to citizenship rights. It is thereby a
terrain on which communities’ demands for recognition and transitional jus-
tice are articulated (see Fonseka and Raheem 2011; People’s Alliance for
Right to Land 2020).
Land in this context speaks to both material and symbolic belonging. The
crux of the argument Abdullah makes is that if memories are not transferred
to successive generations, land and all that it entails will be lost to the evicted
Northern Muslims. He does not deny that for generations born and raised in
Puttalam memories of the North are vague. However, in a system that links
justice to the past, the transmission of memories remains crucial to accessing
compensation for loss, whether one chooses to return and/or remain. For
postgenerations who struggle between maintaining a transferred memory of
origins and their own lived memories in Puttalam, such a linking of justice
and remembering to achieve redress for past atrocities remains fraught. Their
resistance to postmemory thus becomes complicated, as the right to material
and symbolic compensation remain tied to actively remembering and
emphasizing the event of expulsion.
The decision to return to the North and/or to remain in Puttalam further
complicates this link between memory and justice. In the community-led
intervention discussed earlier, the tension between choosing to remember the
expulsion or not, and how and what to remember exactly, marked the entire
process of its planning. In the first of the four-part preparatory FGDs it was
suggested that the resulting intervention should involve children. Discussions
thereafter circled around how much attention should be given to the event of
expulsion itself, and whether it was opening up old wounds that would be
transferred to children, who did not experience the event themselves. Parallel
to this discussion was the need to recognize the current situation in Puttalam
and that the intervention should be future-oriented. The intervention
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eventually became an artwork competition for children. Thematically it
married the past to the present, touching on displacement but recognizing
the generosity of the host community in the Puttalam district in sharing their
resources with the Northerners.
The conversations that took place during the FGDs reveal the tension that
exists between remembering the North and focusing on Puttalam. For the
group that wishes to remain in Puttalam, the memories of living in there
takes precedence over memories of the North. Their views overlap, but also
diverge from those who wish to return to the North. According to the gen-
eral perspective, however, among the postgeneration, the latter seems to be a
small minority. For example, in the FGD conducted with second-generation
Northern Muslims, of the six participants involved, only one woman expres-
sed a wish to return to the North. For those from postgenerations who wish
to return, however, transmission of memories are important facets of access
to the North, as these memories support their right to live in this province.
They also facilitate their transition and settlement as individuals from post-
generations who choose to return, but who have no personal memories of the
North that they can draw upon to support this process. Therefore, their
desire to return forms around their parents’ memories, helping them to
navigate their transition to the North. Return based on memory is not
without its problems. Discrimination against Muslims grows on segregated
experiences of public life that were present previously. Return is complicated,
therefore, not only because of the changed demographics and landscape of
the North – which have been transformed significantly due to war, internal
displacement and more recent post-war reconstruction – but also because of
segregated ethnocentric living patterns (see Thiranagama 2018). However, as
postmemory remains tied to the justice of return, Northern Muslim post-
generations are unable to completely discard memories of living in the North.
Expulsion, and subsequently living in displacement without abandoning the
idea of – and the right to – return, constitute their condition.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the complexity of remembering by focusing
on memories transferred to postgenerations of Northern Muslims in Sri
Lanka. While the first generation recognizes the resistance of postgenerations
to the memory of wartime expulsion and the experiences surrounding this
event, such resistance does not simply mean a displacement of the dominant
memories of expulsion, as these are linked to justice and access to rights and
reparations that stem from the original event. Northern Muslims offer,
instead, complex subject positions as a response to the hegemonic influence
of this postmemory. They recognize that memories of and around expulsion
are part of a network of multiple interlinked memories, which are potentially
in tension with each other. In this way, they counter the effects of a dominant
memory on expulsion at risk of displacing their own lived experiences.
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In arguing the above, the chapter troubles the coupling of justice with
memory in transitional justice processes. The experiences of the Northern
Muslims in Sri Lanka pose a challenge to this coupling. For them, access to
justice requires that memories be transmitted to the next generation, as these
memories are crucial to the demand for redress. However, such transfers can
also result in sustaining memories related to expulsion from the North as the
dominant form of memory, over-shadowing memories of living in Puttalam.
Northern Muslims navigate this dilemma by presenting a complex under-
standing of, and critical engagement with, remembering. Their responses can
inspire scholars and practitioners willing to engage more deeply with the
entangled nature of the different pillars of transitional justice and to develop
a more holistic approach to how the notions of memory and justice are
understood and mobilized in post-war situations.
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Xenophobia, nationalism and struggle
post-transition
Philippa Kerr and John Dixon
Introduction
A negative moment is one where new antagonisms emerge while old ones
remain unresolved.
(Mbembe 2015)
Transitional justice often involves erstwhile victims of unjust regimes taking
over political power from their former persecutors. At the end of apart-
heid in South Africa, this transition happened in a “negotiated revolution”
when members of the banned African National Congress (ANC) began to
meet in secret with members of the National Party in the late 1980s. The
eventual outcome of these negotiations was the unbanning of the ANC and
other political parties in 1990, the release of Nelson Mandela and other
political prisoners, the adoption of an interim Constitution, and, eventually,
the first democratic elections in 1994, which ushered in an ANC government
(Jung and Shapiro 1995).
But, in the years that followed, South Africa had to address the question
of how to “deal with the unfinished business of the past” (O’Connell
2018, p. 33). This is perhaps the classic transitional justice question. Most
studies of transitional justice practices in South Africa have tended to focus
on the work and aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) which operated between 1996 and 1998 (e.g. van Zyl 1999; Mamdani
2002; Gready 2011). The TRC’s mandate was to hear and record the testi-
monies of people who had been victims of gross human rights violations
during apartheid, specifically in the period between 1960 and 1994. Perpe-
trators of these crimes could also apply to the TRC for amnesty, in exchange
for telling the whole truth, in public hearings, of what they had done, and if
they could establish that the crimes had been politically motivated.
While the TRC process enabled many ugly truths, especially of the late
apartheid years, to come to light, criticisms were levelled at the TRC by vic-
tims and their families who believed that the emphasis on truth and amnesty
essentially avoided justice (cf. Mamdani 2002). Others have criticized the
TRC’s limited ability to address the broader structural violence that black
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South Africans who suffered under the old regime continue to suffer in the
new dispensation (Gready and Robins 2014; Evans 2016; cf. Madlingozi
2017). Between 1995 and 2014, under the ANC government, unemployment
in South Africa rose from 15% to 27% (using a conservative definition of
unemployment; a more expansive one puts the figure in the high 30s) (Jonas
2018). This burden of unemployment is borne highly disproportionately by
black people. Madlingozi (2017) has argued that South Africa is in a time of
“neo-apartheid constitutionalism”, a term which is used intentionally to “call
attention to the fact that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements are
transforming society in ways that do not instantiate a fundamental rupture
with [apartheid]” (p. 125). Continuing residential racial segregation, a skewed
distribution of wealth in favour of white South Africans, coupled with dete-
riorating health and education systems and systemic corruption in govern-
ment and state-owned enterprises means that the post-apartheid period has
not been a prosperous one for most black communities.
The purpose of this chapter is not to examine the TRC or other specific
transitional justice mechanisms in South Africa in detail, nor is it to offer a
critique of the lack of transformative justice and substantive socio-economic
redress in the TRC’s aftermath – others have already ably done this (e.g.
Gready and Robins 2014; Evans 2016; see also Chapters 2 and 5 in this
volume). Rather, it is to draw attention to a new form of collective violence
that emerged after apartheid – the phenomenon of anti-immigrant violence –
and to raise questions about how this violence is legitimated in the democratic
human rights era. At around the same time as the TRC was concluding its
work and submitting its final report, the first academic studies started to
appear on a new form of violence and discrimination against mainly African,
and to some extent Asian, immigrants, which they named xenophobia (e.g.
Crush 2000; Harris 2002; Vale 2002; for an account of the emergence of this
term in the media, see Palmary 2016). In May 2008, xenophobic violence
exploded around the country, with attacks on foreign communities beginning
in Alexandra township in Johannesburg and spreading rapidly to other cities.
This violence left at least 62 deaths in its wake, and displaced up to 100,000
people, many into temporary camps for internally displaced persons (Landau
2011). Perhaps the most infamous image to circulate in the media was of a
Mozambican man, Ernesto Nhamuave, burning to death after being set
alight by South African attackers. The case for Nhamuave’s murder was
closed without identifying any suspects and no one was ever arrested (Tromp
2015), but Nhamuave is not the only foreign national to have been killed by
burning (Misago 2016).
These attacks “provided a forceful contrast to the work of reconciliation
that had taken place just a decade earlier, work that was central to articu-
lating a human rights framework for post-apartheid South Africa” (Solomon
2019, p. 156). By 2010, there were still very few successful convictions for the
62 alleged murders and hundreds of other crimes committed during May
2008 (South Africa Human Rights Commission, cited in Breen and Nel
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2011, p. 41). In 2015, there was another spike in anti-immigrant violence that
led to at least ten deaths. It is likely that these attacks were provoked by the
Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, who made a notorious speech at a
“moral regeneration” event during which he compared immigrants to lice
and called on them to “pack their bags and go back where they came from”
(Zwelithini 2015). In fact, xenophobic violence is chronic and ongoing, and
every year after May 2008 there have been at least as many murders of for-
eign nationals as there were in that month (Landau 2015; Misago 2016). In
general, the government response to xenophobic violence has been weak and
denialist, with many politicians claiming that these incidents are “merely
crime” and not “xenophobia” (Crush and Ramachandran 2014; Misago
2016). Also, until very recently South Africa lacked specific hate-crime
legislation, making it difficult for the police and criminal justice system to
identify xenophobic motives (Breen and Nel 2011; Breen et al. 2016).
But 2015 was also a year that saw many black university students calling
for decolonization and the end of white privilege in South African uni-
versities under the banner of #RhodesMustFall and other related student
movements. Black students and academics calling for decolonization – in
some cases, supported by white peers and colleagues – argued that uni-
versities continued to be colonial in their character and curricula (Heleta
2016); that the state “transformation” programme had evidently failed to
undo the anti-black structure not only of universities, but also of the econ-
omy and society; and that more radical decolonization was now needed
instead (Naidoo 2015; Madlingozi 2017; cf. Mbembe 2015). Black pain,
black rage and the unacceptability of black poverty were some of the defin-
ing tropes of the decolonization discourse, illustrated powerfully when Chu-
mani Maxwele threw a container of human faeces, collected from bucket
toilets in poverty-stricken shanty towns around Cape Town, onto the statue
of Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT). Rhodes was a
British empire builder in 19th-century Southern Africa, a diamond mining
magnate and governor of the Cape Colony between 1890 and 1896. UCT is
built on land he owned and bequeathed in his will to the public of South
Africa. In these and other protests, students expressed anger that not only
the statue of Rhodes, in its prominent position at UCT, but numerous other
statues and memorials on university campuses also glorified racist white
politicians and educators.
New antagonisms
And so it was that in 2015, a year of both calls for decolonization and of
anti-immigrant attacks, philosopher and political theorist Achille Mbembe
observed that South Africa had entered a “negative moment”, where “new
antagonisms emerge while old ones remain unresolved” (2015). Mbembe,
who is affiliated with the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg
and was involved in negotiations with students during protests there in 2015–
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16 (Habib 2018), is himself originally from Cameroon. He went on to
elaborate:
Today many want to finally bring white supremacy to its knees. But the
same seem to go missing when it comes to publically [sic] condemning
the extra-judicial executions of fellow Africans on the streets of our cities
and in our townships. As Fanon intimated, they see no contradiction
between wanting to topple white supremacy and being anti-racist while
succumbing to the sirens of isolationism and national-chauvinism.
(Mbembe 2015)
One of the authors of this chapter (Kerr) witnessed this contradiction at
UCT while teaching there temporarily in 2016. Students continuing the
momentum of the 2015 protests called for free decolonized education and
attempted to shut down the university and prevent the completion of the
academic year in order to force the institution to capitulate to their demands.
These protests featured mass meetings with a well-known speaker and an
audience of students and staff. At one such meeting that I attended, an aca-
demic who was a supporter of the student movement and an outspoken
proponent of decolonization stood up to speak. Although I no longer
remember the details of his whole speech, it ended by singling out the foreign
African security guards employed by the private security company which the
university had, controversially, contracted to protect the university buildings
and enable the continuation of the academic programme. Not a single person
spoke up or called out in the meeting that this was xenophobia. Almost the
whole meeting then left the hall, apparently to go and confront the foreign
security guards. It took me some time to fully realize that what had just
happened was an example of an incitement to anti-immigrant violence at a
public meeting, couched in the language of legitimate struggle which I had
by then read and heard so much about in my own studies on xenophobia.
No one asked what purpose would be served by attacking the lowliest
employees of the security company, rather than, for instance, confronting the
university administrators responsible for contracting it.
This chapter is about that “new antagonism” – the phenomenon of anti-
immigrant or xenophobic violence – which emerged after apartheid while the
“old antagonism” of racial inequality among South African citizens was still
unresolved. It presents a conundrum to the transitional justice paradigm:
how can we understand new forms of post-transition violence and victimi-
zation which are not simply a straightforward continuation of the violence of
the old era, but in fact draw on some of the languages and practices of lib-
eration struggle and transitional justice? Indeed, we will argue that the co-
occurrence of these two imperatives in contemporary South Africa – the
imperative to transform or decolonize institutions of white privilege and the
imperative to rid the country of “foreigners” – is not simply incidental.
Rather, anti-immigrant discourses draw deeply on ideologies of struggle,
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rights, freedom, and even community healing and reconciliation (e.g. Palm-
ary 2016; Solomon 2019; Kerr et al. 2019; Monson 2015), while, in the pro-
cess, taking the nationalist assumption of citizens’ entitlements more or less
for granted. In the next section, we first discuss Neocosmos’s historical
account of the roots of xenophobia in the transition to democracy, and then
draw on a diverse set of qualitative case studies which have analysed the
views of perpetrators and apologists of xenophobic violence, mainly expres-
sed in research interviews and focus groups at a number of locations around
South Africa. Thus, the chapter will show how the very discourse of transi-
tional justice can be co-opted to legitimate new forms of violence against
people who have little to do with the actual history of apartheid but are
accused of undermining South Africans’ ongoing efforts to realize the material
benefits of liberation in the present.
The roots of xenophobic violence
What are the roots of this anti-immigrant discrimination and violence in
democratic South Africa? Some academics, especially those that note its
racialized character, have argued that xenophobia is a manifestation of
internalized racism (e.g. Tafira 2011). Other commentators – even those who
condemn anti-immigrant violence – nevertheless treat it as axiomatic that
economic difficulties, state corruption and chronic poverty make people
angry and frustrated, and that in some way it is therefore “understandable”
that citizens would turn on their immigrant neighbours (e.g. Zulu 2020, p.
26). But Neocosmos (2006, 2008) argues that these reasons are insufficient to
explain why this violence is directed at non-citizens and immigrants specifi-
cally. Why do poor South Africans blame immigrants for their troubles –
rather than politicians, or the rich, or corporations, for example? In other
words, while xenophobia can and does have racial, ethnic and class overtones
(Chauke 2020), the specifically nationalistic element of anti-immigrant vio-
lence is often treated as invisible, with commentators falling back more easily
onto familiar race- and poverty-based explanations. Neocosmos is one of the
few scholars who has offered a historical explanation of the roots of xeno-
phobia, an analysis which requires us to consider how citizens – not only
races and classes – were produced in the transition to democracy. He reminds
us that during apartheid the distinction between black people who were citi-
zens of South Africa and those who were not was not as strong as it is today.
Full citizenship of South Africa was for whites only, and the white apartheid
state tried to “denationalize” all black people anyway by dividing them on
the basis of ethnicity and then making them citizens of the nominally inde-
pendent homelands. Thus, black people in South Africa were treated much
the same as Africans from further afield: as foreign migrants, who should
migrate into “white South Africa” only when their labour was needed. In
response, the ideology of the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement was
more Pan-Africanist and “was very much conceived … as a fight of all
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Africans and their allies against the apartheid state. The concept of ‘nation’
thus developed tended to be inclusive rather than exclusive of Africans from
the region” (Neocosmos 2006, pp. 30–1).
So, xenophobia was not an inevitable outcome for the new South Africa.
But when the ANC came to power, it chose to treat its population as passive
“subjects of state or white largesse”, rather than as active subjects able to
contribute to their own development (Neocosmos 2006, p. 77). A distinction
therefore needed to be made between those living in South Africa who qua-
lified for state assistance and those who did not. The dividing line for this
distinction was South African citizenship. Thus, a new category of denatio-
nalized outsiders – those who were citizens of other countries and were not
considered as eligible for South African citizenship1 – was created among
those living within South Africa’s borders. And the new South African state
simply inherited many of the security ideologies and techniques of the
apartheid state, so that once again the movement of people into South Africa
was conceptualized as a threat to national security, which justified a powerful
military (Vale 2002). So, the transition became “a transition between two
different forms of xenophobia, simultaneously with continuity between state
practises” (Neocosmos 2006, p. vi).
Xenophobia and citizens’ rights
How do South African citizens themselves articulate anti-immigrant or
nationalistic sentiments? Solomon (2019) argues that “[p]art of the reason for
the persistence of anti-African migrant sentiment is a prevailing rhetoric of
victimization, which frames irregular African migrants as a threat to the
rights of South Africa’s poor” (p. 156). Solomon conducted a number of
interviews with residents in areas where violence took place in 2008, includ-
ing in Alexandra township in Johannesburg where some of the earliest
attacks in that spate occurred. He reports:
In asking about the scope of the human rights that should be offered to
African migrants in the Alex focus groups, I was declaratively told that
‘there are no rights for foreigners’ in South Africa, that this ‘was not
their space,’ and that ‘only South Africans must have rights’ in their
country.
(p. 164)
Moreover, Solomon argues, many South Africans see “foreigners” as taking
opportunities that should rightfully belong to citizens (economic opportu-
nities, government housing, etc.), and are thus “effectively stealing a portion
of locals’ freedom” (p. 162). He concludes that “these comments show how
easy it is to seek to protect the rights of marginalized citizens by stripping
even further marginalized noncitizens of their basic rights” (p. 164).
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Solomon (2019) grapples with how hard it is to challenge the spurious
connection between the erosion of citizens’ rights and the presence of
migrants. This is because
Black South Africans have experienced generations of being deprived of
rights in their own country, they fought and struggled for decades to
gain access to those rights, and now their continued marginalization has
left them feeling like that struggle has been in vain. Even worse, out-
siders seem to be succeeding in ways that locals have not. In sum, they
feel displaced in their own country, which has left some to wonder whe-
ther it was a bad decision to open up immigration to the rest of the
continent.
(pp. 162–3)
However, there are alternatives: as few other organizations of economically
poor South Africans have done, the shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali
baseMjondolo has argued that migrants are not the cause of South Africans’
poverty and that removing them, depriving them of rights or taking other
similar drastic measures does not bring about its end. Moreover, the shack
dwellers’ movement practises an alternative politics of solidarity which
emphasizes the de facto shared rightlessness of both migrants and citizens
who are black, poor, landless and treated as illegal in various ways by the
state (Solomon 2019; Abahali baseMjondolo 2015).
Xenophobia and transitional justice language
Palmary (2016) examines the discourse of members of South African busi-
ness owners’ associations who organized attacks on immigrant communities
in Johannesburg in 2011 and 2015 – in particular those immigrants running
small businesses which competed with those owned by South Africans.
Palmary notes the deep irony in the way that “the political transition that
South Africa has undergone is used as a justification for excluding foreigners
in the name of realizing freedom” (p. 79). Once again, business association
members invoked the language of rights and of democratic transition to
argue for why foreign communities should be made to leave the country. For
example, some members of the Greater Gauteng Business Forum (GGBF)
said:
We are not saying people mustn’t have their freedom but we are talking
illegal migrants, we are talking about people who are not even allowed to
have that freedom of movement. The migration department [sic] once
told them that to say your rights are very limited despite that South
Africa has got freedom, that freedom is not yours, it is a South African
freedom (GGBF representative, 2011, interview).
(Palmary 2016, p. 96)
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[W]e had to battle for so many years against Apartheid. Now we
defeated that part and now we are in the process of rebuilding the
country to trust each other, to get to know each other, to tolerate each
other, to live with each other, to get to trust each other … So … we want
us to heal and without any disturbances from them (GGBF representative,
2011).
(pp. 96–7)
In these formulations, it is the very language and concepts of transitional
justice that are being deployed to justify anti-immigrant violence.
Xenophobic violence and labour struggles
Our own work on xenophobia has focused on one particular commercial
fruit farming community in South Africa’s Western Cape province (Kerr and
Durrheim 2013; Kerr et al. 2017, 2019). In 2009, 18 months after the May
2008 violence, South Africans living in the informal settlements around the
small town of De Doorns forcibly evicted a community of Zimbabwean
migrant farm workers, accusing them of taking their jobs by working for
farmers at less than the minimum wage. The Zimbabweans – who left their
homes and moved into a temporary camp for displaced persons where they
stayed for up to a year afterwards – denied this allegation, and argued, as did
the farmers, that they were preferred as workers simply because they were
more reliable and hardworking. In this research, we found that among the
South African farm worker community, the language and practices of strug-
gle against exploitation from farm owners was almost indistinguishable from
those of xenophobia. Indeed, forcibly expelling the Zimbabwean community
was construed as a way of ensuring that farmers would not be able to bypass
the more stringent bargaining efforts of South African workers and labour
brokers (labour brokers are middle-men who supply farmers with workers,
and often come from the same communities as those workers). For many of
these residents, the white farming community was deeply implicated in the
town’s problems, as they occupied a position of power to allocate jobs to
some workers and not others. When asked why the Zimbabweans had been
evicted, one labour broker we interviewed explained:
I also feel very sorry for the people from Zimbabwe who now have to
live there [in the displaced persons’ camp], uh, and the reason why it
happened, uh, is because they never stood with us … if we as South
Africans have problems here in, in De Doorns, then they never stood
with us. So, that’s why the community decided, there must be further
steps taken.
When asked about what kinds of problems the community had experienced
in the past, he replied:
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Like I say, we are farm workers here in De Doorns, we all agree when-
ever prices [wages] need to be raised. Well, true, the state also raises its
prices. But … at the end of the day if we go there, then they won’t stand
together with us farm workers, when we go to the farms and go talk to
the people to hear whether they can’t give us a raise.
In this form of victim-blaming, as in many other opinions we heard in De
Doorns, justifications for evicting the Zimbabweans were inextricable from
claims to be engaged in a struggle with farmers against their exploitative
labour practices (Kerr and Durrheim 2013). Other South African workers
felt aggrieved that by giving Zimbabweans work these farmers appeared to
have no sense of responsibility to their fellow South Africans, with whom
they had shared a long and exploitative history; and they also felt aggrieved
about having themselves been evicted from their homes on farms in a rela-
tively recent process of farmers “externalizing” large parts of their labour
force. For example, one man living in the informal settlement of Stofland
remarked: “The white people chased us off the farms so that we are now
sitting in squatter camps … and now they want to put other people from
other countries in our place”. In this view, the arrival of the Zimbabweans
and the farmers’ apparent shift of favour to them as a new workforce was
just the last straw in a much longer history of exploitative relations between
South African workers and farmers in this community. This history was used
and invoked in incitements to anti-immigrant violence by workers, labour
brokers and local politicians (cf. Misago 2009).
Discussion and conclusion
The examples discussed in this chapter have shown how a new form of
nationalistic identity-based discrimination and violence in post-transition
South Africa, that of xenophobia, is justified and legitimated using the lan-
guage of struggle, rights, victimhood and the realization of South Africans’
freedom. While some elements of xenophobia draw on discourses, practices
and politics of migration which have their roots in the old South Africa, the
specific way that nationalism in post-apartheid South Africa has been con-
figured is what makes this form of violence new. While the overt focus of
identity politics discourse in South Africa continues to be mainly on race and
racism, anti-immigrant violence is ongoing in the meantime, and there is
arguably too little focus on constructions and meanings of South African
citizenship as an identity category that warrants critical analysis. In this way,
nationalism has come to be not a forgotten issue, but perhaps an invisible
one in post-transition South Africa. The structures of transitional justice are
hard-pressed to deal with this new violence, because they are attuned to a
previous conflict with a different configuration of (racial) victims and perpe-
trators. Yet xenophobia shows that perpetrators and victims are not mutually
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exclusive categories (Chauke 2020). In this way, questions of race, redress
and citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa cannot easily be separated.
Part of the reason for, or perhaps a manifestation of, the pervasiveness of
xenophobia in South Africa is that our society lacks a sufficiently compelling
or plausible counter-narrative and counter-politics with which to challenge
this seemingly axiomatic link between the rights of black South Africans
struggling for real liberation and the necessity of removing “foreigners” who
undermine that struggle. Xenophobia discourse silences critiques of itself
when it legitimates anti-immigrant violence as part of an ongoing struggle,
because this sets up a false dichotomy where those proposing an anti-xeno-
phobic politics must also avoid appearing as anti-struggle (Kerr and Dur-
rheim 2013; Kerr et al. 2019). Solomon recognizes this when he claims that
“The challenge then is to respond effectively to that rhetoric of victimization
and the logic of exclusive rights that underlies it” (2019, p. 164, emphasis
added). Claiming that xenophobia implicates the discourses of struggle and
rights is not to say that all forms of struggle are xenophobic. There have been
cases of successful anti-xenophobic counter-mobilizations and interventions
by communities, as well as principled anti-xenophobic or inclusive struggle
(see Sinwell 2011; Kirshner 2012; Abahlali baseMjondolo 2015; Solomon
2019). While these are evidently not widespread enough to prevent anti-
immigrant violence from becoming a chronic and entrenched crisis (Landau
2015; Misago 2016), they provide some important examples of what an anti-
xenophobic politics looks like in practice. Nevertheless, xenophobia in South
Africa shows how the struggles of the poor, including the victims of the
legacy of apartheid, can take a toxic or destructive turn when the historic
moral legitimacy of these struggles is used to justify further violence against
new victimized groups and to silence any critique of this violence. So, a
complex dual task now confronts South Africa: of addressing both ongoing
racialized inequality among South Africans, and figuring out rhetorical,
political and practical alternatives to the construction of (false) mutual
exclusivity that is routinely set up between the rights and freedom of citizens
and the rights and freedom of migrants.
Note
1 See Neocosmos (2006) for a discussion of how, after 1994, the possibility was
negotiated of extending South African citizenship to migrant miners from Lesotho
who had spent much of their working lives in South African mines during
apartheid.
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8 Diaspora communities in
transitional justice
A hidden presence
Stephan Parmentier, Mina Rauschenbach and
Laura Hein
Introduction
Although diaspora communities often play a vital role in transitional justice
processes, a number of facets of their engagement remain under-explored in
scholarly work. They have often been described either as conflict spoilers or
peace-makers (Cochrane et al. 2009), but they are less often recognized as
justice actors, victims and/or political agents. Their marginalized status is
also observed in transitional and post-conflict settings where diasporas are
often overlooked as “justice stakeholders” by their home countries, and per-
ceived as being out of touch with the local realities and experiences due to
their resettlement elsewhere (Haider 2014). In this sense, they are truly
“forgotten actors” in transitional justice.
The very notion of “diaspora” possesses a long history and is most fre-
quently associated with broad waves of migration, which can be motivated by
a variety of reasons. In this chapter, we focus specifically on “conflict-generated”
diaspora communities, which are fleeing their country of residence as a result
of political violence and are seeking refuge in another country. In the Span-
ish-speaking world, the notion of “exiles” is preferred to capture this type of
migration, thus highlighting the forceful nature of leaving a place for reasons
of safety and security (Bolzman 2002; Teodora and Oprescu 2013) (on
Argentina, see Jensen 2014; on Colombia, see Estrada et al. 2018; Martínez
Leguízamo 2017). The notions of diaspora and exiles present many simila-
rities such as the dispersal of the group(s) in several states, the (symbolic and
material) connections to their home countries, the dream of returning, and
the mobilization and organization of the group(s) to influence their home
countries. Moreover, the work of memory and the recognition of their
experiences give meaning to their presence abroad and grant them a legit-
imate (and sometimes constitutive) place as citizens and interlocutors in their
country of origin (Bolzman 2002).
Particularly interesting for the scope of this chapter is that diasporas are
recognized in their ability to develop an identity of their own, as well as an
organizational project (Hovanessian, cited in Bolzman 2002). This refers to
the capacity of the diaspora to transform forced migration into a “minority
DOI: 10.4324/9781003167280-11
conscience”, and to make themselves visible in the socio-political scene
through their mobilization. In short, a diaspora is identified as such when it
exists as a social actor (Bolzman 2002).
Scholarship has only begun to decipher the patterns, potential and chal-
lenges attached to diaspora engagement in transitional justice and is still very
limited to sporadic analyses of their role in these processes. The involvement
of diasporas in transitional justice is increasingly acknowledged from a
double perspective (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2016): first, as key justice stake-
holders who can contribute to providing a comprehensive account of human
rights violations committed in a country; and second, as direct victims of
human rights violations back home and possessing the right to have their
suffering acknowledged, akin to the citizens in their country of origin. Tran-
sitional justice scholars are progressively giving attention to diaspora acti-
vism and some studies have sketched the benefits attached to their
engagement in transitional justice processes (Haider 2014; Young and Park
2009). Furthermore, in some cases important steps have been taken to
incorporate diasporas in transitional justice measures (Bradley 2013; Haider
2014) in various ways: in providing input to transitional justice strategies
(such as those in Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Zimbabwe); in awareness-raising initia-
tives (e.g. Argentina, Armenia, Chile, Liberia and Sri Lanka); in the design
and implementation of transitional justice measures (e.g. East Timor,
Liberia, Sierra Leone); in supporting justice initiatives and providing evi-
dence for these in their host country (i.e. Argentina, Cambodia, Chile,
Rwanda, Syria); in truth commission processes (e.g. Colombia, Liberia).
Analysing all possible forms of diaspora engagement in transitional justice
processes goes beyond the scope and objective of this chapter. Instead, we
look at them with a particular focus on the role of turning points and
transformative events in diaspora engagement, the types of transnational
engagement observed in those communities, and the place of memory as a
lynchpin of exiles’ struggles for recognition.
The dimension of memory is particularly relevant to understanding the
engagement of diaspora communities in transitional justice. Conflict-gener-
ated diasporas carry general memories of political violence and a troubled
past, and specific memories of traumatic events and of loss (Lacroix and
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013). Memory practices can serve as symbolic forms of
justice in that they are meant to acknowledge victims’ experiences and suf-
fering (Jimeno 2018; Rauschenbach et al. 2020). In addition, these memories
shape diasporas’ experiences, narratives and claims for justice in several
ways. First, memories circulate and are transformed in interaction with the
emergence and implementation of transitional justice processes. Moreover,
these processes are often conceived and implemented in settings with con-
tested understandings of a violent past (Jelin 2003; McEvoy and McGregor
2008), and this heterogeneity in historical representations can also be
observed within diaspora communities. For example, in the case of Sri
Lankan Tamils, the way in which the past may be understood (and its
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meaning for the present) can depend on factors such as different migration
experiences, social and ethnic status, and the extent to which one identifies
with the Tamil nationalist political project (Orjuela 2008; McDowell 2011;
Étiemble 2017). Furthermore, the memories that drive diasporas’ engage-
ment in transitional justice processes are inevitably subjected to power rela-
tions, which may result in the marginalization of some experiences to the
profit of other dominant accounts of the past. In the Tamil Sri Lankan dia-
spora, powerful and politicized subsections of these communities have
engaged in the selective instrumentalization of particular narratives of the
past aimed to legitimize their separatist and nationalist claims, resulting in
the silencing of many other (individual and collective) narratives (Orjuela
2008).
Various factors can account for the heterogeneity and the relative salience
of specific framings of the past in diasporas’ relations to transitional justice
at home. They include, first of all, diaspora migration experiences and orga-
nizational characteristics, and how these interact with the agendas and
interests of their members (Orjuela 2008) and the political fields and oppor-
tunities of the home and host settings (Amarasingam 2015; Koinova and
Karabegovic 2019). Moreover, these factors are linked to differences in access
to broader international and transnational political fields and the actors
occupying them, such as advocacy groups, the media, etc. (Wiebelhaus-
Brahm 2016). Finally, they are related to the legal and moral normative fra-
meworks within which the discourse and practice of transitional justice are
embedded (Orjuela 2018). Thus, depending on the context and time, dia-
sporas may not have access to public and official spaces for the acknowl-
edgement of their understandings of the past and institutions promoting
them. In such cases, they are likely to resort to more informal and collective
spaces of recognition such as digital platforms of exchanges or oral history
projects (Karabegović 2014), private spaces (family events in the home) or
personal modes of “mnemonic engagement” (e.g. family photography; oral
histories) to uphold their memories within their collective consciousness
(Halilovich 2014; Van Hear and Liberatore 2015).
We illustrate various forms of diaspora engagement with transitional jus-
tice processes through two examples from Latin America, namely the cases
of Argentina and Colombia. These two case studies were chosen because of
their relevance to factors highlighted as important in influencing the will-
ingness and ability of diaspora communities to shape transitional justice
politics in their home countries (e.g. Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2016). On the one
hand, these factors include the socio-political characteristics of diaspora
members and of the perpetrators of historic violence, the way in which some
sort of political transition emerges (in a post-authoritarian context for
Argentina and a peace process in a context of ongoing conflict for Colom-
bia), and the world-historical time period in which transitional justice dis-
cussions take place (the birth of transitional justice in Argentina in a Cold
War context, and the holistic view of transitional justice in Colombia as part
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of a contemporary globalized world order). On the other hand, both cases
show similarities regarding the nature of the violence to be addressed (in
both cases political violence), and the specific place of memory and its
determining role in shaping and keeping the mobilization going, in providing
meaning to a collective identification as an exile community and in bolstering
the struggle for justice and truth.
Two case studies of diaspora participation in transitional
justice processes
Exile from Argentina was the direct result of the political violence and
repressive practices applied by the last military regime (1976–83) through its
“anti-subversive struggle” against all (supposed) opponents. Recent studies
estimate that up to 340,000 individuals were exiled during this period
(Yankelevich 2007) with their main destinations being other countries in
Latin America, Europe and the United States. Overall, the Argentine dia-
spora was composed of highly educated individuals and socio-political acti-
vists, which constituted the very reason for their persecution by the military
regime (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2016). Argentina is frequently considered a pio-
neer in dealing with human rights abuses during this particular period,
because of its strong endeavours to implement a variety of political and legal
strategies for the sake of justice and accountability. Since 1983, it has
experienced a long and complex transitional justice process, consisting of
several periods that have progressed in a non-linear fashion. The first period,
during which the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons
(CONADEP) was established and the trials against the military junta were
held, was followed by a long period of impunity and oblivion based on the
impunity laws, and later by the still ongoing initiatives for truth and justice.
Diaspora communities have been deeply involved in all phases of the transi-
tional justice process in Argentina, but their precise roles have barely been
explored.
Colombia, for its part, has been the theatre of more than 50 years of pro-
tracted and violent conflict involving multiple armed actors with various
agendas (Díaz Pabón 2018). The conflict has affected populations from very
diverse communities, different social classes and ethnic groups, who were
located in different territorial spaces. Forced displacement, resulting in mas-
sive internal and international population movements, is one of the most
prevalent human rights violations observed in this conflict. Overall, more
than seven million Colombians have been forcibly displaced: at least six mil-
lion have been internally displaced and more than one million have migrated
out of Colombia due to the conflict but also because of inequality and lack
of economic opportunities (Bermudez 2016; Swisspeace 2019). The recent
peace process has provided the diaspora communities with unique opportu-
nities to get involved in the transitional justice mechanisms and thus to
become justice stakeholders, besides already being political actors. Following
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the peace accords of 2016, diaspora participation has been included in the
mandate of three bodies established within the comprehensive justice frame-
work: the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-
Repetition (hereafter TC), the Search Unit for Missing Persons and the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (hereafter JEP). Diaspora communities have
been involved from the onset in the workings of the TC and the JEP. Yet
there are many concerns about whether this inclusion will translate into
effective participation (ICTJ 2018), particularly because of the lack of poli-
tical will (Estrada et al. 2018). The TC’s policy of inclusion of Colombian
exiled voices is unprecedented in its scope, as it aims to account for the dif-
ferentiated impacts of forced migration across the different social and ethnic
groups represented in Colombia, and to collect pluralistic documentation of
experiences across different host countries. These objectives are sought by
organizing the international component of the TC in collaborative networks
of nodes situated in various European, Northern American and Latin
American countries.
Different exiles’ engagement and the role of turning points and
“transformative events”
Concerning Argentina, the general objectives of the exiles’ activism, as well
as their specific claims, clearly changed over time. Three partly overlapping
phases of mobilization can be distinguished. They are closely related to
socio-political transformations within the home country, as well as to the
international and regional context that witnessed an increasing recognition
of the legitimacy of human rights norms.
First, during the military junta period (1976–83) the aim of the exiles was
mainly to denounce what was happening in Argentina and to put interna-
tional pressure on the regime to halt the repression by means of collecting
evidence and engaging in awareness-raising initiatives. A second phase of
mobilization started with the end of the military regime and the transition to
democracy. The Argentine exile communities reshaped their aims and gave
support to several types of transitional justice mechanisms: the CONADEP
truth commission established in 1984, and, simultaneously, the pursuit of the
legal accountability of the Argentine perpetrators both in their own country
as well as in that of their hosts. However, with the enactment of impunity
laws (Ley de Punto Final 1986 and Ley de Obediencia Debida 1987), it
became very clear that the Argentine state was no longer willing to prosecute
those responsible. Disappointed by their home country, some exiles pursued
cases in foreign courts based on the principles of universal jurisdiction and
“passive personality” (with victims also possessing the nationality of the
specific country), in countries such as Italy, France, Germany and Spain.
During that period the primary goal was to put pressure on Argentina to
open its domestic avenues for pursuing criminal justice. And indeed, the
pressure caused by the criminal trials abroad was one of the key arguments
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brought into the parliamentary debates that preceded the annulment of the
impunity laws in 2003. From the mid-1990s onwards, a third wave of exile
activism arose from those who remained in the diaspora abroad, but even
more so from those exiles who had returned to Argentina. They progressively
mobilized for the acknowledgement of exile as a separate violation of human
rights, their right to reparations, and the inclusion of their memories within
the broader national narrative of the past, to voice their experiences and to
be recognized as political actors in supporting the transitional justice process.
Particularly in this phase, the Argentine exiles gradually emerged as justice
stakeholders in Argentine society with very specific claims for the recognition
of their own narratives and memories of the past, and of exile as a specific
form of state repression.
An important transformative event for the mobilization of Argentine exiles
was the arrest of former General Pinochet in London in 1998, which was
particularly significant to sustain and legitimize the pursuit of the legal
accountability of the Argentine perpetrators abroad. It energized the Argen-
tine exiles, mostly in Europe, to pursue their search for accountability in their
host countries (Roht-Arriaza 2005). Moreover, the confession in 1995 of
former naval Captain Scilingo of his participation in the so-called death
flights (vuelos de la muerte) strongly revitalized the Argentine public debate
about the crimes committed by the junta. As a result, this “boom of
memory” (Jensen 2014) in Argentine society sparked a new interest in the
exiles’ experiences, and in exile as a specific form of state repression.
The conflict in Colombia is a long-standing one, resulting in Colombians
seeking political exile for the last 30 years, particularly during periods of
peaking violence (Estrada et al. 2018). Yet before the onset of the peace
process, only a minority of the diaspora was engaged in the denunciation of
human rights violations and political activism in relation to the homeland
(Bermudez 2016).
Granting participation possibilities to victims in the peace accords gave a
special impetus for exiles, as historically overlooked justice stakeholders
(Bedoya 2019), to claim their right to be included. The accords provided a
particular momentum for Colombians living abroad to be recognized as jus-
tice stakeholders at the negotiation table and to be included in the develop-
ment of the new political scenario that would follow (CNMH 2018; Martínez
Leguízamo 2017). In addition to sending their inputs to the Havana process,
diaspora members were included in victims’ delegations in the third round of
negotiations which allowed them to have their stories, as well as their justice
and reparations needs, recognized in the Dialogue Agenda (Martínez Leguí-
zamo 2017). The diaspora was also instrumental in placing the Colombian
peace process and its relevance on the international agenda. Through
numerous activities of lobbying and advocacy in their host countries, as well
as the development of national and transnational networking initiatives
(throughout Europe, South America and North America), the exiled have
organized collectively and increased progressively their visibility as potential
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agents of change (Bermudez 2016; Martínez Leguízamo 2017; De Ryck and
Lopez Villamil 2020). With their current participation in the different
mechanisms developed within the comprehensive justice framework resulting
from the peace accords, as well as the development of transnational networks
of Colombian diasporas, the Colombia diaspora’s engagement has thus been
bolstered.
Types of diaspora mobilizations
One significant feature of the Argentinian exiles’ activism, mainly in the late
1970s and early 1980s, was their engagement in transnational networking.
They built networks between Argentine diaspora communities based in dif-
ferent countries and other diaspora communities (such as the Chilean ones),
as well as alliances with international human rights organizations (such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). This allowed the exiles to
achieve international solidarity, and to appeal to the international commu-
nity and public opinion to put pressure on the Argentine regime (e.g.
Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2016; Franco and Pérez 2007). Alongside these more
“horizontal forms of coordination” with civil society actors, the Argentine
diaspora also engaged in “vertical coordination” with political actors in their
host countries as well as with international political institutions such as the
European Union (EU), the United States and also with the Vatican state.
Despite being confined to certain sectors and only a fraction of the Argentine
diaspora (Franco and Pérez 2007), several exiles’ organizations were founded
in Europe and Latin America. One particularly active exile organization was
the Comisión Argentina de Derechos Humanos that had its major delega-
tions in Paris, Mexico and Madrid, and intervened in the anti-junta fight
mainly through its legal expertise. Indeed, another important characteristic
of the Argentine diaspora mobilization of that period was that it accom-
panied humanitarian activism with a specific legal focus. In particular, the
legal strategy explored the possibilities of legal protection under international
human rights law and criminal prosecutions via international criminal jur-
isdictions. In this sense, from the very start, the exile communities went
beyond the political and moral condemnation of serious human rights vio-
lations to walk the path of legal justice. Indeed, after the end of the military
regime, the exiles played a crucial role in promoting the start of criminal
trials in their host countries: as witnesses; by providing information and
informal channels to access documents and testimonies; by giving logistical
and financial support to witnesses travelling from Argentina; and by
mobilizing public support (Roht-Arriaza 2005; Lutz and Sikkink 2001).
The founding document of the Argentine organization Hijas y Hijos del
Exilio (2006) states:
Exile and its consequences were relegated as if it was a minor violation,
unimportant; but many silences and omissions did not erase the
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wounds … We need to tell our story and we want that the exile be treated
as what it is: a violation of human rights.
(Translated from Spanish)
From the mid-1990s, former exiles founded their own organizations in
Argentina (the Comisión de Ex-exiliados Argentinos por la Reparación –
CER – in 1998; the Comisión de Exiliados Políticos de la República Argen-
tina – COEPRA – also in 1998; the Hijas y Hijos del Exilio in 2006) as well
as abroad (Comisión de Exiliados Argentinos en Madrid – CEA-M – in
1999). Their objectives were primarily to obtain acknowledgement by the
Argentine state that their exile was a consequence of forced displacement,
and hence a human rights violation committed as part of the ideological
depuration plan of the military junta, and the right to reparation deriving
therefrom; to seek recognition of their role as political actors in denouncing
the regime and in pursuing accountability; and to give voice to the exile
experiences as part of an inclusive collective memory of the past. The
national and international mobilization of exiles focused mainly on support
for the draft law, the Reparación al Exilio (1998), which proposed a system
of financial compensation for the exiles. Alongside very concrete claims (such
as the recognition of titles and studies carried out abroad, and the accep-
tance of children of exiles as victims of the repression), the exiles’ discourses
drew attention to the symbolic and political aspects of the draft law: “our
main claim is not monetary: we want a law that recognizes exile as a viola-
tion of human rights” (translated from Spanish. Pagina 12 2006; interview
with Miguel Schclarek at COEPRA).
While the draft law was not approved, mostly because of the economic
aspects, the judicial system from the late 1990s onwards started to accept
reparation claims from exiles. Judges (up to the Supreme Court) began to
recognize exile as a human rights violation, a deliberate practice of the military
regime and, consequently, a harm that needed repairing.
In contrast, the Colombian diaspora cannot be described as a strong, wide-
spread and organized movement overall, although it has become more visible
and active in the transformation processes after signing of the peace accord.
Private and individual forms of transnational engagement, particularly in rela-
tion to historical memory, have traditionally been more frequent than collective
and public ones (Bermudez 2016). Only a minority of diaspora members were
engaged in relation to the peace process, mostly individuals with a history of
activism in Colombia and for whom such engagement was possible in the host
society; either by their having a stable migrant status or such favourable eco-
nomic circumstances that their engagement was not impeded by trauma.
Moreover, diaspora engagement suffered from fragmentation within these
migrant communities, related to gender, class, racial and regional divisions,
which reflect the same cleavages existing in Colombia (Bermudez 2016). Divides
also related to political identities, and what they imply in terms of expectations
in relation to the peace process, with some diaspora members more likely to
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claim victim status, while others reject this status to the benefit of political
agency (Dosdad and Louidor 2018). Colombian exiles have generally not bene-
fited much from support from the Colombian state or its institutions, but their
mobilization has significantly grown over the past 20 years due to the existence
of effective opportunities in host societies. The Colombian state also reached out
to the diaspora communities via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
National Centre for Historical Memory.
While the Colombian state has provided only limited support for diaspora
engagement, political opportunity structures in certain host countries, parti-
cularly since the onset of the peace process, have facilitated its development
into an organized movement, through possibilities for networking, advocacy
as well as lobbying with local political leaders and institutions. Their mobi-
lization has involved both horizontal coordination (i.e. relationships with
civil society actors), and vertical coordination (i.e. relationships with host
country policymakers and international organizations) (Stokke and Wie-
belhaus-Brahm 2019). For example, Colombian exiles’ organizations have
developed significant transnational networks in Spain and the United King-
dom, involving government bodies, trade unions, non-governmental organi-
zations, and human rights and academic institutions. Some of these
organizations are also part of a broader transnational network of organiza-
tions, called the Oficina Internacional de los Derechos Humanos Acción
Colombia (International Bureau for Human Rights Action on Colombia),
involved in political advocacy with European institutions, states and the
United Nations (UN), in relation to human rights issues in Colombia. These
transnational activities, of raising public awareness and lobbying politicians,
have helped to sustain the Colombian diaspora’s engagement, as well as to
strengthen European and international support for the peace process. While
they are generally considered to offer less capacity to exiles to mobilize
compared to organizations in Europe, national organizations based in var-
ious Latin American countries, including Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, Argen-
tina or Peru, have also been developed to support the struggle for the
visibility of the victimization of Colombian exiles. Transnational networks,
such as Revicpaz-LAC (Network of Colombian Victims for Peace in Latin
American and the Caribbean) which were built on the legacy of regional exile
experiences are also very active in supporting advocacy for Colombian exiles’
visibility as justice stakeholders.
Informal civil society-led truth-seeking initiatives developed outside of
Colombia also had a significant role in contributing to the active inclusion of
diaspora perspectives in the peace process. An example is the Truth,
Memory, and Reconciliation Commission of Colombian Women in the Dia-
spora, which was created in 2014 and has hubs in London, Barcelona,
Brussels and Stockholm. Through the adoption of an active memory and
empowerment approach, this Commission aims to highlight and document
the role of women in exile and their specific and often marginalized experi-
ences. Another initiative is the Foro Internacional de Victimas (International
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Victims Forum) created in 2014 which is a transnational network with coor-
dinators in 18 cities across the world and which organizes events aimed at
diaspora engagement in the peace process. It serves as a platform for com-
munication, organization and participative action aimed at increasing the
visibility of victims of the conflict abroad and at promoting their participation in
the peace process.
Memory as a lynchpin of exiles’ struggles for recognition
In Argentina, during the early years of the transition to democracy, exile
experiences were marginalized in relation to other experiences of repression
(Jensen 2014). The reasons for this marginalization were manifold. Public
opinion was still influenced by the stigmatizing discourses of the junta
against the exiles (accusing them of conducting an anti-Argentina campaign
abroad), as well as by the prejudice of a “golden exile”. Furthermore, the
experiences of exiles were conditioned by a hierarchical logic of victims that
compared the degree of suffering or damage of the exiles with respect to
prison, death or disappearance (Jensen 2014). The exiles’ sense of guilt, that
they were “privileged among the victims”, led them to stay silent about their
experiences and consequently facilitated the marginalization of the exiles in
the general discourses and memories about the repression.
Since the mid-1990s, however, there has been an increasing repositioning
of exiles in memories of the repression alongside a boom of memory in
Argentinian society. A new social interest in the exile emerged that helped to
re-signify it as another repressive practice of the junta. Initially, such interest
was expressed mainly in the publication of literature (biographies, life stories,
interviews) and public debates that emphasized the individual and human
dimension of the exiles’ experiences. As exiles started to obtain a place in
memories of the repression, groups of exiles mobilized further for the public
acknowledgement of the political and collective dimension of the exiles’
experiences, i.e. for the recognition of forced displacement as part of a plan-
ned cultural repression by the junta, thus placing the exiles among the vic-
tims of its ideological depuration. While the judicial recognition of
reparations to exiles as victims of human rights violations was a first impor-
tant step, it also remained an incomplete solution for the exiles since it lim-
ited the debate around reparations to its strictly material dimension.
Furthermore, it led the exiles to search for individual judicial solutions,
which again undermined the recognition of the collective dimension of exile,
as well as the official and political acknowledgement of exiles’ experiences.
This lack of recognition of the political and collective dimension is the
reason why exiles speak about “memorias lights”, or “memorias anestesia-
das” (“anesthetised memories”), when referring to the place of their experiences
in Argentine society (Jensen 2014).
Within the context of the ongoing conflict in Colombia, “memory is an
expression of rebellion against violence and impunity” (Schultz-Kraft 2017)
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and recovering the historical memory of the conflict is understood as a cen-
tral, forward-looking process for victims to claim justice and reparation
(Tamayo Gomez 2019). Within this broader process of collective memory-
making, Colombians who were forced to migrate have struggled, sometimes
for decades, to have their exile recognized as an injustice resulting from the
armed conflict. This struggle for visibility is complicated by official denial or
by the perception of Colombia as a democratic state affected by an armed
conflict, rather than as a dictatorship like many other cases of exile in Latin
America (Estrada et al. 2018). Within this context, individual and collective
commemorative practices have acted as channels of recognition through
which exiles have been able to keep their memories alive and continue their
struggle for justice and reparation (Bermudez 2011; CNMH 2018). This was
particularly important for exiles in the face of the invisibility of their victim-
hood back home until it was officially recognized in the peace agreements of
2016.
A noteworthy initiative which has helped to disseminate exiles’ experiences
within Colombia is the creation by the Centro Nacional de Memoria His-
tórica (CNMH – National Centre for Historical Memory) of a virtual space
for Las voces del exilio (the Voices from Exile). This initiative was followed
by a report aimed at “recognizing exile as a form of violence that has trans-
versally affected the lives of individuals, groups and communities in exile
around the world, as well as those who have returned to the country volun-
tarily or forcibly” (CNMH 2018, 17). This report describes also how
remembrance practices aimed at preserving identity through language, food
and other traditional practices, serve as forms of resistance against the
uprooting that the exiled have suffered and as guarantees of non-repetition of
past injustices (CNMH 2018). Moreover, informal initiatives such as the
Truth, Memory, and Reconciliation Commission of Colombian Women in
the Diaspora have focused specifically on the active promotion of women’s
perspectives in the reconstruction of historical memory, with the objective to
break the double invisibility of exiled women (Bermudez 2016). More
recently, Colombia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which
began its mandate in late November 2018, has been working actively with
exiles to collect their testimonies, individually and collectively, in order to
recognize and give visibility to the role and impact of exile in Colombia’s
conflict. This truth-telling mechanism, for the very first time, gives exiles a
voice. As Dr Carlos Beristain, a member of the TRC explained at a seminar
in Brussels in October 2019, “[t]here is a truth about Colombia outside the
country and we need to voice it”. This TRC employs not only methodologies
of testimony gathering, but also artistic practices to facilitate the expression
of exiles’ experiences and to promote their inclusion in the construction of
the memory of the conflict in a participatory and healing manner. While the
Colombian TRC displays much promise in its objectives and in its pioneering
active inclusion of exiles, there are concerns about what it will be able to
achieve, given its very short mandate (which was scheduled to end in 2021),
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and the unfavourable Colombian political context (Bermùdez Liévano 2020).
The challenge given this polarized home context is to ensure that historically
marginalized voices are included meaningfully and to have them acknowledged
by the Colombian state.
Discussion: lessons learnt from Argentina and Colombia
These two prominent case studies can produce several interesting insights
into the central theme of our chapter, namely to better understand the
engagement of diaspora communities with transitional justice, with a particular
focus on memory.
Both cases amply demonstrate the important contribution of diaspora
communities to transitional justice, both in the host and the home countries.
In the case of Argentina, during the military junta the aim of the exiles was
mainly to increase international pressure on the regime to halt the ongoing
repression. After the fall of the dictatorship, the exiles oriented their activ-
ities to ascertain the legal accountability of the Argentine perpetrators in
their home settings and host countries (Sikkink 2012). From the mid-1990s,
the exiles progressively mobilized for the acknowledgement of exile as a vio-
lation of human rights and the inclusion of their memories within the
broader national narrative of the past. During this particular phase they
emerged as specific justice stakeholders claiming the acknowledgement of
their own narratives as a transnational community with shared experiences of
exile. In the Colombian case, the exiles were truly forgotten actors and
memory served as a key form of symbolic reparation until the final stages of
the peace accords in 2016, when they suddenly emerged as justice stake-
holders. With the increasing inclusion of victims within the transitional jus-
tice process, the struggle for the acknowledgement of the exiles’ memories
shifted from a more personal form to a more collective and organized one, as
illustrated by initiatives such as the Voices from Exile and the Truth,
Memory, and Reconciliation Commission of Colombian Women in the Dia-
spora. These collective initiatives and the late involvement of exiles in the
peace accords made it impossible for the Colombian state to continue to
overlook the voices of the exiles in the upcoming post-agreement justice process.
The differences in both cases are perfectly logical, as they reflect different
approaches to transitional justice and different contexts. In the case of
Argentina, the exile communities strongly focused on criminal accountability
as the central form of transitional justice, while in the Colombian case the
time was ripe for a more holistic approach, which also included elements of
restorative justice and victim reparations. Moreover, the transitional justice
dynamics were quite different. In the case of Argentina, most strategies and
actions of transitional justice came from within the country and built on the
work of the existing institutions of justice and memory. In contrast, Colom-
bia shows the prominent role of the international community (such as the
UN and the EU) in shaping the transitional justice process and its activities.
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This was partly due to the rapid development since 1995 of transitional jus-
tice as a broad and global field of research, policymaking and practice. Fur-
thermore, the Colombian exiles were less organized in their mobilization
efforts, mostly due to their heterogeneity, as opposed to the Argentinian
exiles who were more homogenous and proactive.
Despite the many differences, several similarities also emerge from these
brief case overviews. Both cases illustrate the importance of diaspora com-
munities being actively involved in transitional justice institutions and
arrangements, in order to raise awareness, provide evidence, push for truth
and justice and, let us not to forget, also advocate for reparations for the
victims of serious human rights violations, including their own victimization
as exiles. Moreover, in both cases, the diasporas evolved from forgotten
actors to justice stakeholders by means of a struggle for remembrance. From
this perspective, they can easily be seen as stakeholders who shaped and
transformed their victimhood into political and legal action, both in the host
setting and the home country. Finally, both cases illustrate the non-linear
shape of historical evolutions, which unfold as waves and cycles that come
with ups and downs, as well as the importance of “turning points” and
“transformative events” (Koinova 2018). In Colombia, it was definitely the
peace process and the resulting accords, while in Argentina it was the
combination of the Pinochet effect and the memory boom.
The two cases also provide ample evidence to explore theoretical frame-
works concerning the engagement of diaspora communities with transitional
justice. In terms of the benefits for transitional justice processes to engage
with diaspora communities, both cases clearly illustrate the relevance of
Wiebelhaus-Brahms’ (2016) framework. Including the experiences of the
Argentine and Colombian diaspora communities in truth and justice institu-
tions has produced a fuller account of past human rights violations. More-
over, both diaspora communities clearly pushed for truth and justice for the
violations committed against them, including exile as such, and for having
their own suffering acknowledged and compensated. Finally, while it seems
that individuals engaged in the Argentine and Colombian diasporas also
acquired a greater stake in contributing to their countries’ futures, this aspect
must be the subject of further studies.
In recent years, a wide range of scholarship has contributed to a better
understanding of diasporas’ engagement with transitional justice institutions
and procedures (see also Koinova and Karabegovic 2019). Several aspects
find a clear connection with the experiences and working methods of the
Argentine and Colombian diaspora communities. First, both communities
(but particularly the Argentine diaspora) have successfully made use of
“strategic framing” (Adamson 2013), by presenting external displacement as
a specific type of human rights violations, and thus insisting on the notion of
exiles rather than diaspora. Second, both communities can be seen to have
acted as “brokers” (Adamson 2013) between different sectors of society
involved in various ways in human rights, justice and peace. More
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specifically, both exile communities were very active in “coordination activ-
ities” (Karabegović 2019), first by forming links with other diaspora com-
munities and groups of human rights activists, and second by undertaking
strong lobbying with policymakers, the media, etc. through institutional
channels in their host countries and regions (such as the EU). Finally, both
cases also clearly illustrate the “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998),
whereby the diaspora communities solicited transnational and international
actors in order to pressurize their home states to cease committing human
rights violations and, later on, to step up transitional justice efforts to deal
with past human rights violations.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have focused on the role of diaspora communities as
transnational actors in various transitional justice processes in two geo-
graphical settings: first, in relation to their home countries, which they have
left behind (and often wish to return to); and second, in relation to their new
host countries. From the limited examples available, it is clear that, overall,
diaspora communities thus far are forgotten actors in transitional justice
processes. Yet they often play an important role in raising awareness about
human rights violations in their home state, in providing evidence and sup-
port to transitional justice institutions, and in advocating institutions that
seek for truth, justice and/or reparations. In this line, diaspora communities
have emerged in various settings as justice stakeholders in the domestic and
international spheres. The role of remembrance in these endeavours is cru-
cial, both at the individual level and the more collective one, as a symbolic
form of transitional justice, especially when there is not (yet) a space for
further forms of transitional justice. Although diaspora communities occupy
a very specific position in between these different worlds, their presence fre-
quently tends to remain hidden until specific turning points and transformative
events enable them to become more visible.
While concise, the two case discussions of Argentina and Colombia have
provided more elements to understand the particular backgrounds, working
methods and objectives that diaspora communities draw upon. While post-
dictatorship Argentina constitutes a classical example in the field of transi-
tional justice, with a clear focus on the criminal accountability of perpetrators,
Colombia is a more recent case, displaying a holistic and innovative
approach to dealing with past abuses. Both cases also illustrate the impor-
tance of expanding in-depth empirical case studies in order to broaden
theoretical frameworks.
Finally, the experiences of Argentina and Colombia open the door for more
research on more recent ongoing violent conflicts such as those in Afghanistan,
Syria or Myanmar. These conflicts produce yet more exiles on a daily basis as
well as new conflict-generated diaspora communities, whose very essence lies in
their forced displacement to other countries and regions of the world.
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9 Rural women and their access to
the law
Gendering the promise of post-war justice
Neloufer de Mel and Danushka Medawatte
Introduction
At the heart of Sri Lanka’s nearly three-decade-long civil war (1983–2009)
between the Sri Lankan state’s armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) over the formation of a separate state of Tamil Eelam,
were women with a variety of experiences of the war. Some were combatants,
administrative and nursing officers in the LTTE’s “Birds of Freedom”
women’s military wing or the Sri Lanka army’s Women’s Corps. Others were
part of the LTTE’s elite “Black Tiger” suicide squad. Numerically more sig-
nificant, however, are the women of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala ethnicity
who survived, bearing the brunt of the war and its aftermath, as war widows,
of whom there are an estimated 89,000 (Witting et al. 2016). In the former
war zones of the north and east, many Tamil and Muslim women are also
heads of households where livelihoods have been destroyed by the war
(International Crisis Group 2017). They are also victim-survivors of conflict-
related domestic and sexual violence, mothers, wives or sisters of family
members who were forcibly disappeared, and caregivers to those disabled
in the war if not disabled themselves. Women living in these areas as well as
in the contiguous border villages also face multiple internal displacements –
an estimated 80% of the displaced population were women (Satkunanathan
2018). The pervasive militarization of these areas has also meant restricted
mobility and insecurity for women (de Mel 2017; Satkunanathan 2018). As a
result of these experiences, women are also at the forefront of calls for tran-
sitional justice and accountability for war crimes, particularly in the north
and east, through membership of associations such as Families of the Dis-
appeared, Women’s Action Network, Maatram, Affected Women’s Forum,
Suriya Women’s Development Centre and the Trincomalee Women’s Network,
to name but a few.
Sri Lanka’s justice system has, by and large, failed these women. It is pla-
gued with issues that deter them from accessing it freely. Distance to courts
of law, poor public transportation particularly in rural areas, low levels of
legal literacy and high legal costs obstruct access to justice in general for
both men and women (Jayasundere and Valters 2014). Women face addi-
tional barriers, such as less access to information, greater restrictions to
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mobility and cultural attitudes that deter them from the judicial process
(Jayasundere and Valters 2014). Inadequate gender mainstreaming within the
law has resulted, moreover, in judicial bias against women (evident in the
misogynist stereotypes contained in legislative enactments)1 and the con-
sideration of women as unreliable witnesses in evidence procedures (Abey-
wardena 2016, pp. 37–44; Fonseka and Schulz 2018; de Mel and
Samararatne 2017; Medawatte 2020; Centre for Equality and Justice 2018).
These prejudices impact adversely on principles of equality and equity sup-
posedly at the heart of the law. As such, they also have implications for the
execution of transitional justice in Sri Lanka.
In relation to war-related harm, there have been only a few prosecutions to
date, whether for conflict-related sexual violence, such as the Krishanthi
Kumaraswamy and Vishvamadhu cases,2 or for enforced disappearances.3
These cases navigate/d a highly politicized context in which political inter-
ference, from the gathering of evidence at police stations onwards, is com-
monplace and a culture of impunity is entrenched (Pinto-Jayawardena and
Guthrie 2016; Pinto-Jayawardena and Anantharajah 2016). Successful pro-
secutions, such as in the Krishanthi Kumaraswamy case, were reliant on
political will at the highest levels of the executive and the military.4 In such
contexts but also more generally, in order to establish their autonomy, courts
of law establish maze-like procedures. These procedural intricacies favour
those who can afford good legal counsel, while those without such resources
are often stumped, constituting “a source of new imbalances” (Galanter
2002). All of the above in the Sri Lankan context has resulted, particularly
for poor, rural war-affected women, in a deterioration of trust in formal
institutions of justice. In this environment, their reliance on other frameworks of
justice play an important role when seeking redress for harms.
Understandings of justice in a border village
The data for this chapter is drawn from a rural border village in the former
war zone of the North Central Province of Sri Lanka. The term “border
village” denotes a village situated at the outskirts of a conflict zone, which
makes its residents and property vulnerable to direct attacks or indirect harm
resulting from the military incursions of the parties to the conflict.5 Its
income is derived from agriculture and the Civil Defence Force (CDF) to
which many of its men belong.6
The village suffered a horrific bombing attack during the war in which
many people, including children, died. As a small, endogamous village,
everyone lost a relative. A young woman’s impression on seeing the bodies
laid out in the village school hall was apt:
It was like seeing people we know at some kind of function … that was
how the bodies were also kept. That is to say, every face we saw, we
knew, recognized … that day was an event that I will never forget.7
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Apart from the bombing, following the abduction of two villagers by an
enemy group in the 1990s, about 100 families from this village had also spent
two long spells in refugee camps, one of which lasted nearly six years.8 On
returning to the village when it was safer, the villagers spent nights in make-
shift shelters in the forest to avoid enemy detection.9 They also spoke of
intergenerational harm and of disrupted education.10 We were also told that
many youngsters in the village were addicted to drugs, due to a sense of
stagnation and hopelessness.11 More than a decade after the bombing, its
narration continued to evoke powerful memories of loss.
The villagers’ narratives force a re-examination of a common assumption
that in such contexts anger and resentment against perpetrators of violence is
the default norm – a conjecture also informed by an adversarial legal system.
What we actually found were dissenting memories, and a departure from the
victor’s perspective, indicative, perhaps, of the rural peripherality of their
lives – even though all the women were Sinhala Buddhists and, as such,
beneficiaries of the Sri Lankan state’s emphasis of and support for Sinhala
Buddhism (see Chapter 4 in this volume). For them, the war was ambient but
not the only orientation point or route to the present. Many villagers
articulated a deeper sense of injustice at how the state had failed to provide
them with title deeds to the lands they had been forced to abandon during
the war, or at the re-demarcation of forest land undertaken by the Forest
Department which threatened their areas of cultivations. As noted by a
woman at a focus group discussion (FGD):
When speaking about the war, it has been … this is 2019, right? Yes, it’s
been ten years since the end of the war. These ten years have been
enough time for the government to restore the people who were affected
back to their normal life. That has not happened in our village.12
Clearly, no development drives have targeted the village. Its only educational
institution is a primary school. The prosperity in the south of the country,
where a majority of Sinhalese live, is missing – evident of how “large parts of
the rural hinterland, further away from Colombo, had little to show for it,
[with] many areas … only marginally better off than the war-torn districts of
the north and east that they border” (Venugopal 2018). In this context of
precarity, the villagers insisted on being in the moment, and not only in the
past. They subtly resist a politics of the “duty to remember” the war. In the
interviews the women came across as having a pragmatic, open-ended rela-
tionship with history, refusing to ransack the past for political or ethno-
nationalist gain (Eng and Kazanjian 2003; Judt in Rieff 2016, p. 80). They
did not speak ill of Tamils and some noted their traditional interactions, as a
border village, with this community although these connections have now
been lost.13 They did not abandon the idea of criminal justice for the war-
time harms they experienced. But they had a pragmatic approach to justice,
which emerged from their recognition that the legal system was stacked
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against them. From a Buddhist perspective they also noted that hatred
(vairaya), which one risks when remembering injustice, is harmful. When
asked for their responses to post-war justice claims, a woman declared “apo –
apita vairaya epa” (Oh no! We don’t want hatred), which also pointed to how
she understood our question on justice as being, first and foremost, about a
retributive system of criminal justice.
That respondent was Leelawathi (pseudonym). To date, she is the only
person from the village to be summoned to a court of law regarding a crime
committed during the war – in this case the abduction and murder of her
husband. Leelawathi’s narrative is instructive for understanding how the
weight of the law, which promises to act “in the best interests” of everyone
involved (Motha 2018), bears down on rural women. In the face of Leela-
wathi’s alienation from the law, her story also marks the transformative
potential of local cultural and religious beliefs. She draws on these beliefs to
remember the past in more agentive ways and to open a pathway to an ulti-
mate justice over which she has more control. Her decisions regarding post-
war justice illuminate the fault lines that will occur if transitional justice
maps itself onto existing legal procedures of criminal accountability. They
also invite us to reappraise the relationship between the law and the sentiment
dubbed “belief in a just world”.
The law’s authority and belief in a just world (BJW)
Citing a wide body of literature, Rachel Fasel and Dario Spini (2014) note
that “belief in a just world” enables people to confront their physical and
social environments as though they were stable and orderly, commit to long-
term personal goals and derive life satisfaction. Even when victimization is
systematic as in prolonged wars, this belief can enable greater resilience and
coping (p. 195). In a context such as post-war Sri Lanka, if belief in a just
world is crucial for resilience and recovery from war, what does access to the
law for war crimes mean for rural women who may hold different under-
standings of justice? Belief in a just world is neither a simple nor a homo-
genous category of beliefs. Sutton and Winnard (2007), citing the work of
Lipkus et al. (1996), emphasize a distinction between belief in a just world in
relation to self (the understanding that the world is fair to oneself), which
leads to motivation and confidence in the achievement of life goals, and
belief in a just world in relation to others (the understanding that the world
is fair to others). The latter can lead to prejudice and even a desire for
revenge against others, but also to mitigation of threats to oneself. Uphold-
ing a belief in a just world typically requires, therefore, constant effort. Vic-
tims do so by either denying or minimizing their hurts, by understanding
harm as inevitable or amendable, or by seeing themselves (in a self-accusatory
move) as the cause of the harm (Frankenberg 2014; Kaplan 2012).
Each of these positions is evident in Leelawathi’s narrative. What were her
expectations towards the law as justice, and towards the legal process for
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vindicating her rights as a war victim-survivor and adjudicating culpability
for the abduction and murder of her husband? Summoned to a High Court
for a hearing on the case, she did not comply. Her response to the law was
shaped by the generally felt disillusionment with law enforcement authorities.
The women spoke, for instance, about police prejudice against them not
necessarily because of their gender but because they were “uneducated and
poor”. They also noted that they would only approach the court, if at all, as
a collective group and not as individuals. For them, Heaven would be a place
where they were treated with dignity and respect by authority figures.14 Lee-
lawathi spoke, additionally, of being watched by the “enemy” and the fear of
being harmed while at court, rendering her children bereft again. She thereby
flagged witness protection as a crucial condition for accessing formal justice.
Eventually Leelawathi did go to court, but not before the law’s authority
bore down on her in the form of a police threat of a warrant against her,
perhaps for contempt of court.15 Apart from this intimidating and enforced
start, her entire experience at the High Court was one of bewilderment. She
related how she encountered “a well-dressed Tamil man with a flower in his
ear” and three or four other Tamil men at the court gates who frightened her,
prompting her to hide. This court is in the vicinity of a Hindu kovil (temple)
from which it is not uncommon for men (particularly in the north and east)
to come out after a puja (ceremonial worship) wearing a flower in their ear.16
For Leelawathi, a resident of a traditional Sinhala Buddhist village, this
encounter with a strange man, queered by his flower, was a site of incom-
prehensible cultural difference. As in Kafka’s short story “Before the law”
(whereby, like the supplicant at the gate in the story, Leelawathi is also a
petitioner from the countryside) these men at the gate of the law appear to
her as an intimidating hindrance to justice. Inside the court it is no better.
Only her name, that of her husband and the date on which he disappeared
are asked and confirmed in Sinhala. For the rest, the charges are read out in
Tamil, a language she does not understand. No translation is offered or
provided by the court.17 The court’s failure to abide by its constitutional
mandate of upholding the language rights of all citizens (Article 18 of the
1978 Constitution) positions her as an abject subject before the law.
The women’s statement that they would not go to court alone was borne
out by Soma (pseudonym) who accompanied Leelawathi to court. Soma’s
attitude to justice was markedly different to that of Leelawathi: she spoke a
language of rights and resistance and stated that the villagers had no option
but to protest, as the authorities and the media had failed to satisfy their
demands for justice. Soma also offered an alternative interpretation to
Leelawathi’s conduct in court. She recalled:
In the witness box she [Leelawathi] said “I forgive. I do not ask for
compensation. It can’t be calculated”. The judge didn’t speak but he
appeared to nod and approve of her statement. I was wondering whether
the judge doesn’t understand Sinhala. Did he not want to appreciate her
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when she smiled and forgave? I also wondered whether he was uppish
because of his position.
Even though Soma intuited that the judge approved of Leelawathi’s stance,
his failure to verbalize his approval had left her confused. Leelawathi, on the
other hand, was clear that she did not forgive the accused, although she did
voice empathy for him. She stated:
I don’t have hatred towards them. I will never litigate either. I will not do
anything unfair by them. This must be a sin I committed in a past life. If
not, if he committed it in this life, he must take responsibility for it, for
like your shadow that comes behind you, you must take responsibility
for your actions. I am removing this from the root itself. I will never hate
this person.
Locating her own victimhood within the laws of karma, Leelawathi decided
to walk away from court and avoid further involvement in the case. While
information on how her case concluded is unknown, what is important to
note here is that, in her rebuff of the court, she declines to be drawn back to
the law on its terms. Instead, she turns to an alternative system of under-
standing within Buddhism without the antagonism of accusation and retri-
bution that the law requires. Importantly, turning her back on the law was
neither about forgiveness (misread as such by Soma) nor the forgetting
demanded by political elites in favour of “moving on”. Rather, it signified a
belief in an ultimate justice – like a shadow that eventually catches up with a
culprit – that keeps to a different temporality than the law, because it need
not coincide with one’s particular lifetime. This belief in ultimate justice was
recognized by Fasel and Spini (2014) as an important coping mechanism
where war related victimization was systematic. Citing Maes (1998), they
noted:
When victimisation becomes a nearly ubiquitous phenomenon, as in
Kosovo, people may come to believe in ultimate justice: even if a situa-
tion is unjust at present, justice will be re-established sooner or later
(sometimes only after a person’s lifetime). Belief in ultimate justice is
associated with positive impressions of the victim, whereas belief in
immanent justice (the tendency to perceive justice in the events that have
already occurred) is more associated with devaluation of the victim and
ascription of responsibility.
(Fasel and Spini (2014, p. 195, emphasis in the original)
Leelawathi’s belief in an ultimate justice encourages her to be patient from a
place that is, for her, culturally secure, true and therefore agentive. From such
a place she refuses the law’s certainties. She told us of the alleged perpetrator:
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He was standing in the witness box. He was young, not old at all. He
was quite thin. Tall, like my son, and thin. He was wearing a checked
shirt and long black pants. He had become very, very thin. He looked at
my face twice or thrice as well. When the judge was reading that book,
he looked at me and frowned twice or thrice. The … court room is not
big – you can see the judge very clearly … He looked at me, and at that
moment, I thought to myself that if it is some sin I have committed, then
it is over in this lifetime, or if you have done something, then you have to
take responsibility for it.
Leelawathi’s insistence here on the provisional – “if it is some sin I have
committed” or “if you have done something, then you have to take respon-
sibility for it” marks the fact that she refuses to act “as if” – that locution
which, as Stewart Motha (2018) notes, is at the heart of the law’s grammar
because the law presents itself as if it is grounded on Kantian reason (p. 9)
and therefore as solid fact (p. 88). In other words, Leelawathi refuses to go
along with the prosecution’s premise that for the time being, for the purpose
of the court, this tall, thin young man who looks like her son is to be charged
as if he were the murderer. She told us, “I did not see what happened with
my own eyes, so how do I know?” Preferring to act on uncertainty rather
than on the constative “as if”, she refuses the law’s sleight of hand.
Conclusion
According to Felstiner et al. (1980–1), there are three stages associated
with accessing the law as justice: (1) recognizing an incident as injurious; (2)
attributing the injury to someone outside of oneself; and (3) requesting a
remedy for the harm (cited in Young 2009). While all three steps are
informed by social and cultural norms and are dependent on recognition as
well as BJW, the third step is particularly reliant on external sources such
as impartial courts. Where, due to a multiplicity of reasons, this third stage
fails to fulfil its promise, the effect of this failure on the victim-survivor, his/her
immediate family and social circle is adverse. This is viscerally heightened in
situations of armed conflict where, for women, the everyday challenges of
gender insecurity and discrimination are exacerbated by trauma, displace-
ment, poverty, peripherality, fragmentation of family and community, as well
as risks in witnessing.
In courts of law, the broken promise of justice means impunity and lack of
accountability for various crimes: a condition which, in Sri Lanka, both
predates and postdates the war (Pinto-Jayawardena and Anantharajah 2016;
Fonseka and Schultz 2018; Woodworth and Fonseka 2016; Dancy and Wie-
belhaus-Brahm 2019). When the law fails victims-survivors, they resort or
return to BJW to mitigate what is injurious in their physical and social
environments. As the women’s narratives reflect, however, there is no single
approach to the law and/or justice. While for many of them law enforcement
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has shown its limits by failing to protect their dignity, Soma, for instance,
kept her faith in the legal arena as an important site of “protest for justice
for what they lost”. Her approach is resonant with the demands of many
Tamil women in the north and east for accountability through the courts
(inclusive of international judges) for enforced disappearances (Amnesty
International 2017; de Mel and Kodikara 2018). Leelawathi’s rejection of the
law, on the other hand, challenged the idea of requesting a remedy through
the courts altogether, and moved it towards a place of internal transforma-
tion within her control. Where the court was a theatre of bewilderment and
fear, her route took an alternative inward journey, to a place Ratna Kapur
(2018) would characterize as holding other “vocabularies of freedom” which
challenge the “fishbowl” of liberal human rights.
Critiques of liberal human rights are all the more important as these rights
are central to transitional justice doctrine (Posner and Vermeule, cited in
Webber 2012). Kapur does not dismiss the necessity of rights. Her argument,
rather, is that
The notion that divergent understandings of freedom have always existed
outside of the liberal and neoliberal imaginaries and related market
terms is either barely considered by those who shape, support and
implement the rights regime, or considered inherently alien and therefore
irrelevant to the recursive ideological currents within the fishbowl.
(Kapur, 2018, p. 1).
This is why, even when transitional justice has accommodated local methodol-
ogies of justice as in the gacaca courts of Rwanda or the Special Court in Sierra
Leone, the results have been mixed. Coerced participation and the footprint of
stern post-conflict states with their own versions of reconciliation apart, these
experiments have also been marred by a tension in the imposition of interna-
tional frameworks which sit uneasily with local practices and expectations
(Thomson and Nagy 2010, pp. 14–15, 20; Kelsall 2009; Friedman 2017, p. 384).
While we were interviewing her, Leelawathi left apologetically, stating that
she had been called for a kiri dane (an almsgiving where women “of good
character” play a dominant role) organized by a family in the village. They
were unable to start without her. Where she had been unable to be agentive
before the law, in the village she had forged for herself a role of belonging
and leadership through her spirituality. Nowhere in her narrative did she
refuse the necessity for justice or ask that the perpetrator be pardoned. It is
just that her sense of justice transcended retribution, particularly in a context
of doubt, given that the abductions took place in the forest, and the killings
elsewhere, without village witnesses. She also noted that the accused pro-
duced at court may have been too young to commit the crime. Uncomfor-
table not only with court procedures but also with the prosecution’s
assumptions, she turned her back on the law because it was at odds with the
kind of justice and closure she required.
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What are the implications of Leelawathi’s trajectory for understanding the
challenges of criminal accountability in the context of war? This is an
important question for transitional justice in Sri Lanka. While her retreat
from the law is an individual choice, other war-affected women continue to
look to the courts for justice. A transformative justice would necessarily
ensure full and equitable access for all women to the law in the first place.
But beyond this, it would also have to accept that criminal justice as cur-
rently provided by the law is limited in both its substantive and procedural
aspects. A transformative approach would, then, carefully but necessarily
endorse a system that accepts a range of justice procedures and outcomes. To
be fair, transitional justice does attempt this in its four pillars of criminal
accountability, reparation, truth-telling and institutional reform, designed to
enable different registers and arrangements of justice. Paul Gready (2011, p. 5)
argues, moreover, of its “shift in ethos from substitution (choosing one
mechanism over another … ) to complementarity”. Yet a hierarchy which
values the accountability pillar over the others still persists (International
Center for Transitional Justice n.d.),18 especially where, as in Sri Lanka,
accountability has been overlooked. Where even in these limited circum-
stances, formal legal justice remains the primary site of adjudicating criminal
accountability, Leelawathi’s discomfort with its dualism and authoritative-
ness calls for amending the law in a manner that frees, without prejudice or
dismissal, the witness who is not a suspect from conforming to the pressures of
adversariality and retribution. This does not mean giving up on the goal of
accountability. Rather, it requires states to redouble their efforts at finding
other sources of evidence, thereby disbursing evidentiary responsibility
beyond the witness. This is especially important for preventing the state from
adopting the easier route of dropping a case altogether for lack of witnesses,
particularly when the accused is a favoured party. Revising legislation and
evidence procedures in this manner goes beyond fixing gaps in implementa-
tion to re-evaluate assumptions at the heart of the law itself. It also means
instantiating an ecology of justice in which the diverse experiences and choi-
ces of war-affected women in particular, with their different understandings
of justice, find acceptance.
Notes
1 See for instance, Section 8 – Matrimonial Rights and Inheritance (Jaffna) Ordi-
nance No. 1 of 1911 as amended; Section 3 Vagrants Ordinance No. 4 of 1881 as
amended; Section 40 of Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No 19 of 1931 as
amended; and Sections 27 and 28 of Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Act No. 13
of 1951 as amended.
2 The gang rape and murder of Krishanthy Kumaraswamy, a schoolgirl, and the
murder of her mother and brother, and another villager who was among the search
party occurred in 1996. The accused were military officers and one Reserve Con-
stable manning the Chemmuni Checkpoint at which Krishanthi had been
detained while returning home after sitting the Advanced Level Examination. The
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accused were produced before a three-member High Court Bench in 1997. The
three judges issued three separate judgments which were later challenged at the
Supreme Court as being evidence of lack of concurrence and so were used by
the accused-appellants for a trial de novo. However, the Supreme Court (S.C
Appeal No. 2/2002) determined the Trial at Bar decision valid as all the judges
had arrived at the same decision, albeit through diverse reasoning processes. The
Vishvamadhu case is for the gang rape in 2010 (after the war ended) of a 27-
year-old woman known in the legal record as ‘Vishvamadhu’ (the locus of the
crime) and the sexual abuse of another woman. At the Trial at Bar (case number
HC1569/2012 in Jaffna High Court) four Sri Lanka army personnel of the 572nd
Brigade were found guilty and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for up to 30
years. At an appeal on the basis that there were flaws in the identification of the
accused-appellants, the Court of Appeal set aside the initial conviction and dis-
charged the men on 10 October 2019. This acquittal has been challenged by
Vishvamadhu and her case is ongoing.
3 One such bench at the Permanent Trial at Bar of the Colombo High Court was
appointed in February 2020 to hear the abduction and disappearance of Prageeth
Ekneligoda allegedly by Sri Lanka army men in 2010. Ekneligoda was a journal-
ist. The other is on 11 young men allegedly abducted and disappeared by naval
personnel in and around Colombo in 2008. Fourteen navy officers have been
implicated in the crime with ransom as an alleged motive. However, both cases
remain unresolved and open pending more evidence. Decades after the crimes
were committed no perpetrators have yet been brought to justice.
4 Interview with Prashanthi Mahindraratne, prosecutor of the Krishanthi
Kumaraswamy case. Colombo, November 2020.
5 Data is drawn from the Pluralistic Memories Project (PMP) 2015; Women,
Trauma and Peacebuilding (WTP) project, 2018, and the GCRF Gender Justice
and Security Hub project FGDs, 2019. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
6 The Civil Defence Force is akin to the Home Guards and is paramilitary by
nature. It was established by the Sri Lanka government under the Mobilization
and Supplementary Forces Act No. 40 of 1985. It functions under the Ministry of
Defence, and during the war members of the CDF were tasked with the protec-
tion of border villages. CDF men are drawn primarily from such villages and
alternate between agricultural activity and defence.
7 PMP interview 16, 2015.
8 PMP interview 18, 2015; WTP respondent 1, KPI 1 2018.
9 WTP KPI 1 2018; PMP interview 17, 2015.
10 WTP KPI 1, 2018; PMP interview 17, 2015.
11 WTP respondent 1, KPI1, 2018.
12 GCRF interview participant, August 2019.
13 The village has had a long history of interaction with Tamils who have either
passed through it on their way to the east, taken cattle and carts through the
forest skirting the village, or bought cow dung from the villagers. PMP interviews
17 and 18, 2015.
14 GCRF FGD, August 2019.
15 The threat of a “warrant” is conveyed to Leelawathi by the local police force.
Leelawathi, interview, August 2019.
16 Interview with a human rights lawyer who practises in the north and east, August
2019.
17 This is a common experience for Tamil speakers who encounter, on a daily basis,
the dominance of the Sinhala language, including in courts of law.
18 In an introduction to transitional justice, the ICTJ states, for instance, that “[t]
ransitional justice is rooted in accountability and redress for victims. It recognizes
134 Neloufer de Mel and Danushka Medawatte
their dignity as citizens and as human beings. Ignoring massive abuses is an easy
way out but it destroys the values on which any decent society can be built”.
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10 Former combatants
Assessing their reintegration ten years after
the end of war
Ramila Usoof-Thowfeek and Viyanga Gunasekera
Introduction
When years of fighting, hostilities and destruction that characterize intract-
able conflicts come to an end, many mistakenly believe that it also signifies a
return to normal; a return to complete peace and the end of tensions, vio-
lence and challenges. However, examples from all over the world and many
different conflicts show that this is far from the reality. Intractable conflicts
leave people grieving, injured both physically and psychologically, often
needing help in forging a way forward: communities that are fragmented
and lacking in both resources and relationships that otherwise would have
held them together (Coleman 2000). Many countries that have experienced
intractable conflicts are found to have regressed economically and in other
facets of development (Muggah 2005). Therefore, despite expectations and
hope, it is clear that after an intractable conflict, moving forward needs
careful consideration, strategizing, planning and implementation of pro-
grammes that facilitate a successful transition to a more peaceful post-war
and eventually a post-conflict state.
Transitional justice is an important mechanism used when normal justice
systems are inadequate for addressing war crimes and past conflict-related
abuse and where communities and social relations are fractured and in need
of transition to peace (Garcia-Godos and Sriram 2013). One such aspect of
peacebuilding and transitional justice is the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration of ex-combatants. For a variety of reasons such as the
likelihood of recidivism, broken bonds of trust and social cohesion and the
long-term goal of reconciliation, it is seen as important to have a particular
focus on ex-combatants in post-conflict communities (Nilsson 2005; Berdal
and Ucko 2013). Known by the acronym DDR or DDRR, the standard
process pivots on three facets: (1) disarmament involving the collection and
disposal of weapons; (2) demobilization entailing the discharge of comba-
tants from armed groups; and (3) reintegration as the long-term process of
integrating former combatants to civilian status, providing viable employ-
ment and placing them in their former communities (Muggah 2005; Waldorf
2013). DDR has become a central part of international peacebuilding,
peacekeeping and transitional justice, as it is considered essential for
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stabilizing security, limiting the risks of return to violence and long-term
social cohesion (Garcia-Godos and Sriram 2013).
This process is long and can be difficult because it is often not linear and
sequential (Berdal and Ucko 2013). Defining and identifying combatants
who take part in DDR programmes is in itself a sensitive issue especially in
the context of civil wars where many combatants are forcefully recruited, or
are irregular combatants, “war wives”, or child combatants who may not
necessarily bear arms and commit crimes but merely accompany fighting
forces (Waldorf 2013). Furthermore, while DDR focuses on ex-combatants
and state security, transitional justice focuses on accountability and victims,
and the two processes often take parallel paths in terms of operations.
The reintegration aspect of DDR, which is a long-term process, needs to
be closely linked with transitional justice processes so that it facilitates the
social reintegration of ex-combatants (Waldorf 2013). Social reintegration is
basically the process through which ex-combatants navigate their post-war
identities and social relationships (Friedman 2018). Community life and
social relationships are important components of one’s psychosocial well-
being and effective agency. In the case of ex-combatants returning to civilian
communities, these steps are seen as critical in reclaiming or forming iden-
tities and belonging within the community. The deep stigmatization and
reluctance on the part of the community to accept former combatants as
members of their ingroups are crucial issues that DDR programmes often
fail to address. Waldorf (2013) recommends employing transitional justice
mechanisms such as truth commissions, local justice processes and memor-
ialization rituals where ex-combatants are given a public space to tell their
stories, apologize, undergo purification rituals or justice processes as solu-
tions to this challenge. Such practices would help the community to indivi-
dualize criminal responsibility, empathize with the other and not necessarily
perceive and treat all ex-combatants as having committed war crimes. Over-
all, such transitional justice practices may reduce fears, resentment, stigma-
tization and discrimination against ex-combatants if they are given the
chance to tell their stories and make amendments publicly. This, in turn,
would benefit their social reintegration (pp. 72–3).
DDR programmes are also important because they allow international
bodies, such as the United Nations, governments and government agencies,
international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to help in
post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice processes (Muggah 2005).
Although there have been about 60 such DDR processes globally, during the
past three decades, which have been successful, there also have been contexts
where the DDR process has been more difficult and challenging. The Sri
Lankan case is one such situation.
This chapter critically examines the nature of the DDR process put in
place by the Sri Lankan government, its achievements, pitfalls and the state
of the process more than a decade after the end of the war. The chapter first
discusses DDR as a concept, transitional justice and the importance of
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meaningful reintegration of ex-combatants. Next, it focuses on the Sri
Lankan context, its civil war and the implementation of DDR in an envir-
onment where the state won an overwhelming military victory over the Lib-
eration Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The chapter foregrounds its findings
under three main sections: (1) how the state discourse around DDR and ex-
combatants was framed; (2) how it was legitimized by handpicked academics
through research; and (3) alternative findings and narratives on the experi-
ences and challenges faced by LTTE ex-combatants and military personnel.
In conclusion, the chapter discusses the need for a more transformative
politics and programmes for better integration and social participation of
ex-combatants in Sri Lanka.
Background: Sri Lanka’s war
For 30 years, since the mid-1970s, Sri Lanka was embroiled in a civil war
between the LTTE and the government’s armed forces. While there is con-
tention about the starting point of the war, many scholars agree that a long-
term feeling of deprivation among the Tamil community was pivotal in the
formation of the LTTE and its subsequent militancy. Certainly, the attacks
perpetrated on the Tamil community in July 1983, known as Black July, was
also fertile grounds for recruitment of combatants to the LTTE (Perera
2001). The war raged most severely in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
However, many other areas of the country were also susceptible to violence,
characterized by sporadic attacks on government installations and suicide
bombings targeting populated areas. While initially recruitment to the LTTE
tended to be voluntary, in later years, as the fighting intensified, the LTTE
instantiated forced recruitment as a means of bolstering its forces and
dwindling ranks. Nevertheless, at the end of the war in 2009, it was estimated
that 25,000 combatants, including those who played more civilian/adminis-
trative roles, were enlisted by the LTTE (Richards 2014). This also included
children, many of them forcibly recruited, and women cadres, some of whom
played a central role in combat, bearing higher military ranks and partici-
pating in high-profile missions – especially suicide bombing missions (Fried-
man 2018). On the other hand, it is estimated that during the 30-year war
over 300,000 soldiers were recruited to the government’s armed forces (A
correspondent 2012). The majority of these recruits tended to be from rural
areas and lower socio-economic circumstances. Collectively, therefore, the
number of former combatants in Sri Lanka who have war exposure run into
the hundreds of thousands. Despite this large number of people with direct
involvement in military activities on both sides, the focus has been very much
on the DDR process involving former LTTE combatants rather than soldiers
in the government’s armed forces. This was largely the result of the
circumstances under which the civil war ended.
In 2009, the Sri Lankan government’s armed forces announced the defeat
of the LTTE. At the end of the war, it was reported that between 10,000–
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12,000 LTTE combatants (depending on different sources) had either sur-
rendered or had been taken into custody by the Sri Lanka military (Roberts
2011; Antonovskaya 2015; Gunasekera and Pathiraja 2019). Additionally,
much of the LTTE’s weaponry was captured during the final push by the Sri
Lanka military.
As a means of moving forward on transitional justice and dealing with the
large number of LTTE combatants in its custody immediately after the war,
the Sri Lankan government embarked on a process ostensibly geared towards
rehabilitating and reintegrating these ex-combatants. Given the nature of its
unilateral war victory, the disarmament and demobilization phases of the
DDR were already redundant. Rehabilitation and reintegration became a
focus only in relation to ex-LTTE combatants and not the state’s military
personnel (Hettiarachchi 2013, pp. 106–7; Dharmawardhane 2013, p. 28).
DDR, which is generally designed as a consensual process between warring
parties and a precondition to a ceasefire or peace agreement (Subedi 2013;
Antonovskaya 2015), took a different form in Sri Lanka, however, in the
context of the state’s unilateral victory over the LTTE, whereby the defeated
side did not have a say in the process.
Ten years on, the process of rehabilitation and reintegration that the Sri
Lankan government embarked upon still raises questions. Despite the fact
that its formal phase has more or less come to an end, as we will discuss later
in the chapter, many ex-combatants who went through the process continue to
struggle, hidden behind new political realities. We will also analyse the
situation of the Sri Lanka army soldiers who were not included in the
rehabilitation and reintegration process of the DDR programme.
The state narrative of the DDR process
Just as the details around the final stage of the war have been a tightly
guarded secret, so too were the details about the rehabilitation process that
ex-LTTE combatants underwent. The rehabilitation process was completely
under the control of the Sri Lankan government forces, especially the Sri
Lanka Army. The immediate aftermath of the war also saw a complete ban
on any other party, whether local and international NGOs, researchers and
scholars, or advocacy groups with contacts with the war-affected population
in the newly “liberated” provinces. The government at the time carefully
crafted a narrative in which any organization that had expressed sympathy or
concern for the Tamil community in the North and East were labelled as
“anti-Sri Lanka” and “pro-LTTE”. This was not surprising given the antag-
onism of the government to many international and local advocacy and
NGOs (Gomez 2018; Höglund and Orjuela 2013; Webber et al. 2018). It was
the case, however, that a small select team of psychologists and academics
were given access to the rehabilitees (Webber et al. 2018). However, ten years
after the ending of the war, ex-combatants who underwent the rehabilitation
process are still reluctant to talk about their experiences. Trying to
Former combatants 141
understand what ex-LTTE combatants underwent during rehabilitation
requires, therefore, a piecing together of information from many different
sources. This is important because it provides a basis for a better under-
standing of the rehabilitation programme in Sri Lanka and of ex-combatants
as “forgotten actors”.
According to the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation
(BCGR), the military arm in charge of the rehabilitation process, it was for-
malized in 2006 through a gazette notification to enable ex-LTTE comba-
tants who had surrendered, or who had been taken into custody by the Sri
Lanka government armed forces, to be rehabilitated. However, given Sri
Lanka’s long history of ethnic strife and insurrection, the idea of rehabilita-
tion had been in the official discourse much longer. The first occasion upon
which Sri Lanka employed a rehabilitation programme was in 1971 after the
defeat of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurrection. It was not
conceived as a comprehensive programme but is generally considered a suc-
cess, as the JVP has evolved into a strong political movement (Hettiarachchi
2013). The current programme for the rehabilitation of ex-LTTE combatants
has been set up under the Ministry of Defence, with some involvement of the
Ministry of Justice, and is now vested with the Ministry of Justice, Human
Rights and Legal Reform. The procedure for rehabilitation began with the
categorization of the rehabilitees according to their levels of exposure and
involvement, gender and whether they were adults or children. Throughout
its existence the commissioner of the BCGR has been a senior army officer
(BCGR 2011).
The rehabilitation programme established at the end of the war stood on
six pillars (Webber et al. 2018). These were (1) spiritual, religious and cul-
tural rehabilitation; (2) educational rehabilitation; (3) vocational rehabilita-
tion geared at livelihood development; (4) family, social and community
rehabilitation; (5) psychological and creative therapies rehabilitation; and (6)
sports and extracurricular activities.
Access to rehabilitees and research
The final stage of the war, when fighting was at its most intense, was dubbed
a “humanitarian mission” by the government. In the same vein, the DDR
programme was dubbed “humanitarian mission two” (Hettiarachchi 2018).
The rehabilitation of ex-LTTE combatants was legitimized and, nationally
and internationally, promoted as being “based on Buddhist principles of
forgiveness and compassion”. The LTTE cadres were constantly described as
“diehard ruthless terrorists” and “human beings whose minds were dis-
torted”, who were in need of reversing their “radicalization process” (BCGR
2011; Hettiarachchi 2014). As we will discuss later in the chapter, the Sri
Lanka DDR programme was justified as a mechanism of transitional justice
geared towards fostering reconciliation and social cohesion, although others
have described it as a tool for strengthening the victor’s security and
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governance, legitimizing social and political control of ex-combatants and
silencing minority voices (Schröter 2013; Subedi 2013).
While the BCGR describes a six-pillar process, according to other sources
the programme was described as a 6+1 process, with the rehabilitation of the
community added as a separate pillar (Hettiarachchi 2015). Furthermore,
detailed information on the programme was available only to a hand-picked
group of persons who had been granted access to the rehabilitees during the
rehabilitation period. Interestingly, a number of papers written by this group
describe the rehabilitation process as a success story (see Kruglanski et al.
2014; Hettiarachchi 2013, 2014, 2015, 2018; Webber et al. 2018). Their papers
also include the discussion of some empirical work conducted by this team.
For example, Webber et al. (2018, p. 542) describe studies conducted with the
rehabilitees while they were still at the rehabilitation centres, which examined
attitudinal change induced by the training. Using questionnaires (translated
into, but not necessarily validated in, local languages) measuring embedded-
ness, extremism attitudes, deradicalization and change of status, the
researchers concluded that those who completed the rehabilitation process
had given up their “radical”, “extremist” and “terrorist” ways (Webber et al.
2018)
In order to bolster the claim of the efficacy of the rehabilitation pro-
gramme, the researchers also conducted a second, follow-up study (Webber
et al. 2018, p. 562). In this study, rehabilitees who had completed the pro-
gramme were compared to a sample from the community. Again, it was
found that the rehabilitees were more likely to express attitudes that rejected
extremism and violence. Additionally, the study also concluded that rehabi-
litees were more likely to have positive attitudes toward Sinhala people and
the Sri Lankan government. The researchers asserted that they were not
associated with the then government or the military in any way (Webber et
al. 2018, p. 546). However, their findings were used to refute and question
opinions that were critical of the government’s handling of the immediate
aftermath of the war. These studies were hence instrumental not only to
defend the government’s conduct in handling the Tamil community in aca-
demic discourse on the end of the war, but also in promoting the govern-
ment’s case in the face of international criticism. The researchers were invited
to speak at different government-sponsored or government-organized forums
to share their findings (Kruglanski 2012). However, questions regarding the
research ethics and methodology can be raised.
For instance, the researchers do not discuss the power dynamics of the
context within which their research was conducted (Kruglanski et al. 2014;
Hettiarachchi 2013, 2014, 2015, 2018; Webber et al. 2018). The fact that they
were allowed into highly restricted facilities would have immediately signalled
to the rehabilitees that they were sanctioned by the government and the
military. Therefore, given the restricted freedoms conferred on the rehabili-
tees, the notion of informed consent and voluntary participation becomes
problematic. It is unlikely that, in this context, respondents would perceive
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that they were in a position to decline taking part in the research without
fearing consequences. Overall, the unilateral victory that ended the war, and
the ethos of triumphalism vs subjugation that governed the relationships
between Sinhala and Tamils, between the government of Sri Lanka and the
Tamil community, between the state military and the former LTTE comba-
tants, appears to have permeated a specific reading of the context that orients
the goals and conduct of the research. These issues are not addressed in their
work published so far.
The rehabilitees also included children, but there is little information pro-
vided in the studies as to how standards of informed consent and voluntary
participation were met in the case of these minors. Additionally, the context
and the manner in which data was collected raises some methodological
questions. The studies do not address how the military presence during data
collection was handled. This becomes important in the context of other
reports that rehabilitees were forced to complete questionnaires while at the
rehabilitation centres (Roberts 2011). The likelihood that they would freely
and without fear respond to the questionnaires needs to be critically exam-
ined. Therefore, the findings and the assertions made in these studies need to
be read with caution.
Challenges and experiences faced by former combatants and the
Sri Lanka military
In contrast, a larger number of studies have pointed to difficulties of reinte-
gration. The success of a post-war DDR process is measured by the success
of the reintegration of former combatants (Khan et al. 2018). Given the
constraints of access to ex-combatants while on the rehabilitation pro-
gramme, and the ethical challenges associated with this situation, many
researchers approached ex-combatants only after they had been released for
reintegration into the community. These studies pay careful attention to
ethical concerns and security in working with such a vulnerable population
(Krishnan 2012; Azmi 2015; Friedman 2018; Kabir 2018; Gunasekera and
Pathiraja 2019). One particular reason for the security concerns is that many
ex-combatants believed they were under continuous surveillance by the military
and police.
Although ex-combatants had completed the formal rehabilitation pro-
gramme stipulated by the government, the CID and army intelligence officers
were believed to follow them within their communities (Roberts 2011; Azmi
2015). While the official justification for this surveillance was that it was to
ensure the non-involvement of ex-combatants with groups or people that
could pose a threat to the country, many ex-combatants saw this as a sign
that they were not trusted by the authorities. Ironically, although the main
aim of the rehabilitation programme was to ensure that they became reor-
iented towards the community, continued surveillance has caused their
ostracism, as including them in social interactions risks bringing unwanted
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attention to the whole community. This is further compounded by the fact
that family members or associates of ex-combatants have been questioned or
pursued by the authorities due to missteps by an ex-combatant (Roberts
2011).
Furthermore, although the 6+1 rehabilitation uses the term “beneficiary”
to describe an ex-combatant, the terms “ex-combatant” and “ex-LTTEer”
have become entrenched both in official communication and day-to-day dis-
course. This identity is formalized by a certificate provided to all rehabilitees,
which includes information on the rehabilitation process, that they are
required to carry throughout their lifetimes (Gunasekera and Pathiraja
2019). This impedes successful reintegration, as having to carry such doc-
umentation means that ex-combatants cannot expunge their past histories
and move forward. Having to deal with such labels also has negative reper-
cussions on a person’s ability to secure employment. Many firms do not want
to employ people with such a past for fear of attracting the scrutiny of the
authorities on their businesses or organizations. Additionally, despite the
LTTE having claimed to be the sole representative of the Tamil people, many
Tamils have mixed feelings about the group. Therefore, people do not always
trust those who associated with the LTTE (Usoof-Thowfeek 2018).
Livelihood and work-related challenges
While these reasons are associated with high rates of unemployment among
ex-combatants, a shortage of viable employment opportunities further
exacerbates the situation. According to the BCGR, unemployment rates have
been as high as 16% among the ex-combatant group at certain times. The
Northern Province in general tends to have a very high rate of unemploy-
ment, largely due to its history of under-development and exposure to the
war. With the restriction on movement placed on the rehabilitees by the
BCGR, ex-combatants are limited to finding work within the community
(although some have been able to secure employment abroad with permission
from the Bureau). Although the rehabilitation programme focused largely
on the acquisition of skills such as carpentry, masonry, mechanics, informa-
tion technology, etc., the work most commonly available in the Northern
Province tends to be daily wage work, often centred around development
projects. More recently, however, these opportunities have also become lim-
ited with southern contractors bringing their own labour force (Silva et al.
2018). Other job opportunities have been on the controversial military-run
agricultural farms in the North and East. These are viewed as attempts by
the Sri Lanka military to take control of the agricultural production in these
provinces, in a context whereby local farmers are unable to compete with
large-scale farms powered by free and/or cheap labour. Self-employment
among ex-combatants has also been promoted by the government, but due
to the above-mentioned reasons and the lack of entrepreneurial training,
many have not been able to sustain these endeavours. This is especially true
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for child ex-combatants, who, because of their involvement in the war, lost
years of education that would otherwise have prepared them for a career. As
such, none of the prospects promised by the government really provided a
clear career path for ex-combatants (Miriyagalla 2014).
Female ex-combatants
The situation of female ex-combatants has been of particular interest in the
discourse about rehabilitation and reintegration. With very traditional
gender norms still prevalent in Sri Lanka, and particularly in the Northern
and Eastern Provinces, women are particularly susceptible to challenges in
reintegration. For example, women associated with the LTTE and who have
been in combat are seen as deviant and are therefore stigmatized and ostra-
cized from their communities. Where women in general have found it difficult
to find work, given the nature of the job market in these provinces, some
female ex-combatants are also heads of households. Having to sustain
themselves and their families within the narrow confines of acceptable gender
roles has been quite distressing (Usoof-Thowfeek 2018). This is particularly
so as the measure of successful reintegration for female ex-combatants is
adopted within these narrow, conservative and traditional gender norms. For
instance, marriage and starting a family are regarded as key markers of the
successful reintegration of a woman (Krishnan 2012, p. 10; Martin 2017, p.
81). State- and military-sponsored mass weddings were quite common at the
end of the rehabilitation processes. These were often graced by high-level
politicians and military personnel, and were widely telecast over electronic
media with little regard for the privacy of the rehabilitees involved. However,
not all of these marriages result in “happily ever after”, given the higher rates
of divorce, separation and abandonment among ex-combatants (Gunasekera
and Pathiraja 2019). This adds another layer of challenge to the experiences
of female ex-combatants who face further stigma and ostracization when a
marriage fails. But most importantly, these narrow interpretations of gender
roles prevent women from imagining a future for themselves in which they
have the freedom to redefine their expectations of what is possible and
acceptable.
Rehabilitation and reintegration within the Sri Lanka military
While a significant body of literature has focused on the rehabilitation and
reintegration of ex-LTTE combatants, the process for soldiers of the Sri
Lanka military has gained little attention. The rehabilitation and reintegra-
tion of military personnel has been completely under the purview of the
military. While the government has been eager to speak of the rehabilitation
of the LTTE combatants, the process in relation to Sri Lankan military per-
sonnel has garnered very little attention. Most discussions on the topic have
been from a purely physical well-being aspect, focused on those who have
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suffered injury and/or are disabled. This is the focus of institutions such as
Ranaviru Sevana and Abhimansala. Weisdorf and Sørensen (2019) describe
this focus on disability as being protective for the soldier (p. 97). They con-
tend that, despite being disabled, it allowed soldiers to take on a certain level
of heroism. However, ten years after the ending of the war these institutions
are hardly ever heard of and there is little discussion about the programmes
that help former military personnel. What has been continuously missing
from this discussion is the question of what mechanisms should be put in
place to support those who have not been disabled in fighting but who have
still been directly involved in combat. For example, these soldiers are trained
in the use of weaponry and some have only known a life of combat for sev-
eral decades. Therefore, it is important to have some training that prepares
them for civilian life, especially upon retirement and during periods of rela-
tive peace. This is particularly the case when, after the end of war, the mili-
tary diversified into other ventures, such as the tourism service sector where
soldiers did become involved in the management and running of hotels, but
where the numbers involved in such ventures have been small.
Additionally, with the unilateral victory by the Sri Lanka armed forces in
2009, one wonders whether maintaining the image of the army as unfaltering
and undefeated also played a role in suppressing the narrative on military
rehabilitation. To admit that soldiers needed help with reintegration would
damage the narrative constructed about the Sri Lanka military and thereby
be considered disrespectful. The result of this is that thousands of military
personnel with weapons training, who directly experienced the horrors of
war, have been left without the help they might need to reacclimatize to
civilian roles. Certain statistics suggest indeed that help is needed: researchers
have pointed to high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder and other psy-
chological disorders among military personnel exposed to war (Fernando
and Jayatunge 2013). The toll exerted on families and communities when
large numbers of military personnel suffer from such psychological distress
can be substantial. Additionally, there have been reports of ex-military per-
sonnel and deserters’ involvement in crime. In one report, according to police
statistics, military deserters were involved in 18% of crimes committed in the
country (Colombage 2014). The government’s strategy so far has been to
announce amnesty periods periodically and once a considerable number of
deserters have surrendered or have been arrested, they are discharged from
the military with no programmes that prepare them for civilian life. However,
this is not a far-reaching solution to help those in the military reintegrate
into civilian lives during more peaceful times.
Conclusion
Ten years after the end of the war, Sri Lanka still needs to confront the
reintegration needs of those who had, for several decades, fought the war.
Both former military personnel attached to the Sri Lankan armed forces as
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well as those who had fought on the side of the LTTE seem to have been left
behind to fight another battle. In the North and East, rehabilitees are
resentful towards government and military authorities as well as their own
communities because they are unable to move forward. The system has not
given them the freedom to redefine themselves in relation to their current
lives, make public amends and gain the acceptance and trust of their com-
munities. Who they are today, and who they will be tomorrow is, above all,
defined by their past: in some cases, a past that was chosen for them.
On the other hand, for those in the government armed forces, being dis-
abled is the most acceptable way of having a voice in the reintegration debate.
Those who have not suffered such a catastrophe have had to continue to play
the role of the invincible, ever-unfaltering soldier, called upon to fulfil many
different tasks – from keeping the city clean, to selling vegetables, to working
in the hospitality industry and, mostly recently, preventing the spread of
coronavirus disease (COVID-19). This status change cannot be easy. It is
clear that if this situation is left as is, it poses a threat to future reconciliation
and social cohesion, as the country attempts to move forward from a history
of violence and conflict.
As much as DDR might be viewed as a next required and inevitable step
in post-war scenarios, ensuring the inclusion of forgotten actors such as ex-
combatants and state military personnel in transitional justice processes such
as this is of paramount importance for meaningful reconciliation and sus-
tainable peace. Limiting the militarization and surveillance of ex-combatants
is a long-overdue first step. Ideally, government institutes, together with civil
society, could then take steps to initiate a truth-telling process and provide
the space to share the pluralistic memories of ex-combatants and communities,
in order to seek communal forgiveness and acceptance, restore the dignity of
victims, address justice concerns, help outsiders to understand the different
sociocultural and political circumstances that led people to become parties to
violence, or promote ritualistic penance and communal healing. Such steps
would benefit not only ex-combatants and their communities but also the
state by meaningfully addressing international allegations of human rights
abuse, inculcating trust in national and international transitional justice and
reconciliation processes, and encouraging forgotten actors to participate
more proactively in peacebuilding as well as in the socio-economic and
political development of the country.
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11 Constructive resistance and the




There is a significant and compelling body of work on transitional justice
that encourages scholars, practitioners and policymakers to rethink the field’s
assumptions about how best to address large-scale human rights violations of
the past. This might be in relation to its liberal vision of transition and
democracy (Sharp 2018), the ability of international experts and transitional
justice entrepreneurs to generate the change that they want in varied domes-
tic contexts (McAuliffe 2017), or the expectation that transitional justice
should bring about closure and reconciliation (Weinstein 2011). I believe that
this work should be taken seriously, and that if we wish to think differently
about transitional justice, then we must interrogate and reflect on the labels
we give to actors whose motivations, actions and impacts we try to under-
stand. On the one hand, transitional justice comprises the mechanisms,
interventions and processes of what has been described as the “global norm”
(Nagy 2008). We have United Nations (2010) pillars, transitional justice
toolkits1 and a burgeoning of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
consultancies to advise and direct transitional justice (Rubli 2012). On the
other hand, transitional justice comprises the always incomplete and sub-
jective impulse to reckon with past violence and to find different ways of
living together (Weinstein 2011). We have imaginations of future possibilities,
calls to unity and debates over what counts as justice or peace. The empirical
reality of societies which are embarking on dealing with the past reflects an
iterative movement between these two versions of transitional justice –
mechanisms and incomplete reckoning – which in fact cannot be easily
separated.
As a field, transitional justice scholars are seeking new ways of capturing
and comprehending the politics of transitional justice in practice. Much of
what shapes this politics is the motivations and actions of actors. In this
chapter, my focus is on actors who resist, often designated as “spoilers” in
the transitional justice literature, but who offer a valuable analytical window
into the ways transitional justice can be reimagined. This it to say that
“spoilers” – or actors considered to be motivated primarily by a desire to
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block transitional justice – have not yet been fully understood in the transi-
tional justice field. The tendency to dismiss actors assumed to be working
against transitional justice means that the label of spoiler obfuscates ongoing
and legitimate debates over the nature of past violence and the different ways
to address it. This chapter builds on my prior work on resistance and tran-
sitional justice (Jones and Bernath 2017a) and combines it with a politics of
knowledge lens in order to further strengthen my argument that “resistance”
should be taken seriously as an object of inquiry in transitional justice. There
is varied work on resistance from different fields, but I use here the work of
political geographers, anthropologists and political scientists to understand
resistance as socially constructed, meaning that we should try and under-
stand why and how acts are labelled as resistance when others are not. This is
connected to a politics of knowledge lens as the latter focuses on how certain
forms of knowledge come to prevail over others. By “politics of knowledge”
I mean how the recognition of knowledge as (valid) knowledge is political,
and what this tells us about the power relations between actors, the legiti-
macy of different perspectives, and how what we “know” is shaped by
context.
Combining these insights, I draw on a case study of Côte d’Ivoire, where
supporters of the former president have been labelled as spoilers of transi-
tional justice. After first situating resistance and transitional justice in the
literature on the contested politics of transitional justice, I suggest thinking
about resistance as a “way of knowing”, or rather “not knowing”, in relation
to transitional justice. I aim to show how analysing “resistance” as socially
constructed can point to the necessarily incomplete nature of “knowing” in
transitional justice contexts. Going further, I also argue that not knowing is
important, as it creates space for divergent and varied voices in transitional
justice.
Transitional justice and its politics of knowledge
Transitional justice is a field defined by porous boundaries between research
and practice, between experientially informed and generalized knowledge,
between universals and context. As such it is, in its current state, an assem-
blage of actors, ideas, actions and objects (Jones and Lühe 2021) generating,
claiming and responding to various forms of knowledge. The reason this is
important is because transitional justice, in practice, is typically a normative
endeavour seeking to generate change. This normative project overlaps with,
but can be distinguished from, transitional justice as a journey to reckon
with the past. The former seeks “truth” in order to settle accounts and seek
order, in response to the violence of the past. This implicitly associates a lack
of knowledge, or disagreement over how to know the past, with the danger of
not moving forward towards peace and justice. The latter version of transi-
tional justice as a journey to reckon with the past cannot be so sure of its end
point, or the road that must be travelled to get there. Joining the critiques of
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other scholars who caution against a desire to seek order and closure in the
aftermath of large-scale violations of human rights (Schaap 2007), in this
chapter I accept the contested politics of transitional justice and argue that
they can be better understood through an empirically informed intellectual
enquiry on resistance in terms of those who resist, acts of resistance and the
objects of resistance.
By seeking change – be it peace, justice, democratic transition – transi-
tional justice is political. Not all change is equal, and not all voices are
heard. The “global norm” of transitional justice has been critiqued for its
focus on liberal democracy (Sharp 2018), its association with good govern-
ance agendas of liberal peace (Sriram 2017) and its marginalization of the
voices of the supposed beneficiaries (Madlingozi 2010) as well as of scholars
from the Global South (Kagoro 2012). It is hard for transitional justice to
escape its reputation as “Western” and “liberal” when, despite the significant
role played by Global South experiences in the formation and shaping of the
field (Jones and Lühe forthcoming), the flows of money and “expertise”
consolidate “knowledge” as internationally mobile, Western-educated and
articulated in the language of the toolkits and pillars associated with the
United Nations and international NGOs (McAuliffe 2017, p. 180). What we
have, then, is a narrowing of the knowledge landscape of transitional justice and
the ways that transitional justice advocates tend to “know” the problem of
violence and the solution of transitional justice through trials, truth com-
missions, reparations or institutional reform. This is not to undermine the
work which is done in pursuit of justice or the motivations of those actors.
Rather, it is to state that debates about the legitimacy of transitional justice
have an important knowledge dimension, asking who can speak on behalf of
whom, and how monoliths of knowledge can be broken down, where they
remain or emerge.
The monoliths of knowledge which have been a target of critique are
varied. Kagoro contends that the origins and development of the transitional
justice norm are part of a “post-cold war ascendency of particular, culturally
laden narratives about history, society, governmentality and justice” (2012,
p. 10). He goes on to write of transitional justice’s “knowledge imperialism”
(p. 12), a term that reflects the substantial debate in the transitional justice
literature about the extent to which the “dominant script” (Sharp 2018, p. ix)
of transitional justice continues the imbalances, and even violence, of rela-
tions between the Global North and the Global South. Indeed, the produc-
tion of knowledge on and for transitional justice is not a practice that
different actors can engage in equally for “only a particular set of people, in a
particular set of circumstances, is able to shape the research agenda which in
turn informs policies that shape the world” (Nouwen 2014, p. 258).
This leads to a second area of concern and debate, that of the distinction
between the “foreign expert” and the “local beneficiary”. Local ownership as
a lens of critique emerged largely in response to the standardized solutions
offered by international actors from the Global North to the Global South,
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which have been critiqued for undermining local ownership in terms of con-
trol, process and substance (Sharp 2013). The “local turn” in transitional
justice includes work on “justice from below” (McEvoy and McGregor
2008), positionalities and standpoints (Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan 2010), and
African transitional justice (Bennett et al. 2012), among others. However, as
noted above, the assumption persists of an unequal binary between interna-
tional “experts” and local “knowledge” although the latter has instrumental
value to the experts in relation to policy advocacy. Therefore, any attempt to
reclaim, revive or render visible the “local” in transitional justice may still be
read as an act of those with epistemic privilege seeking to give back power to
those whose voices have been marginalized. Thus, instead of deconstructing
which voices are seen to be expert and which are seen to be local in the first
place, these critiques invariably assume and perpetuate a problematic “sense
of naturalness and inevitability” of transitional justice (Sharp 2018, p. 1) and
the positions assigned to its different actors. This has profound effects on the
way we think about, and do, transitional justice. These effects are of course
complex and not necessarily negative. The important aspect to highlight for
the purpose of this chapter is that their very existence narrows the range of
permissive ways of understanding past violence and the justice needed to
repair it.
One influential debate about expanding the ways of knowing which
underpin transitional justice is that of the legal versus non-legal approaches.
Earlier work had already called for transitional justice to look beyond the
legal (McEvoy 2007) and to consider not only other disciplinary insights
from anthropology, psychology and criminology, for example, but also non-
legal mechanisms such as truth commissions, symbolic reparations and
traditional forms of healing (Thomson and Nagy 2011). The legalism of
transitional justice is perhaps not surprising, as the challenge with early cases
of transitional justice, such as in Argentina, was to identify the appropriate
legal tool with which to address past human rights violations (Murphy 2017,
p. 29). But this has come to be seen as a “hegemonic quality of law”
(Campbell and Turner 2008, p. 378) and empirical research has highlighted
the ways in which legal practice in tribunals narrows the set of permissible
narratives and seeks to solidify the expertise of the law and lawyers (Wilson
2016; Kelsall 2006). The dominant paradigm of transitional justice, crystal-
lized in the global norm, is still seen to focus heavily on civil and political
rights and legal remedies to the exclusion of other violations and remedies
(Miller 2008; Palmer et al. 2015; Evans 2016).
These monoliths of knowledge need to be broken down because they do
not represent the necessarily contested spaces in which transitional justice
interventions take place. If the contestation cannot be seen, for example
because of a selective approach to violence and/or a desire to seek closure of
the past, then this will weigh on the relationship between transitional justice
advocates and those who have experienced violence. There is a significant
body of work which highlights the necessarily incomplete nature of
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reconciliation in transitional justice contexts. Schaap (2007) warns of the
irreconcilability of social conflict and Little (2009) suggests that a contested
politics is perhaps more “normal” following past violence. In contrast, tran-
sitional justice literature tends to approach resistance as a problem of “spoi-
lerism” or “deviancy” of those unwilling to accept its processes (Jones and
Bernath 2017b, p. 3). Understanding the role of resistance as more than
spoilerism builds on work which holds that contestation is present and
important, and that resistance may point towards other ways of under-
standing the past violence and how to respond to it. I argue here that resis-
tance reminds us of what we don’t know and that recognizing the
incompleteness of our knowledge is important for moving towards answering
the crisis of legitimacy in transitional justice.
Resistance as a way of not knowing transitional justice
In previous work on resistance and transitional justice I have found, along
with my co-authors and collaborators, that we can make gains in our analy-
sis of transitional justice if we take resistance seriously as an object of
enquiry (Jones and Bernath 2017a). This is an important argument to make
because resistance, in transitional justice scholarship, is primarily associated
with spoilers. This identity of the spoiler is rather one-dimensional, typically
based on the assumption that such actors are only interested in self-pre-
servation through disruption of a formal transitional justice process: by “old
regime loyalists” (Subotić 2014, p. 135), by a national political leadership
against international criminal procedures (Hansen 2014, p. 119) or by “bad”
victims who refuse to accept outcomes of transitional justice processes
(Hamber and Wilson 2002, p. 45). This has three key effects. First, it assumes
that self-preservation is necessary because those actors have something to
fear from the process, implying that they must have been involved in past
violence and are the potential targets of any criminal or justice-related
intervention. This sets up a moral hierarchy between the values of those who
resist transitional justice and those who promote it. Second, it casts resis-
tance as a technical problem of process, something to be overcome if transi-
tional justice actors are to succeed in their ambitions. This limits our
understanding of what are highly political and contested contexts. Third, it
assumes that what are observed to be acts of resistance can be meaningfully
understood in sole reference to transitional justice, i.e. that they are motived,
above anything else, by responding to a transitional justice intervention and
its specific goals.
The implication of these assumptions is that they go on to make transi-
tional justice itself the centre of our analyses. Learning from the “inside-out”
work of scholars on transitional justice such as McAuliffe (2017, p. 22), it is
more illuminating, however, to start with understanding in their own right
the motivations, actors and effects of resistance which may only partly be
related to the specific transitional justice intervention being undertaken
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(Jones and Bernath 2017b). For if we begin the other way around – with the
transitional justice intervention first and ask who resists it – we may miss
valuable insights into other contestations and debates which might overlap
with, but can also pre-date or be only tangentially connected to, transitional
justice. We might think here, for example, of colonial histories of violence or
of the historical marginalization of groups who are either elevated or tar-
geted by a particular transitional justice intervention. To assume that all acts
of resistance can be addressed by either neutralizing spoilers or tweaking the
transitional justice intervention is short-sighted and continues the proble-
matic “sense of naturalness and inevitability” of transitional justice (Sharp
2018, p. 14). Moreover, “since transitional justice is inherently political and
contested, resistance is necessarily present in multiple forms in the empirical
unfolding of transitional justice” (Jones and Bernath 2017a, p. 5). We should
therefore not see it as abnormal but as something which we expect to find
and that can be used to help us to understand different perspectives on vio-
lence, peace, truth and justice. Resistance to transitional justice not only
questions its processes but shapes them (Salehi 2018) and holds the key to
make sense of the empirical unfolding of transitional justice. In doing so we
need to see it as more than the desperation of spoilers and more than a
problem requiring a technical fix. We should see resistance instead as a way
to bring to the surface what we do not yet understand, or know, about
transitional justice and its politics.
It is hence useful to think more constructively about the role of resistance
in transitional justice. We can think of the attempt to understand resistance
as a new lens, a way of knowing how transitional justice plays out in specific
contexts and how it is perceived and experienced by the supposed bene-
ficiaries. Resistance reminds us that we do not in fact know violence or jus-
tice in their entirety. It reminds us to be humble and to seek as inclusive a
dialogue as possible before we can even begin to make claims to know what
has happened in the past and how it should be addressed. In the following
section, a short example from Côte d’Ivoire will be used to illustrate how this
more constructive approach to resistance and “not knowing” can be analyti-
cally useful. These reflections will build on previous work I have published on
the subject (Jones 2017) and are based on qualitative empirical work under-
taken in 2014, as well as ongoing desk-based research on transitional justice
in Côte d’Ivoire. The data was generated through semi-structured interviews,
observations, and focus groups both in Côte d’Ivoire and with diaspora in
the United States and the United Kingdom.2
Côte d’Ivoire: knowledge claims and justice politics




Following independence from France in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire was led by Felix
Houphouët-Boigny and his Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire – Ras-
semblement Démocratique Africain (Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire),
which remained the only political party until 1990. This was seen by many
commentators as a time of stability, management of ethnic tensions, and
economic prosperity (Diallo 2005). Following the introduction of multi-party
politics and Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, there was a series of political
crises connected to ethnic divisions, regional splits and claims to auto-
chthony (Bah 2010). A civil war in 2002 was followed by the creation of a
unity government in 2003, a buffer zone between the north and south of the
country, further violence and then finally the signing, in 2007, of the Oua-
gadougou Agreement. The 2010 presidential elections (postponed from 2005)
were supposed to solidify unity within the country and mark a formal end to
the peace process. However, contested results in the second round of the
presidential run-off elections led to both the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and
his opponent Alassane Ouattara declaring victory. The African Union, the
Economic Community of West African States and the United Nations (UN)
supported the election of Ouattara amid high levels of post-election violence
from 2010–11. The crisis finally ended on 11 April 2011, after the capture
and house arrest of Gbagbo.
Interwoven with these events were acts of political violence from 1990–
2011, which produced a variety of victims whose cases were supported by
different political parties. Moreover, the decision of the UN Security Council
to announce the election result in favour of Ouattara, in direct opposition to
the result announced by the Ivorian Constitutional Council which declared
Gbagbo the winner, set the stage for ongoing disagreement, resentment and
lack of transparency over the election and its result (Bellamy and Williams
2011, p. 832). The significant role of the former colonial power of France and
its troops in using force to protect civilians and in the arrest of Gbagbo also
“blurred the lines between human protection and regime change … and
[raised questions] about the place of neutrality and impartiality in UN
peacekeeping” (p. 835). These controversies have not been helped by a con-
tinued narrative of a “victor’s justice” for Ouattara and his supporters.
Among other international actors, the independent commission established
by the UN Human Rights Council has expressed concern that investigations
by the national military and public prosecutors have been limited to former
officials and allies of Gbagbo (Baldo 2011; ICG 2011). McGovern (2011), in his
detailed anthropological work on the period preceding the post-election crisis
“insists on a multicausal explanation of the Ivorian conflict” (p. 25). In doing
so, he refuses to accept the tendency of both Ivorian and non-Ivorian ana-
lyses to seek “neat” (p. 7) categories of ethnic, religious, and political affilia-
tion which can explain a “victor” and a “loser”. However, the dominant
discussion among actors both inside and outside of the country is about the
nature of the transitional justice process and whether it is biased in favour of
Ouattara and his supporters.
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Despite these complexities and contestations, or perhaps because of them,
the subsequent transitional justice process was put in place quickly by the
new President Ouattara. The Special Inquiry and Investigation Unit on the
post-electoral crisis was set up, the Rome Statute was ratified, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) began its proceedings and the national courts
were activated. ICC indictments for crimes against humanity were issued
against Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé. Their cases were joined
and then they were both acquitted in February 2020, with the acquittal
upheld on March 31, 2021. An ICC indictment was also issued against
Gbagbo’s ex-wife Simone Gbagbo, who was convicted in the Ivorian national
courts to 20 years’ imprisonment but who was then released under a 2018
amnesty. Several non-judicial transitional justice institutions were also
established, including the Commission dialogue, vérité et reconciliation
(CDVR – Truth and Dialogue Commission), the Ministry of Solidarity,
Family, Women and Children and its war victims’ department, and the
National Program for Social Cohesion. Institutional reforms to protect the right
to guarantees of non-recurrence and Security Sector Reform were launched
and the National Security Council reinstated. Their design and operation
met UN standards, but their functioning has been strongly influenced by the
political strategies and power games in Côte d’Ivoire (Adou Djané and Jones
forthcoming). For example, the final report of the CDVR remained hidden
from public scrutiny from 2014 until 2016, and President of the CDVR
Konan Banny is a controversial figure, seen by many to be leveraging his
position to gain political weight when he became involved in the 2015
presidential election contest.
These contestations pivot on historical injustices and grievances as well as
the specifics of the way in which the conflict ended and transitional justice
has been implemented. There are varied resistances that we can observe in
response: to the different mechanisms of the transitional justice process; to
Ouattara’s presidency; to the ICC indictments and now appeal against the
acquittal of Gbagbo and Blé Goudé. This resistance, following the 2011
violence, has been located in certain actors and interpreted in particular
ways. From the beginning of the transitional justice process, pockets of mili-
tia violence have been interpreted by the government and its supporters as
attempts, by disgruntled “losers” of the transition, to destabilize the country
and disrupt the justice process. However, according to Adou Djané (2017,
p. 21), this violence is designed to target the political transition itself, mean-
ing the state and current government. The latter, of course, forms the basis of
a transitional justice process, but it is not the same, and this distinction is
important.
There are also supporters of the former President, Gbagbo, and members
of his political party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front),
who are seen as unable to accept Ouattara’s victory. These actors have boy-
cotted the work of the CDVR and political dialogues (Adou Djané 2017,
p. 25). In addition, supporters of Gbagbo in the diaspora have organized
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themselves into organized resistance, publishing leaflets denouncing the cur-
rent president and demanding transparency of the election results of 2010
(Jones 2017).
These actors – supporters of the former president – are the classic “spoi-
lers” of transitional justice: disgruntled; unable to accept democratic process;
afraid of being held accountable for crimes; and unwilling to embrace its
“values”. Cast as the “losers” of the violence as well as of the transition, it is
assumed by domestic and international actors that this is the end of the
story. Former regime loyalists are known to want to block political progress,
to delegitimize Ouattara’s presidency and to avoid justice (Jones 2017). The
forms of resistance I have described above – protests, violence, boycotts and
public denouncements – are also simply understood to be acts of incivility
associated with a “past” of disorder and violence (Jones and Adou Djané
2018). The underpinning narratives about resistance to transitional justice in
Côte d’Ivoire are thus (a) that it is motivated by failure to accept the “right”
outcome of the elections and of the justice process, and (b) that it is part of a
deviant disorder of past violence that has no place in the present justice-
seeking process, or in the imagined future of peace and democracy.
However, analysis of the resistance can tell us so much more. It is impor-
tant to see it above all through the lens of “the continuity of violence that
characterises the political system” (Adou Djané 2017, p. 17) and thus to
understand it as “continual doubting of the political and social contract to
which the current transitional justice process has been appended” (p. 17).
The complex history of socio-political crises related to citizenship, auto-
chthony and economic collapse in Côte d’Ivoire (Akindès 2004) finds a focal
point in and through transitional justice, so while labelling acts of resistance
by the election “losers” is an easy interpretation of events, it also reproduces
the (partial) narrative of those who are resisted. In my research I have found
that those who resist do, in fact, connect their actions to bigger questions of
historical standing: “all those in love with justice and democracy must resist”
(Zokou 2012), or “Alassane Dramane Ouattara was forced on Côte d’Ivoire
by the French army” (Interview 260314F). Interestingly, their counter-narrative
echoes similar concerns raised by more “moderate” voices over the trans-
parency of the UN when declaring Ouattara the winner, the lack of trans-
parency of the work of the CDVR, or the bias in prosecutions against
supporters of Gbagbo (Jones 2017, p. 47), which makes it even more
problematic to simply discount it as not based on facts.
The supposed acts of resistance against transitional justice in fact tell us
that the transitional justice process has not been, and perhaps cannot be, able
to fully reveal the violence and the contexts which led to it. The focus on
specific acts of violence following the 2010 election precludes a larger dis-
cussion about the involvement of the former colonial power France, about
the historical exclusion of certain ethnic groups from political power and
about the distribution of wealth and land in the country. Now that many of
the mechanisms have finished their work, including the CDVR, the
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contestations continue. The decision by the ICC to lift the travel restrictions
on Gbagbo and Blé Goudé led to the observation that “[o]nce again, the
International Criminal Court is upending Ivorian politics” (Africa Con-
fidential 2020). This decision put pressure on the presidential election of
October 2020, which was won by Ouattara amid controversy over his “third
term”, boycotts from the opposition, and violence.4 The limits of Ouattara’s
reconciliation, based on economic recovery and stability through decisive
action from the centre of presidential power (N’Da and Fokou 2021), will be
tested, as will the limits of a hastily completed and certainly limited
transitional justice process.
Concluding remarks
There is a central contradiction in dominant transitional justice discourse
and practice. There is a desire to seek the truth and to claim it when found,
while at the same time specific transitional justice mechanisms and processes
are necessarily incomplete. This may be due to a selective mandate which
looks at violent acts committed between a certain range of dates or by par-
ticular actors. It may be due to its instrumentalization by varied actors with
particular agendas. It may also be because of the impulse to agree on one
narrative, which can unify and form the basis of a future of peace. Such
selective politics of knowledge can be enriching and valuable if we can find
ways of reading them and understanding what they communicate. In this
chapter I have tried to show how resistance can highlight the usefulness of
not knowing, of demonstrating the incompleteness of attempts, through
transitional justice, to order and categorize the past and to shed a light on
diverse experiences and diverse perspectives on the ways forward.
At the beginning of this chapter, I outlined some well-known critiques of
transitional justice. I agree with Colvin’s (2008, p. 424) assessment that the
field does not need yet more knowledge; instead, it needs to rethink its failed
relationship to the “other’. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, more assessments of
transitional justice mechanisms and their impacts, while important, do not
necessarily help to overcome the frames of reference set by transitional jus-
tice discourse and practice. If we stay within the “naturalness and inevit-
ability’” of transitional justice (Sharp 201, p. 1), claims to knowledge about
the past are less easy to critique. Transitional justice processes and experts all
too often make claims to know what happened, how it should be addressed
and what kind of future should result. Frequently, there is limited space to
recognize what is not known, or what maybe cannot ever be known. Resis-
tance, if nothing else, reminds us that all knowledge of the past is incomplete.
I argue that in order to create a more ethical relationship with “the other” –
with alleged “spoilers”, “bad losers” or “unthankful beneficiaries” – humility
is fundamental. It allows transitional justice “experts” to begin their work
with acknowledging what is not known and what can be learnt from listening
to others. Such a process is not easy, as the discussions about inclusivity by
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Vollhardt et al. in Chapter 12 of this volume demonstrate. Learning from
resistance is but one way of opening dialogue. It can be difficult because of
the perceived “incivility” of those who resist (Jones and Adou Djané 2018),
or because of an expected clash of values. But dialogue does not have to be
easy to ensure that we are attentive to ongoing efforts to learn from the past
rather than seeking to close it down.
Notes
1 www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Pages/TransitionalJustice.aspx.
2 The fieldwork was conducted in 2014 in collaboration with Dit Fatogoma Adou
Djané based at the Centre Suisses de Recherches Scientifiques in Abidjan, but I
take sole responsibility for the reflections presented in this chapter.
3 The fieldwork was generously funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation as
part of the project ‘Resisting Transitional Justice? Alternative Visions of Peace and
Justice’ which ran from 2012–2015.
4 www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/02/cote-divoire-post-election-violence-repression.
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12 Inclusive narratives of suffering
Johanna Ray Vollhardt, Michelle Sinayobye Twali
and Sumedha Jayakody
One important step towards rebuilding social relationships between former
adversary groups in the aftermath of collective violence may entail over-
coming the mindset that loss and suffering was confined to one’s own exclu-
sively defined community. A decade of research (for reviews see Noor et al.
2017; Vollhardt 2009, 2015) has shown how inclusive victim consciousness –
the view that the losses and struggles endured by one’s group are similar to
those endured by other groups – is linked to support for reconciliation,
reparation and prevention of further injustice. Such findings open new per-
spectives on transitional justice as an inclusive process during which people
may discover commonalities in grievances, beyond the boundaries of com-
munities they are conventionally associated with. For example, every year
since 2005, many Israeli Jews and Palestinians hold an Alternative Memorial
Day event to recognize and support families on both sides who have lost
loved ones during the intractable conflict (Corry and Khatib 2019; Shnabel et
al. 2017). However, there are also risks associated with overly inclusive nar-
ratives that fail to acknowledge power differences and resultant inequalities
in experiences between groups – just as calls for reconciliation and harmony
may serve to maintain, rather than to challenge, existing inequalities and
power relations and therefore may be more problematic than they appear at
the surface level (Dixon et al. 2012; Saguy et al. 2009; see also Chapter 11 in
this volume). Accordingly, the meaning and consequences of (seemingly)
inclusive victim consciousness can differ depending on the power relations of
the groups involved. This chapter addresses both the promises and the pit-
falls of inclusive narratives of suffering in transitional justice processes, and
emphasizes that inclusive victim beliefs, just like any construal of conflict or
of victimization, are used rhetorically to serve specific political or social
purposes (McNeill and Vollhardt 2020).
What are inclusive narratives of suffering?
Inclusive narratives of suffering communicate inclusive victim consciousness,
which is defined as the recognition of similarities between the suffering of the
ingroup and other groups (Vollhardt 2012). This can involve groups in other
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parts of the world that have suffered in different conflicts due to different
oppressors, i.e. global inclusive victim consciousness, such as the perceived
similarities between Palestinians and African Americans, or between Jews
and Tutsi. It can also involve perceiving similarities between two groups that
are in conflict with each other, i.e. conflict-specific inclusive victim conscious-
ness, such as when Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland see their
suffering as similar (Vollhardt 2015). Conflict-specific inclusive victim con-
sciousness is psychologically more challenging (see also Warner et al. 2014).
In some cases – especially those characterized by strong power differences,
which we discuss in more detail later in the chapter – inclusive victim con-
sciousness may entail mere acknowledgement that the other group has also
suffered, rather than explicit statements on perceived similarities. Acknowl-
edgement of the other side’s suffering and their inclusion in who counts as a
“victim” is rare and is often contested in conflict narratives (Hameiri and
Nadler 2017; Noor et al. 2012). Therefore, acknowledging the other group’s
victimization without explicitly stating similarities is also an important form
of inclusive victim consciousness. It may also often be factually more accu-
rate than claiming similarities in experiences between groups with different
histories of oppression or different degrees of power, thereby inviting less
reactance and backlash.
What inclusive victim consciousness is not
Inclusive victim consciousness should not be confused with the assertion that
experiences of suffering are the “same” (Nair and Vollhardt 2020). Although
this is one way in which people may express a sense of shared grief and loss
with other groups, claiming that two groups suffered in the same way or to
the same degree often disregards power relations and different histories of
oppression (Vollhardt and Twali 2016). Therefore, such statements are often
strongly rejected by members of victimized groups who assert that no two
experiences are ever the same (Vollhardt et al. 2021). In fact, a study of
Jewish Americans reflecting on the Holocaust found that communicating
both similarities and differences between the victimized ingroup and other
victim groups worldwide resulted in more prosocial outcomes towards other
victim groups compared to overly inclusive construals of the ingroup’s suf-
fering as a “crime against humanity” that did not acknowledge distinct
groups and their respective fates (Vollhardt 2013).
Inclusive victim narratives are also not merely general perceptions of
similarity regarding two groups’ cultures or another superordinate identity
(Garagozov 2016). For example, in a study of Jewish Israelis, perceived
shared regional identity as “Middle Easterners” did not increase willingness
for reconciliation with Palestinians, while a shared victim identity did
(Shnabel et al. 2013). We discuss these effects of inclusive victim narratives
on intergroup relations and policy support in more detail below. Here, we
simply wish to emphasize that, although the effects of inclusive victim
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consciousness can be understood theoretically as prosocial effects of shared,
superordinate identities on intergroup outcomes (Dovidio et al. 2009), the
inclusion of other groups in a shared category of “victims of violence and
oppression” may be particularly powerful in the context of ongoing violent
conflicts and in post-violence transitional justice settings, in comparison to
other superordinate identities and social categories that practitioners may use
in interventions aimed at fostering peace and social change. In other words,
it is not just the boundaries of the group identity that matter but also the
content of this shared identity (see also Reicher et al. 2006; Twali 2019).
Challenges in defining the reference points for inclusive victim narratives
It is crucial to critically examine the reference points and identities that
create the basis for inclusive victim narratives. Most research examining this
topic focus on singular identities such as ethnicity, nationality, religion or
race, which are also often the fault lines of conflict and group-based violence
(Nair and Vollhardt 2019; Twali 2019). However, social identities as well as
social roles within identity groups are complex and fluid.
First, people have multiple intersecting identities, such as ethnicity, gender
and social class, that together inform peoples’ experiences of victimization and
oppression (Cole 2009; Rosenthal 2016). Some group members may be
acutely aware of the impact of these intersecting identities and, based on this
“intersectional consciousness” (Greenwood 2008), compare experiences of
suffering within the broader social group instead of focusing on comparisons
with other ethnic or religious groups’ suffering. For example, in a qualitative
study among Muslims and Dalits in India, participants discussed the experi-
ences of female versus male Muslims, or Dalits who lived in slums versus
those who had obtained middle class status (Nair and Vollhardt 2019). This
intersectional consciousness also shaped inclusive victim consciousness (and
other comparative victim beliefs such as perceiving that others suffered more,
or less than the ingroup) between group members with different intersecting
identities (ibid).
Second, group members take on different roles during conflicts, and partici-
pate to varying degrees in violent resistance movements and perpetration of
violence against the adversary. For example, in a qualitative study on per-
ceptions of collective victimhood among Protestants and Catholics in
Northern Ireland (Ferguson et al. 2010), some participants stressed that
there were members of their group who had been involved in paramilitary
groups and committed violence, in addition to generally belonging to a vic-
timized group. This led some to perceive of “hierarchies of victims” within
their group as opposed to just between groups, which is commonly referred to as
competitive victimhood (Noor et al. 2012). Moreover, they insisted that only
those who did not commit violence were “true” and “innocent” victims
(Ferguson et al. 2010). Conversely, other participants in this study empha-
sized the commonality of suffering among all members of their group,
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without making such distinctions. Thus, both intersecting identities and dif-
ferent roles in conflict can result in the same dynamics within groups that
occur between groups, and people may recount inclusive victim narratives
revolving around different reference points.
Third, some conflicts redefine the boundaries and identities of the groups
involved, thereby creating a new basis for comparisons of suffering (Elcher-
oth and Reicher 2017; Twali 2019). These transformations occur when alli-
ances between some groups facilitate new superordinate identities, or when
internal conflicts and competition for resources create factions among pre-
existing groups. New social identities transformed through conflicts in this
way may thereafter supplant the social identities that existed before the con-
flict. They may also be more salient and relevant when people construct
inclusive narratives of the suffering they experienced during the conflict. For
example, interviews with South Sudanese diaspora members about the civil
wars in Sudan revealed that the transformation of various groups into larger
superordinate identities cut across ethnicities and religion based on these
groups’ shared experiences of suffering (Twali 2019). Consequently, inclusive
narratives of suffering accommodated the experiences of previous outgroups
who were now part of a post-conflict superordinate ingroup (for example,
Dinkas and Nuers within a transformed South Sudanese superordinate
identity) that rarely included other outgroups who did not share their conflict
experiences (e.g. Sudanese Arabs).
Fourth, conflicts often make the group identities involved in conflict par-
ticularly salient even when they were previously considered insignificant
within a country’s social, economic and political discourse. This creates
challenges in the construction of inclusive victim narratives. Sri Lanka during
colonial and post-colonial times provides a good example of this phenom-
enon. The “divide and rule” policies of the British colonizers (often char-
acterized through territorial segregation and division of populations along
linguistic, religious and ethnic fault lines; see Christopher 1988) entailed that
minority Tamils were favoured over the Sinhalese majority. For instance,
despite being a minority of only 11% of the population in 1946 (while
Sinhalese made up 70% of the population), the Tamils were represented in
the prestigious Ceylon civil service and university admissions at 33% and
31%, respectively (de Silva 1984; Schwarz 1983; DeVotta 2002). In the wake
of Sri Lanka’s independence, Sinhalese-dominated governments eliminated
previous disparities but did so by engaging in clientelist policies and diver-
sionary war politics that created new disparities. The Sinhala Only Act of
1956, for instance, which instituted Sinhalese (spoken by the majority) as the
official language and discouraged Tamils from entering state employment
except in the north and east where Tamil was accepted as the administrative
language, or the 1971 policy on education standardization which replaced a
merit-based system of university admission with one based on district quotas
that curtailed the number of Tamil students receiving free university educa-
tion provide examples of such practice. These policies transformed Sinhalese
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and Tamil ethnic identities into frozen, exclusive ones with conflict-exacerbating
boundaries that fed the three-decade-long civil war (see Abeyratne 2004;
DeVotta 2002, 2005). Due to such identity transformations – and considering
the different conflict experiences that each group was exposed to, their varied
roles in the conflict and levels of power – perceiving similarities in suffering
across ethnic group boundaries became psychologically challenging.
Inclusive narratives of suffering used in the transitional justice process
should pay attention, therefore, to the scope of comparison – that is, whose
suffering is included in these post-conflict narratives. For example, are inclu-
sive narratives of suffering only those that feature former outgroups who are
now part of the newly created ingroup based on their experiences of victi-
mization during the conflict (Twali 2019)? What about the narratives that
(only) mention those outgroups that suffered at the hands of the same per-
petrator (e.g. Muslims in Sri Lanka who were victimized by both the state
military and the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and there-
fore could be part of both Sinhalese and Tamils’ inclusive narratives of suf-
fering, while other outgroups may be excluded (Haniffa 2007)? Or should
inclusive narratives of suffering acknowledge the experiences of everyone
involved in the conflict, including members of the perpetrator group?
Depending on the scope of these narratives, we can expect different outcomes
in the transitional justice process (see also Cohrs et al. 2015). Moreover, the
inclusion of some groups’ experiences may have seemingly paradoxical effects
on intergroup outcomes, as discussed below where we explore the functions
and consequences of inclusive victim narratives which hold both promises
and pitfalls.
The promise of inclusive victimhood: effects of inclusive victimhood on
harmonious intergroup relations in the aftermath of conflict
Several studies have demonstrated the prosocial effects of inclusive victim
narratives on intergroup relations, both in ongoing conflicts and their after-
maths (Vollhardt 2015). For example, among Jewish Israelis, perceptions of
shared experiences of loss and suffering with Palestinians due to the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict predicted involvement in peace activism – above and
beyond the effects of political ideology, demographic variables and personal
experiences of victimization (Shnabel et al. 2013). Among Burundians,
Rwandans and people living in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo (members of all ethnic groups in the respective regions), inclusive
victim consciousness – specifically, agreement with the statement “[t]he victi-
mization other groups in Rwanda [Burundi/DRC] have experienced is similar
to what my group has experienced” – predicted various prosocial intergroup
attitudes (Vollhardt and Bilali 2015). This included the self-reported will-
ingness to speak up for outgroup members in need, and support for inclusive
political leaders who consider all ethnic groups important, not just the par-
ticipant’s ingroup (Vollhardt and Bilali 2015). Overall, these studies in
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different contexts suggest that people who see that other groups involved in a
conflict have also suffered are more likely to support views and actions that
contribute to harmonious relations between different groups. Moreover,
inclusive victim consciousness entails recognition of others’ suffering, which
is central to victim-centred measures of transitional justice in the aftermath
of conflict (Auerbach 2009).
However, some studies also suggest limits to these effects of inclusive
victim consciousness. One such study was conducted among Protestants and
Catholics in post-accord Northern Ireland. For some participants, inclusive
victim consciousness was associated with low levels of competitive victim-
hood. This is theoretically expected and in line with findings reported above.
However, for other participants inclusive victim consciousness was, counter-
intuitively, associated with high levels of competitive victimhood (Cohrs et al.
2015). Moreover, the positive relationship between inclusive victim con-
sciousness and support for reconciliation with the other group in the conflict
was only present among participants who perceived low levels of competitive
victimhood. Among participants who expressed both high levels of inclusive
victim consciousness and high levels of competitive victimhood there was less
support for reconciliation.
How can we explain these seemingly contradictory findings? Notably, in
this particular study (Cohrs et al. 2015), the researchers assessed global
inclusive victim consciousness rather than conflict-specific inclusive victim
consciousness, asking participants whether they agreed or disagreed with
statements such as “[m]any other groups in the world have suffered in similar
ways to my group”. This means that participants came up with their own
choice of groups which they thought were similar to the ingroup in terms of
experiences of oppression and victimization. Different participants may
hence think of different groups when the items do not specify the context
such as in conflict-specific victim consciousness. In a follow-up study (Cohrs
et al. 2015, Study 2), content analysis of open-ended answers to the question
of which groups participants were thinking of when they completed these
items revealed two different levels of inclusivity. Some answers indicated a
broad, universal sense of inclusivity where victims of different types of vio-
lence, with different positions of power in the conflict, and/or living in dif-
ferent parts of the world were described as having suffered in similar ways as
the ingroup. For example, a Protestant participant in Northern Ireland
noted: “Any group that has suffered as a result of violent conflict … The
trauma of violent conflict is the same for everyone” (Cohrs et al. 2015, Table
4). A Catholic participant similarly stated: “Both sides of any conflict or
wars that are going on. I believe each side has its own stories to be told”
(Cohrs et al. 2015). Conversely, other participants expressed a more selective
sense of inclusive victim consciousness that was limited to other victim
groups who had the same role or position of power in their respective con-
flict, and/or groups that had suffered from the same type of violence and
oppression. This resulted in distinct answers for Catholic versus Protestant or
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Loyalist versus Nationalist participants, due to their group’s role in, and
dominant framing of, the conflict. For example, a Protestant participant – i.e.
a member of the majority and high-power group in the conflict in Northern
Ireland – wrote that they thought the following groups had suffered in simi-
lar ways as Protestants in Northern Ireland: “South African, Spanish, Iraqi
communities … They have been terrorized by anti-government political
groups” (Cohrs et al. 2015, Table 4). In contrast, a self-identified Nationalist
participant – i.e. a member of the minority with lower power in the conflict –
wrote that “Aborigines, Indian people, Black South Africans, American
Indians, Palestinians [were similar to their own group] … They have had
their native countries taken and been murdered and persecuted” (Cohrs et al.
2015). These examples show the potential boundaries of inclusive victim
consciousness which does not always include the other conflict party or all
types of victim groups. Additionally, in some cases inclusive victim narratives
may not even focus on the outgroup’s interests and well-being, but instead
may be used merely rhetorically to strengthen the ingroup’s conflict position
and strategic alliances (McNeill et al. 2017).
The pitfalls of inclusive victimhood: power differences, silencing
and demobilization
Although the effects of inclusive narratives of suffering on establishing har-
monious intergroup relations are fairly well documented, these processes may
fail or even have conflict-enhancing consequences in post-conflict societies.
What are often deemed to be “harmonious” intergroup relations may some-
times serve to maintain power differences and impunity, as well as mask
inequality (Dixon et al. 2012; Saguy et al. 2009; see also Chapter 11 in this
volume).
First, inclusive narratives of suffering can take on different forms as dis-
cussed earlier (i.e. selective or universal inclusive narratives; Cohrs et al.
2015) and can incorporate the experiences of different groups (e.g. adversary
versus unrelated victim groups; Warner et al. 2014). Some forms of inclusive
victim consciousness involve ignoring or silencing certain groups’ experiences
while privileging others. For example, overly inclusive victim narratives that
are abstract and do not specify any group (e.g. “All Lives Matter”; “Crimes
against Humanity”) deny or diminish the unique experiences of victim
groups (Vollhardt 2013; Leach and Allen 2017; Solomon and Martin 2019).
Additionally, they can reduce empathy and raise undue expectations of for-
giveness among the perpetrator group (Greenaway et al. 2012), while demo-
bilizing collective action among the victim group demanding justice
(Greenaway et al. 2011).
Furthermore, the outcome of inclusive victim narratives depends on the
power of the group shaping the narrative. For high-power groups, narratives
of suffering that incorporate both the ingroup and outgroup’s suffering can
be used strategically to justify ingroup violence and gain further legitimacy
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(McNeill and Vollhardt 2020). Inclusive narratives of suffering by high-power
group members can also be viewed as a form of denial especially when the
experiences of the (high-power) ingroup and low-power outgroup are equa-
ted (Twali et al. 2020). For example, in a speech to commemorate the 99th
anniversary of the Armenian genocide, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan
declared that it was important to remember and understand this violence in
the context of the “suffering for Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, Armenian and
millions of other Ottoman citizens” during and after the First World War
(Armenian Weekly 2014). Although on the surface this narrative appears to
be inclusive, by strategically using it on the anniversary of a genocide that is
actively denied by the Turkish state, Erdoğan was, in effect, denying the
unique experience of the Armenian genocide and the role of the state in
perpetrating the violence. Suffering is portrayed as a universal human
experience during war, and more specifically as a shared experience of the
region, without differentiating targeted violence intended to destroy a specific
group and violence carried out in the context of military confrontations,
which affected many groups in the region. Moreover, Turkey under Erdoğan
continues to support policies that harm Armenian Turks and other mino-
rities in Turkey (Bilali et al. 2019), showing that seemingly inclusive
construals do not always go along with prosocial actions.
Similarly, in Sri Lanka, leaders from the Sinhalese majority group have his-
torically utilized an inclusive narrative of suffering that focuses on terrorism
(perpetrated by the LTTE) to delegitimize the political efforts of the less pow-
erful Tamil minority, while legitimizing violence committed by the Sinhalese
government and evading domestic and international criticism for human rights
abuses committed in the process (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005). Specifi-
cally, since the end of the civil war in 2009, after the state’s military secured a
unilateral victory by annihilating the LTTE, an official ethos of triumph and an
inclusive narrative of victimization has been maintained by the Sri Lankan state.
This narrative focuses on defeating a terrorist organization that plagued the
country for 26 years, causing mass destruction to both Sinhalese and Tamils
alike (Jayakody and Penić 2021; Nadarajah 2018; Cronin-Furman 2020). How-
ever, this seemingly inclusive narrative is silent on claims that violence was car-
ried out by state forces specifically against the Tamil minority or it can be used
to legitimize such violence, thereby circumventing questions of accountability
(Bala 2015; Cronin-Furman 2020).
As these examples show, inclusive victim consciousness does not always go
along with prosocial attitudes or behaviours towards the other party/parties
in the conflict. For example, among Jewish Israelis and Americans in the
United States, inclusive narratives of suffering only increased support for
policies benefiting Palestinians and Pakistanis, respectively, when participants
were not concerned about losing support from other nations if they
acknowledged the adversary’s suffering (Adelman et al. 2016). Similarly, in a
nationally representative survey study conducted in post-war Sri Lanka, dif-
ferent motives underlying inclusive victim consciousness predicted varied
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intergroup outcomes among the former parties to the war, particularly in
relation to accountability (Jayakody and Penić 2021). Specifically, among the
high-power Sinhalese ethnic group, inclusive victim consciousness predicted
greater support for impartial prosecutions (conducted both domestically and
with international involvement) of human rights violations of both parties
only when they acknowledged crimes that their ingroup committed against
the Tamil minority. In the absence of acknowledging such ingroup crimes,
inclusive victim consciousness predicted less support for prosecutions, which
appears to highlight the potentially strategic and defensive nature of inclusive
victimhood claims made by the high-power majority (Jayakody and Penić
2021). These findings need to be understood in the context of what the jus-
tice process means for both parties. For the Tamil minority, the historical
oppression suffered, and the way in which the war ended with high civilian
casualties attributed to the actions of the state military, are important
(OHCHR 2021). Accordingly, for Tamils, accountability measures are crucial
and international involvement is necessary to ensure their fair implementa-
tion. Conversely, for many Sinhalese, the ending of the civil war and the
violent separatist claims of the LTTE are important and accountability
measures are seen as undermining the heroic actions of their state and
military (see Lecamwasam 2016).
Among low-power groups, inclusive narratives that incorporate both the
ingroup and high- power groups’ suffering may inadvertently demobilize resis-
tance efforts. For example, Kurds from Turkey who hold inclusive victimhood
narratives were less likely to support policies that challenged Turkey’s dom-
inance (e.g. “bring lawsuits against Turkey in the European Court of Human
Rights”, “Kurds should support resistance organizations”; Adelman et al. 2016).
Similarly, Sri Lankan Tamils who hold inclusive narratives of the suffering of all
civilians irrespective of ethnicity or religion, are less likely to support impartial
prosecutions of human rights violations (Jayakody and Penić 2021). These
effects can, again, be explained by the lack of attention to power differences that
overly inclusive victim narratives in asymmetric conflicts entail.
Conclusion
In conclusion, inclusive narratives of suffering are commonly found in post-
conflict societies and need to be considered in the transitional justice process.
Several studies reviewed in this chapter indicate the potential of inclusive
victim consciousness to foster reconciliation and justice and other outcomes
commonly deemed to be positive in post-conflict settings. In line with
important critiques of these approaches (see, for example, Chapter 11 in this
volume; Penić et al. 2020), however, and of the focus on “harmony” as a goal
of intergroup relations (e.g. Dixon et al. 2012; Saguy et al. 2009), we caution
against uncritically utilizing (overly) inclusive narratives in post-conflict
societies due to the risk of masking power differences between groups, legit-
imizing violence and silencing the narratives of individuals whose experiences
Inclusive narratives of suffering 177
are not included in their ingroup’s official narrative. Instead of assuming that
inclusive victim narratives are inherently positive and constructive, their spe-
cific function in each given context needs to be considered, given the power
relations and status differences between the different actors involved. Transi-
tional justice researchers and practitioners therefore have to engage in a
nuanced, contextualized analysis of each conflict when constructing or
drawing on inclusive narratives of suffering.
First, the scope of inclusive victimhood narratives that are to be utilized
within transitional justice processes requires careful consideration. Social iden-
tities are complex and fluid, and it is easy to overlook nuances such as inter-
secting identities, intragroup disagreements concerning the boundaries of
identities or the role of civilians’ suffering versus that of combatants. Excluding
certain experiences from seemingly inclusive narratives can endanger the success
of the transitional justice processes that are to be implemented.
A second factor that can affect the success of a transitional justice process
involves the specific framing of any given inclusive victimhood narrative. As
stated before, when the framing is too abstract, it can diminish the unique-
ness of a group’s experience and ignore oppressive hierarchies, thereby con-
tributing to the status quo and failing to address the roots of conflict.
Inclusive victim narratives can also be more selective and, for example, focus
on other groups who hold an analogous role to the ingroup, but within a
different conflict setting. These narratives can take into account the interests
and well-being of other groups to varying degrees and/or be used strategically
to defend the ingroup’s initial position. Hence, one might infer that inclusive
narratives of suffering will only be successful in the transitional justice pro-
cess if they are nuanced and effectively framed. As high-power groups often
have the upper hand in framing narratives, the role of alternative media,
education and other independent civil society organizations is important in
creating, disseminating and contributing to the perception that nuanced
inclusive victim narratives are morally right and widely accepted in a given
society (Bilali 2014).
Finally, there are clear ethical boundaries and limits to inclusive narratives,
such as when perpetrator groups in asymmetric conflicts and genocides
attempt to construct inclusive narratives to relativize atrocities, justify impu-
nity or maintain oppressive social relations. In such cases, resistance against
inclusive narratives of victimization is informative about the political con-
troversies in a conflicted setting (see Chapter 11 in this volume). Additionally,
in such contexts resistance against inclusive victim narratives can be morally
just as important as it might be to promote them in some other contexts.
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13 How crowds transform identities
Yasemin Gülsüm Acar and Stephen Reicher
Introduction
In this chapter we address the role of crowd events in reshaping the bound-
aries of group inclusion and exclusion. In this way we hope to shed some
new light on the process of reconciliation – of how it can be facilitated and
how it can be undermined through the dynamics of mass action.
Empirically, our discussion is based on two major events in the recent
history of Turkey, both of which were centred on the question of the nature
of Turkish nationhood. We start with the 2013 Gezi Park protests which
sought to assert a new vision of Turkey and, in so doing, brought together
groups who, previously, had been deeply (and, at times, violently) opposed.
Kurds stood side by side with nationalist Turks, even after decades of
assimilationist policies and conflict, Alevis with Sunnis, despite discrimina-
tion and violence, and LGBT activists, who were often maligned and mar-
ginalized by any or all of these groups. We then turn to the post-2016 coup
“Democracy Watches” gatherings, which also brought people together under
the badge of nationhood but which excluded many, such as the Kurds, who
were defined as a threat, as were those who sympathized with them – or at
least opposed repressive measures being taken against them. This contributed
to both the deepening and the broadening of conflict, where previously there
had been a process of reconciliation.
At first glance, it might seem rather strange to address the issue of recon-
ciliation through the prism of crowd psychology, and even stranger to sug-
gest that crowds might be a resource for reconciling opposed groups. After
all, crowds are traditionally associated with chaos and discord. According to
Gustave Le Bon’s (1895) classic text, they undermine reason and restraint
and lead ordinarily rational individuals into frenzied extremes of destruction.
What on earth could crowds have to do with reconciliation?
Crowds and social identity
In order to answer this question, we need to rethink the nature of crowd
psychology and the process of reconciliation – the link between the two lying
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in the centrality of social identity processes in both. The concept was intro-
duced to social psychology through the work of Henri Tajfel and John
Turner (1986), which posits that at different times, different aspects of the
self-system will be salient (in church, religious identity; at a rally, political
identity, etc.). Moreover, when different identities are salient, we will behave
in terms of the different beliefs, understandings and priorities associated with
them: reverent when religious, raucous when political. Over the past four
decades, these insights have been applied to the analysis of crowd action
(Drury and Reicher 2020; Reicher 1984, 2001, 2017). Not all physical crowds
are psychological groups. Sometimes they consist of individuals who have no
sense of commonality with others – people crowded onto a train, say. But
one sees the contrast when something happens which creates a sense of
shared social identity among them – the train breaks down and people begin
to view themselves and others as aggrieved commuters. Behaviour changes,
people become closer, united in a shared grievance against the train company
(Neville et al. 2020).
What happens in such psychological crowds is not that people lose iden-
tity, and hence lose control, but rather shift from personal to social identity.
Correspondingly, they do not lose all their standards or lose control over
their behaviour. Rather, control shifts to collective beliefs, understandings
and priorities. This accords with historical studies which show that crowds,
including the most extreme and violent crowds, don’t do just anything.
Rather, crowd action is socially patterned, reflecting collective beliefs,
revealing perceptions of who is friend, who is foe, and how they should be
treated (Davis 1973; Thompson 1971).
However, it is not just that crowd action reflects social identity, it also
serves to create and change social identities (Drury and Reicher 2009; Reicher
1996). One recurring pattern, for instance, arises as a psychologically dis-
parate crowd (say a protest comprising many different groups, some even
actively opposed to one another) is treated as if they were all the same by
external agents such as the police. This leads to a sense of common fate and
can unite those previously opposed within a single emergent category (e.g.
Drury and Reicher 2000; Stott and Drury 2000).
Moreover, group identities can be transformed not only for those involved
but also for those who observe crowds. As Benedict Anderson (1983)
famously argued, large categories like the nation are always “imagined com-
munities”, since it would be impossible for all members to assemble together.
However, crowds that represent the nation (and other such extended
categories) can be seen as the imagined community made manifest.
At the same time, crowd events can be seen as performative acts, deliber-
ately structured in such a way as to create and sustain specific constructions
of social identity. This is particularly clear from the literature on festivals and
commemorations (e.g. Gillis 1994) which illustrates how these are carefully
staged in order to define social relations within the group (who belongs, who
takes precedence and who represents us) and between groups. Indeed, where
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understandings of the group change, or where different versions of the group
compete at the same time, these are reflected in the changing choreography of
collective events (Gelvin 1998; Ozouf 1991).
Reconciliation and social identity
In this chapter, then, we join together the study of how crowds create social
identities with the study of how social identities impact intergroup relations –
both in terms of reconciling those previously opposed to one another and
dividing those previously united. As stated above, we do this in the context
of Turkey, a country whose sense of nationhood has always been troubled
and contested – and which, as a consequence, remains deeply divided on
multiple axes (Poulton 1997). Turkey is split geographically, between a lar-
gely rural, traditional and devout Sunni Muslim population and the more
urban, modern and secular one. It is also split ethnically, with a long-standing
conflict between the state and Kurds, and on religious grounds between
Alevis, an often unrecognized heterodox Islamic minority, and the majority
Sunni Muslims. Furthermore it is split ideologically, with the political left
and right having violently clashed most notably in the years leading up to the
1980 coup.
We examine two of the largest crowd events in recent Turkish history: the
2013 Gezi Park protests and the post 2016-coup “Democracy Watches”
gatherings. Both events were bound up with defining what it means to be a
citizen of Turkey and involved both elements of unification and of division.
However, in contrast to what went before, what was striking in the Gezi Park
protests was the way in which they included and brought together previously
disparate groups within their definition of nationhood. While reconciliation
may not have been the objective of the protests, we discuss how the this
provided an opportunity for groups who have long been disconnected and in
many cases in conflict with each other (such as Muslim faith groups and
LGBT activists) to reconcile.
On the other hand, what was striking about the “Democracy Watches”
gatherings, which followed the failed attempt by the military to oust Pre-
sident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was the way that they were deliberately aimed
at excluding particular groups which, previously, had been accepted as part
of the nation. We discuss how this reignited conflict between groups pre-
viously involved in a process of reconciliation and also widened the scope of
this conflict.
We explore how these outcomes came about by drawing on some of our
previous (i.e. Acar and Uluğ 2016; Uluğ and Acar 2015, 2018), and ongoing
(i.e. Acar and Reicher manuscript in preparation) studies. The Gezi Park
research consists of semi-structured interviews with protest participants in
2013–14 (Acar and Uluğ 2016; Uluğ and Acar 2015), and, later, discussions
on the outcomes of the protests in 2016 (Uluğ and Acar 2018). The ongoing
research consists of analysis of archival media footage of events, as well as
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participant observation at one of the “Democracy Watches” gatherings in
Taksim on 21 July 2016 (Acar and Reicher manuscript in preparation; Acar
and Sandal Önal forthcoming).
The Gezi Park protests
The events at Gezi Park
In 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s government initiated a project aimed at
redeveloping the Taksim Square area in the centre of I
.
stanbul. Part of
pedestrianizing Taksim involved plans to remove Gezi Park, one of the few
remaining green spaces in the centre of the European side of the city and
replacing it with a building in the style of an Ottoman-style artillery bar-
racks. Strong objections were made about the proposed artillery barracks, as
they would remove the Gezi Promenade and also harm mature trees in the
area. Furthermore, that the barracks would house a shopping mall was also
met with objections, based on the reason that the park was an area used for
public recreation being replaced with a consumerist space.
There was also a third, ideological, objection. For many liberals and lef-
tists in Turkey, who claim the heritage of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the
contemporary nation, Taksim is an urban space representing a modern, post-
Ottoman Turkey. In contrast to old I
.
stanbul’s restrictive traditional norms,
Taksim became the place where men and women could co-exist and partici-
pate equally in a secular atmosphere (Gül et al. 2014). The ideological
struggles in the 1960s and 1970s brought another layer of symbolism to
Taksim, as it became synonymous with socialist ideology and the labour
movement. Taksim has, since the 1950s, been the preferred location for poli-
tical rallies, public meetings and demonstrations. The May Day demonstra-
tion on 1 May 1977 were a turning point in Turkish political history. An
unknown gunman concealed in a nearby building killed 34 people and
injured hundreds of others. The events created a strong symbolic link
between Taksim and the leftists in Turkey.
Therefore, the government’s intention to reoccupy the square was con-
sidered provocation enough, to do so with the construction of a building
along pre-modern militaristic lines was even worse and seen as an attempt to
erase the symbolic meaning of the square. In occupying Gezi Park, the pro-
testers were doing more than simply opposing a specific urban development.
They were defending their vision of a modern nation against what they
perceived as Erdoğan’s archaic authoritarian vision.
On 28 May 2013, a small group of protesters camped in the park and
refused to leave. Images of the police burning protesters’ tents and using tear
gas to disperse them spread quickly across social media and brought atten-
tion to the protests. The size of the protests grew until 31 May when, after an
early morning police raid, thousands began to gather in Taksim to protest.
Over 1,000 protesters marched on foot over the Bosphorus Bridge from the
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Asian side to the European side of I
.
stanbul to join protesters in Taksim and
neighbouring Beşiktaş. On 1 June, the protests spread to Ankara and I
.
zmir,
where protesters assembled to show solidarity with those in I
.
stanbul. After
being met with police resistance these became centres of occupation in their
own right. In the following days, people across the country – in total between
2.5 and 3.5 million – took to the streets in solidarity and to raise their voices
regarding the plans for the park. The focus of the protests quickly shifted
from environmental and urban policies to a general opposition to the ruling
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party) and to
then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
The park and surrounding Taksim Square remained an occupied space
until 11 June, when police entered the square in the harshest crackdown since
the start of the movement. On 15 June, the police entered Gezi Park itself
and cleared out the protesters, using, as a pretext, a meeting by Prime Min-
ister Erdoğan in another part of I
.
stanbul. After the eviction, there was an
increase in protests and demonstrations, with events occurring on and off
every weekend throughout mid-2013.
The Gezi Park protests were unique in Turkey for their ability to bring
together people who spanned the country’s traditional divides, oftentimes
with the only common ground being their opposition to Erdoğan and his
party. Religious and ethnic minorities (i.e. Kurds, Alevis, Armenians) had a
strong presence at the protests, as did LGBT activists. Socialist and the main
opposition parties were also present, with some more nationalist groups
represented as well.
Common experience, common repression and the production of unity
The combination of opposition to the AKP, the contextual factors of ongo-
ing events and discontent with government policy, and the police brutality in
the streets brought different groups together who oftentimes did not see one
another as part of a common community. In some of our previous work
(Acar and Uluğ 2016; Acar 2018; Uluğ and Acar 2015, 2018, 2019) Gezi
Park protesters described the way that participation in the protests changed
their perception of others. A study involving 34 participants from various
groups, political parties or institutions pointed to multiple instances of
common fate and resultant experiences of togetherness.
At the most basic level, the mere experience of protesting together with
others blurred previous boundaries between “us” and “them” and created a
common category of protester:
Many different segments came together. You no longer had LGBT, trans,
Armenian, CHP, right-wing, or right-wingers. There were a lot of people
there to show their reaction to the violent, wild, fascist attitudes of the
police or the state.
(Trans activist, Uluğ and Acar 2015)
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In part, this was a process of living in proximity and discovering common-
alities that overcame previous assumptions of difference –between feminists
and Muslim groups, say, as shown in the following: “Meeting the anti-capitalist
Muslims was really interesting … Iftar meals, the earth tables were unbelie-
vable … Even though I don’t fast, I really looked forward to breakfast
because I was going to their earth table” (feminist activist cited in Acar and
Uluğ 2016). It also came out of the need for mutual support to cope with the
basic conditions of the protest. As Uluğ and Acar (2018, 2019) show, Gezi
Park functioned as an open-air commune. Tents and blankets were shared.
Food and water were distributed and a variety of facilities, including a med-
ical clinic and library, were established by the participants. The park and
camp area were cleaned by protesters. Lists of items that were needed were
posted in the park and on social media, and items would be brought by
supporters. If such mutual support is, as we argued above, a consequence of
shared social identity, it equally functions as an antecedent, cementing a
sense of “we are in this together”.
What is more, the various groups managed to work together. That they cre-
ated an effective and harmonious society in miniature, even with very limited
resources, was a source of shared pride which further consolidated a shared
sense of identity, mutual respect and transcendence of previous differences:
We showed the world a model of democracy there. “Democracy can be
such a thing”, we said. We showed “we can go hand in hand with each
other, even though we are not like each other, we can exist together in a
society by respecting each other”.
(Trans activist cited in Uluğ and Acar 2015)
However, while these mutual efforts to survive in harsh times were impor-
tant, they were framed by the context of repression they had all experienced
at the hands of the police. Common repression led to a common category of
resistors even among unlikely combinations. Sometimes, this process brought
together nationalist Turks and Kurds – previously opposed in armed conflict.
As the nationalists found themselves, for the first time, on the receiving end
of state brutality, they began to doubt their own previous understandings, to
empathize with the Kurdish experience of repression and to question their
support for conflict:
Of course, we experienced really interesting things. The gas bombs that
were thrown there, the injured people, the oppression; against all this, for
example, nationalist Turks would come and say to us “We never under-
stood you, you’ve experienced this oppression for years … there were
also those who compared themselves to us, “Here in İstanbul’s centre,
they are calling us the “enemy”. I wonder what happened in the east and
we didn’t see it?”
(Kurdish activist cited in Acar and Uluğ 2016)
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So, whether Muslim or LGBT, nationalist or Kurdish – whichever side of
Turkey’s entrenched divides one had occupied outside Gezi Park – within the
park itself, the protesters were equally subject to police violence and hence
came to be on the same side.
This sense of unity in diversity (in face of common adversity) was not just
an idea, it was a felt experience. It was embedded in the sensual fabric of the
protests. One only had to look at them. The different parties, organizations
and groups all had their various flags and banners, the colours that repre-
sented them, hanging in the park and on the front of the Atatürk Cultural
Centre at the edge of Taksim Square. Walking through the park you could
see shades of red of various communist groups, the purple of feminist orga-
nizations, combinations of green, red, and yellow for pro-Kurdish groups,
not to mention the LGBT rainbow flag and anarchists’ black. When reflect-
ing on the protests, some participants would refer to the “many colours of
Gezi” and how this patchwork of people came together and coalesced in a
common cause.
What is more, the experience was not ephemeral. It did not dissipate as
soon as people were evicted from the square. In the years following the pro-
tests, many activists still referred to the experiences of togetherness they had
at Gezi as a point at which other groups began to embrace their groups’
goals for social justice, as well as the new connections that were formed.
We always kept other organizations, other social movements at arm’s
length. We kind of went along with the feminist movement, the anti-
military movement, ecologic, women’s movement, but going arm in arm
to a protest is something else … It’s like having a roommate. You can be
really good friends with someone but you can have problems when you
move in together. [But] at Gezi, we became “roommates” with at least 30
social movements.
(LGBTI activist cited in Uluğ and Acar 2018)
In sum, the Gezi Park protests provide a powerful example of how crowd
events can transform the identities of participants. This was achieved through
creating a conception of nationhood which, although being rooted in oppo-
sition to the AKP government as pursuing an anti-national course, did bring
together groups that had previously been opposed to one another and in
some cases were even in open conflict with each other.
Of course, this is not a reconciliation process in the conventional sense. No
one set out to get on better with anyone. Groups did not go to Gezi Park in
order to change their social relations with each other. They didn’t evaluate
the event in terms of the effects of these relations. But precisely for these
reasons Gezi Park is particularly interesting to understand informal, emergent
and bottom-up dynamics of reconciliation.
At this point, though, a caveat is in order. We must beware of going from
universal condemnation of crowds to universal praise. For, as we shall see
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next, crowds don’t only redefine categories to include those who were pre-
viously excluded and reverse processes of conflict between these groups. They
can equally redraw the boundaries to exclude those who were previously
included and hence invigorate intergroup conflict.
The 2016 post-coup “Democracy Watch” gatherings
The July 2016 coup attempt
On 15 July 2016, a faction of the Turkish Armed Forces, calling themselves
the Yurtta Sulh Konseyi (Peace at Home Council), attempted a coup d’état
against Turkey’s state institutions. The Peace at Home Council coordinated
operations in major cities and key locations in an attempt to remove Pre-
sident Erdoğan. Within a couple of hours, President Erdoğan, who was on
holiday in southwest Turkey at the time, gave a FaceTime interview on CNN
Türk, during which he called upon his supporters to take to the streets in
defiance of the military-imposed curfew. His statement and encouragement
to take to the streets was reiterated by other members of his government,
including the mayor of Ankara, and soon thousands responded by opposing
the military presence around I
.
stanbul and Ankara.
Within a matter of hours, the crowds defeated the coup, and soldiers who
took part in the coup attempt surrendered on the Bosphorus Bridge in
I
.
stanbul. The AKP regained control of the government and blamed the
exiled religious leader Fethullah Gülen and his followers for instigating
the coup. But regaining control came at a high price: the event is considered
the bloodiest coup attempt in Turkey’s political history; 241 people were
killed and 2,194 were injured. Following the coup attempt, the government
issued a state of emergency that lasted approximately two years. During
emergency rule, the government enacted 32 emergency decrees, removing
over 100,000 people from public service, and permanently closed non-
governmental organizations, universities and other entities with supposed ties
to Gülen or who were otherwise in opposition to the AKP.
The “Democracy Watch” gatherings
In the weeks following the coup attempt, the government encouraged citizens
to continue their presence on the streets with so-called Democracy Watch
gatherings organized in major centres and squares in I
.
stanbul and Ankara,
including Taksim Square in I
.
stanbul. These nightly meetings were considered
a continuation of the civil resistance that took place during the night of 15
July. In contrast with the Gezi Park protests, the Democracy Watches had
strong institutional support; food and water were distributed, portable toilets
were brought to Taksim Square, and numerous stages were erected, with
local radio personalities and others leading the festivities every evening.
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On 7 August 2016, the AKP, together with two other major political par-
ties, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP – Republican People’s Party) and the
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party), held an anti-coup
rally in Yenikapı, I
.
stanbul. Notably, the pro-Kurdish Halkların Demokratik
Partisi (HDP – Peoples’ Democratic Party) was not invited. The Turkish
media announced that millions of people were in attendance at the meeting,
although no official estimate exists. President Erdoğan spoke to attendees at
Yenikapı Square from a large stage draped with national flags and images of
Erdoğan and the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
Rather than party banners, Erdoğan encouraged participants to carry Turk-
ish flags. In his two-hour speech, Erdoğan extolled the virtues of the citizens
who took to the streets on the night of the coup attempt, praising them and
their sacrifices.
In contrast to the many different types of flags and banners on display in
Taksim during the Gezi Park protests, during the “Democracy Watch”
gatherings, the only symbol in Taksim Square was the Turkish flag. One flag
took up the entire space of the Atatürk Cultural Centre, with wording that
read “Sovereignty belongs to the nation.” Beyond the “Democracy Watch”
gatherings, this message of unifying under a single national flag could be
found all across I
.




stanbulites … Being one and being together, giving your heart and
soul in hand, we showed the power of being a nation to the whole world,
together we have protected our democracy, our freedom and our home-
land. Now is the time for our flag to wave proudly, let’s hang our moon
and star flag from our workplaces and our homes, and let’s be one and
be together in its shadow.
(Acar and Sandal Önal forthcoming)
The AKP government also put the coup attempt and the resistance against it
into a historical framework. The “Democracy Watch” gatherings utilized
familiar tropes related to Turkey’s 1919–23 War of Independence, creating
and perpetuating the myth of a “second founding” after 2016 (Konya 2020).
Therefore, the crowds that rose up to prevent the coup were lauded as
saviours of the country and of democracy. They were consistently honoured
in the national media through personal stories and the traumas that were
experienced on the night of the attempted coup. Those who died received
official “martyr” status, and the resistance of that night became a war com-
parable to the American and French Revolutions (Taş 2018). Erdoğan stated
that “15 July is the second War of Independence for the Turkish nation. Let
us know it like that. They [threatened] us with Sèvres in 1920 and persuaded
us to [accept] Lausanne in 1923’ (Hürriyet Daily News 2016). In doing so, he
created a narrative that continued the one that created the Turkish Republic,
whereby Western Imperialism attempts to “destroy” the Turkish state, but it
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is the people that resist and prevent its destruction. Turkish history texts
were revised to include the events, and national landmarks and squares were
renamed to keep the memory of the coup attempt alive.
Critically, the notion of a “coup” relies not only on an external enemy but
also on an internal enemy. It therefore serves not only to bring the nation
together against foreign foes, but also against those within the nation who
are characterized as the dupes or collaborators of these foes. One should
note, though, that in different coups the nature of the internal enemy (and
hence the identity of those who need to be excluded) changes. During the
1980 coup the target was the “anarchists” (referring mostly to young politi-
cized leftists). In this case the focus was the “terrorists”. In practice this
meant anyone who opposed the AKP and President Erdoğan. Hence,
although the ostensible focus of the event was one of inclusion and unifica-
tion within the nation, the Democracy Watches served to narrow the defini-
tion of the category so as to exclude many groups which, previously, could be
included as Turkish.
So, while at one level the Democracy Watches and the Gezi Park protests
were similar in that they both involved elements of both inclusion and
exclusion, at another level they were diametrically opposed. The Gezi Park
protests were ostensibly an act of opposition (rejecting the AKP as repre-
senting the nation) but one that brought together opposed groups in an
extended definition of the nation. The Democracy Watches were ostensibly
acts of unification (bringing the nation together after experiencing trauma)
but nevertheless excluded previously reconciled groups from a narrowed
definition of the nation.
This contrast was visible at many levels. We have seen how Gezi Park was
a riot of different colours and styles and flags manifesting “unity in differ-
ence” (Konya 2020, p. 18). By contrast, the “Democracy Watches” gather-
ings were uniformly uniform: a single colour (red), and a single flag (the
Turkish national standard) for all. Whereas the Gezi Park protests were
bottom-up, encouraging a multitude of voices and emphasizing the need to
learn from one another, the “Democracy Watch” gatherings were rigidly top-
down, allowing only one voice, namely that of Erdoğan and his AKP.
Indeed, the contrast between the two events is not just an analytic claim, it is
emphasized by Erdoğan himself:
One of the biggest heroes of the July 15 was our youth … Immediately
taking action, they stood up against tanks and retrieved the areas inva-
ded by the coup plotters … Those coming there that night were not the
youth of Gezi Park. Those who came there that night were the ones who
loved the country.
(Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2017)
Time and again during the “Democracy Watch” events, those present and
those who opposed the plotters on the night of the coup are described as
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“the nation”, while others are described either as “terrorists” or as “terrorist
supporters”. Moreover, the crowd participated actively in this construction,
sharing their personal stories, booing when anyone was named as an enemy
of the state (Acar and Reicher in progress). In this way Erdoğan, the AKP
leadership and their followers co-created an exclusive boundary to Turkish
nationhood.
Having said this, the prototypical “terrorist other” is identified with the
Kurds and the pro-Kurdish political parties (notably the pro-Kurdish HDP,
even though they held the third largest percentage of votes garnered by the
four major parties). While other opposition parties such as the CHP were
invited to participate in the Democracy Meeting (albeit on Erdoğan’s terms),
the HDP was not, and when asked why Erdoğan replied:
As I always say, I can meet any opinion, any group that has the four
principles: One homeland, one nation, one state, one flag … I do not
come together with those who are involved in terrorism and are inter-
twined with terrorism. This is my red line.
(Diken 2016)
Just as what happened in Gezi Park did not stay in Gezi Park but impacted
longer-term social relations, the same is true of the “Democracy Watch”
gatherings – although this time they undermined rather than promoted pro-
cesses of reconciliation. Prior to the coup, the government was involved in a
peace process with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK – Kurdish Workers’
Party). It was the calm brought about by this process in a region that had
been marked by conflict for decades that allowed the HDP to gain popularity
as a pro-minority and egalitarian party. The “Democracy Watch” gatherings
were part of a process, however, which positioned Erdoğan’s opponents as
enemies of the state and, hence, as illegitimate participants in the political
and social sphere.
This had begun pre-coup after the HDP won 80 seats in the June 2015 gen-
eral election and deprived Erdoğan’s AKP of an overall majority. Mounting
conflict led to the collapse of the peace process with the PKK. As we have seen,
the “Democracy Watch” gatherings were used to broaden the definition of the
“terrorist other” to include the HDP. Subsequently, it was broadened still fur-
ther to include all those who criticized Erdoğan’s Kurdish policy, with many of
the 1,128 intellectuals and academics, who, in January 2016, had signed a
“peace petition”, being prosecuted as “terrorist sympathizers”. In effect, to
oppose Erdoğan was to be a “non-citizen” (Acar and Coşkan 2020).
Conclusion
The two cases we have considered in this chapter highlight the different ways
in which crowd events can impact upon how boundaries of identity are
drawn and intergroup histories rewritten.
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In sum, the mass rallies of August 2016, like those witnessed three years
earlier in Gezi Park, served as a performative construction of group bound-
aries – and, more specifically, of Turkish national identity. As acts of
boundary making both necessarily involved inclusion and exclusion, unifica-
tion and differentiation. But whereas the Gezi Park protests served to
broaden the conventional boundaries of inclusion, the “Democracy Watch”
gatherings served to narrow down previous definitions. Correspondingly,
whereas the Gezi Park protests promoted reconciliation (including between
nationalists and Kurds), the August 2016 rallies disrupted reconciliation with
the Kurds and accentuated existing fault lines in society between Erdoğan’s
mainly traditional and rural base and his urban liberal opponents so as to
produce new forms of conflict.
The overall point that comes out of this is that reconciliation may well be
a matter of category relations but that, more basically, category relations are
a function of how category boundaries are drawn – that is, how we define
who is “us” and who is “them”. And, as recent research has shown, crowd
events are one of the major sites in which these definitions can change
(Drury and Reicher 2020). That is not to say that crowds always produce
such change. Indeed, many crowds serve to confirm existing social relations.
Indeed, there is an abundance of literature on how commemorations, festi-
vals and other mass phenomena are central to telling us who we are and who
is “us” (e.g. Gillis 1994). But that doesn’t mean that these are irrelevant for
reconciliation, simply that they confirm rather than change existing prospects
for reconciliation.
One final comment based on a final contrast between the Gezi Park protests
and the “Democracy Watches” rallies: as we stressed earlier, the Gezi Park
crowds were not intended as a reconciliation process, but they nevertheless led
to a process of reconciliation. The “Democracy Watch” gatherings, however,
were very deliberately choreographed in order to narrow Turkish nationhood
around the figure of the president. Yet the effects came about irrespective of
whether they were intended to or not. It is simply that, if we can understand
the path from crowd dynamics to categorical change to the prospects for
reconciliation, we are in a better position to harness those dynamics for the
sake of resolving old antagonisms rather than creating new ones.
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Örgütlenmenin Kolektif Eylemlerdeki Rolü [What happened after Gezi? The role
of empowerment, politicization and organization in collective action]”. Turkish
Psychology Articles, vol. 21, 2018, pp. 62–81.
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14 Collective resilience
Sandra Penić, John Drury and Zacharia Bady
A classic pitfall of transitional justice discourse and practice resides in
creating a binary between active perpetrators and passive victims (Gready
and Robins 2014; Shaw et al. 2010). Affected civilians are generally assumed
to be powerless, helpless and subject to various forms of suffering, whereas the
ways in which they socially organize to avoid or cope with violence are typi-
cally neglected. Accordingly, transitional justice measures are all too often
limited to institutional mechanisms dominated by international elite net-
works of donors and professionals, who claim rights on behalf of the victims
(Madlingozi 2010). The participation of affected civilians is usually limited: a
small number of citizens are involved in transitional justice mechanisms
through prescribed roles, such as witnesses and defendants. Consequently,
those most affected by violations frequently have little or no opportunity to
impact upon the goals of the transitional justice process or the nature of
particular mechanisms (Gready and Robins 2014).
This account of civilians as passive victims, however, tends to overlook
emergent forms of coordination, solidarity and collective agency within sur-
vivor communities and, consequently, the role they could play in a process of
conflict transformation. A growing number of studies suggest that collective
violence does not necessarily disrupt communities and that collective coping
with the adversity of war may be much more common than traditionally
assumed. For example, a recent meta-analysis (Bauer et al. 2016) of nearly 20
studies conducted in over 40 countries has found a strong, persistent pattern
that exposure to war violence tends to increase social cooperation at the local
level, including community participation and prosocial behaviour (for similar
findings see also Arjona et al. 2016; Bellows and Miguel 2009; Fritz 1961/
1996; Gáfaro et al. 2014; Gilligan et al. 2014; Nussio 2019; Vélez et al. 2016).
Why this occurs, however, is still poorly understood.
In sum, this chapter makes the argument that the capacity for collective
resilience of civilians in armed conflicts represents an important forgotten
resource for conflict transformation. We suggest that a better understanding
of the processes through which communities cooperate to face war, and its
aftermath, will also open new ways of thinking about conflict transforma-
tion, and that concepts developed in recent social psychological research on
DOI: 10.4324/9781003167280-18
collective emergencies and disasters can inform our understanding of both
types of processes.
A social identity model of collective psychosocial resilience
The overemphasis on passive victimhood and mental disorder as an outcome
of conflict appears to echo a long tradition of thinking about collective
behaviour in mass emergencies and disasters. Early theories of “panic” sug-
gested that emergencies inevitably lead to psychological vulnerability and a
breakdown of norms, with the crowd as the conduit for these pathological
outcomes (see Quarantelli 2001). Yet one of the most frequently observed
patterns of behaviour in emergencies and disasters is the very opposite of
what “panic” theories would predict. The evidence of widespread supportive
behaviours across a variety of types of emergency and disaster (e.g. Fritz and
Williams 1957; Drury 2018; Grimm et al. 2014) contradicts the notion that
individualistic flight and mindless contagion represent the default reactions,
as “panic” theories suggest.
Existing social bonds – whether family ties or wider social capital net-
works – account for much of the evidence of supportive behaviours in
emergencies and disasters (e.g. Aldrich and Meyer 2015; Feinberg and John-
son 2001; Mawson 2017). However, in many major incidents, there is evi-
dence of widespread helping, cooperation and other forms of social
coordination even among people with no prior connections (Clarke 2002).
“Disaster community” and similar terms have been coined to characterize
the emergent collective relationships of support and spontaneous coopera-
tion commonly found immediately following an emergency (Kaniasty and
Norris 1999).
The social identity model of collective psychosocial resilience (Drury 2012;
Drury et al. 2019) attempts to explain this evidence of spontaneous social
support and coordination among strangers in emergencies. It suggests that
the sense of common fate people may experience in relation to a fire, bomb-
ing or other threat can lead them to see themselves as a single group. In
gestalt terms, the figure-and-ground shifts from “me in relation to other indi-
viduals” to “us in relation to the emergency”. Such common fate created by
the disaster setting forms the basis of an emergent social identity, shared with
others in the same situation.
Extending the boundaries of identity from the personal self to a collective
self (which might be defined as “those of us affected by the emergency”)
means extending the boundaries of concern. Shared social identity motivates
solidarity behaviours towards “us” in the form of support and cooperation.
While the proposition that shared identity increases supportive behaviours
towards ingroup members is well established (e.g. Gaertner and Dovidio
2012; Levine et al. 2005), the model described here applies this notion to
events where there is time pressure and threat to both helper and helped. It
also suggests that the shared social identity in question is one specific to, and
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a function of, that threatening context. Evidence that shared social identity
arises in emergencies and increases supportive behaviours to others affected
by the emergency is provided, for example, in interviews and archival analy-
sis of a range of emergencies and disasters, including the 7 July 2005 London
bombings, the 1989 Hillsborough disaster, sinking ships, floods and
earthquakes (Drury et al. 2009a, 2009b; Ntontis et al. 2018).
In addition to providing the motivation to support others in the group,
shared social identity can lead people to expect support from others who
share their group membership. Expecting support, in such contexts, has a
number of consequences. First, it increases people’s sense of efficacy or
empowerment. Second, it facilitates joint action, as people are able to
anticipate and to coordinate each other’s actions. Third, it enables people to
regulate each other’s behaviour and to ensure the collective response is in line
with common norms and values. These different pathways, and how they
produce coordinated support activities (such as, for example, the collective
self-regulation of looters), have been documented empirically in a survey
conducted among a representative sample of over 1,000 people who survived
the Maule earthquake in Chile in 2010 (Drury et al. 2016).
Expected support, and the actions that flow from that support, make it
easier for crowd members to help each other to reach safety, and hence con-
tribute to their well-being and survival. Thus, collective psychosocial resi-
lience, in this context, refers to “the way a shared identity allows groups of
survivors to express and expect solidarity and cohesion, and thereby to
coordinate and draw upon collective sources of support” (Drury et al. 2019).
Most “disaster communities” decline over time. Those affected exhaust
their material and psychosocial resources, and previous social divisions res-
urface (Kaniasty 2020; Kaniasty and Norris 1999). Floods are a good
example, here. In these events, the secondary stressors (Lock et al. 2012)
following the disaster may cause more distress than the disaster itself, as
people try to cope with insurance, continued disruption and damage to their
homes. As a consequence, the need for psychosocial support through shared
social identity can peak just at a time when the contextual affordances that
produced such an identity – that is, the common fate experienced during the
flood itself – may be diminished.
Recent research has investigated the processes by which the benefits of
emergent shared identity may be retained in the “recovery” phase of a flood.
Interviews carried out some months after the floods in York, UK, in 2015–16
suggested that those affected used a range of criteria to define themselves as
a group (e.g. not just common fate in relation to the flood but also shared
experience of secondary stressors afterwards). They also actively posited a
group identity in various ways to keep the new community alive. This included
referring to a shared history in conversation as a reminder of the common
past, as well as organizing meetings, Facebook groups and commemorations
in which a version of the shared identity of the flood community was invoked
and celebrated (Ntontis et al. 2020).
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Some would argue that people affected by disaster eventually need to move
on from the identities associated with the disaster and that, therefore, part of
the recovery process is to let go of such identities rather than keep them alive.
However, an important distinction should made between different types of
identities associated with disasters. If a “victim” identity in which “others
can never understand our needs” prevails, the possibility of forming suppor-
tive relationships with external groups may become closed off. But survivors
also develop “resilient” collective identities, which are defined broadly
enough to enable the mobilization of external solidarity. As an example, the
support groups associated with the Grenfell Tower fire of 2017 have success-
fully created alliances with others to help survivors, families and the local
community to campaign for justice (Tekin and Drury 2020).
Collective psychosocial resilience in the context of political violence
Because war and other forms of political violence can be so destructive, most
research and practice related to transitional justice has been guided by a
focus on the negative psychological and social impact of trauma (Vollhardt
2012). But a growing number of studies suggest that exposure to collective
violence does not automatically have a debilitating effect, and that indivi-
duals and communities can be remarkably resilient. For example, several
studies suggest that most people directly affected by traumatic events do not
develop psychiatric disorders (Barber and Doty 2013; Linley and Joseph
2004) or that exposure to collective violence can increase social cooperation,
prosocial behaviour, egalitarian preferences, community cohesion and
participation (Bauer et al. 2016; Blattman 2009).
But how does this happen? As pointed by Bauer and colleagues (2016, p. 22),
“the research to date has done a far better job of establishing the effect of
war violence on later cooperation than of explaining it”. Most available
explanations tend to focus on social processes related to conflict dynamics.
Some authors argue that experiencing violence collectively increases cohesion
by reinforcing the conflict-defined identities (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017;
Rohner et al. 2013). Similarly, some authors draw on evolutionary theories of
parochial altruism to argue that intergroup competition – and collective
violence as its extreme form – favours prosociality towards ingroup members
(Choi and Bowles 2007; Haidt 2012). Other explanations focus on more
local, community dynamics and point to a “collective coping mechanism
whereby members of communities that have few options to flee band together
to cope with threats and trauma” (Gilligan et al. 2014, p. 616, emphasis
added).
A more comprehensive explanation can be drawn from the social identity
model of collective psychosocial resilience exposed above (Drury 2012, 2018):
the experience of common fate (shared exposure to collective violence) can
foster shared social identity, which then serves as a basis for mutually sup-
portive behaviour and coordinated action. Contrary to previous
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explanations, the model does not presume that violence necessarily reinforces
already established or conflict-defined identities; violence can also be con-
ducive to the emergence of new social identities – a new “we” – and some-
times even of inclusive social identities beyond the conflict cleavage. Prima
facie, wars differ from disasters in important ways. Yet, in many disasters,
there is a clear intergroup context of historical disadvantage (Tekin and
Drury submitted) or outright intergroup hostility (Drury et al. 2009). These
contexts shape attributions of cause and blame, and they impact relations
within the affected ingroup, where social divisions can be exacerbated as well
as transcended (Kaniasty and Norris 1999). For these reasons, we suggest
that the social identity model carries over from disasters to wars: it can help
us to explain the conditions under which collective resilience arises in both
types of calamities.
Political violence and the reinforcement of shared social identity
A number of studies have shown that experiencing collective violence can
reinforce existing social identities that facilitate prosocial behaviour and
coordinated action among ingroup members. For example, in the well-
researched aftermath of the “9/11” terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center, there was a strong increase in national patriotism (Skitka 2005) and
the consequent supportive behaviours, such as increased volunteering and
donating (Glynn et al. 2003; Penner et al. 2005). Robert Putnam, a long-time
critic of an increasingly individualistic and atomistic society in the United
States, has observed in an article entitled “A better society in a time of war”:
Since Sept. 11, we Americans have surprised ourselves in our solidarity.
Roughly a quarter of all Americans, and more than a third of all New
Yorkers, report giving blood in the aftermath of the attacks. Financial
donations for the victims and their rescuers have reached almost $1
billion. Attendance at places of worship has increased.
New York Times (2001)
The strengthening of shared social identities is also well documented in cases
of internal intergroup conflicts, such as civil wars. Studies focusing on the
communal level have shown that collective exposure to violence can reinforce
social cohesion and solidarity (Bauer et al. 2016). In contrast to the assumption
that civilians are passive victims of violence, which predominates in transi-
tional justice discourse, recent studies suggest that organized communities
can be successful even in avoiding or limiting violence. Oliver Kaplan (2017)
explored cases from Colombia to show how unarmed civilians can influence
armed actors and limit violence. His research highlights the role of social
identity processes, particularly the role of community cohesion in reinforcing
peaceful community norms and enabling collective organizing.
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However, not all studies show that violence reinforces the established
social identities; sometimes it has a detrimental impact on community or
national cohesion (e.g. Hager et al. 2019; Kijewski and Freitag 2018; Barclay
Child and Nikolova 2020; Dell and Querubin 2018; Vélez et al. 2016).
According to the social identity model of collective psychosocial resilience
(Drury 2012; Drury et al. 2019), the emergence of shared social identity is
predicated on the sense of common fate in relation to collective violence. In
conflict dynamics, violence that is indiscriminately imposed on an entire
community by an outgroup is particularly likely to reinforce the sense that
“we are all in this together” and consequently solidify the shared identity
(Drury and Reicher 2009). For example, in the cases of violent political
repression in Tunisia and Egypt, Elizabeth Nugent (2020) showed how
indiscriminate repression by the authoritarian regime created shared political
identity, decreased polarization and increased cooperation among the mem-
bers of opposition; by contrast, targeted repression fragmented the opposi-
tion and contributed to its failure to challenge authoritarian regimes.
Krzysztof Krakowski (2020) found that, in Colombia, indiscriminate vio-
lence against local communities increased community cohesion by spurring
individuals to band together, strengthening their shared communal identity.
However, asymmetric guerrilla war characterized by selective violence against
civilians reduced community cohesion by instilling fear and suspicion among
community members. Fear of one’s neighbours can contribute to the estab-
lishment of a “law of silence” that erodes social bonds and decreases
community cohesion (see Kaplan 2017).
Political violence and the foregrounding of inclusive identities
The reinforcement of conflict-induced identities and internal cohesion due to
violence can at the same time enhance the cleavages between the conflict
groups. Guided by the assumption that “violence begets violence”, some
authors have argued that the conflict-induced reinforcement of intragroup
bonding and cooperation comes at the cost of further outgroup derogation
(Choi and Bowles 2007; Haidt 2012). For example, whereas studies on the 9/
11 terrorist attack have shown, as previously described, an increase in
national patriotism and prosocial behaviour towards compatriots, they have
also shown that the violence fostered mobilization for the invasion of Iraq
and widespread Islamophobia (Ross 2013). The troubling corollary is,
therefore, that collective violence might enhance intragroup cooperation
while simultaneously raising the risk of future social divisions and renewed
intergroup conflict (Bauer et al. 2016).
However, a growing number of studies indicate that collective victimization
does not necessarily lead to outgroup antagonism but can, on the contrary,
foster prosocial behaviour beyond group boundaries. Studies in various con-
flict-affected societies, such as Liberia (Hartman and Morse 2020), Darfur
(Hazlett 2020), Colombia (Tellez 2019), the North Caucasus (Bakke et al.
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2009), the former Yugoslavia (Penic et al. 2017, 2018, 2020; Spini et al. 2019),
as well as comparative studies conducted across multiple countries (Elcheroth
2006; Spini et al. 2008) show that collective exposure to violence can enhance
support for peace, human rights or reconciliation with the “enemy” side. Some
authors explain such findings in terms of individual psychological factors,
such as the “post-traumatic growth” of war-affected individuals, who become
more altruistic and socially engaged (see Bellows and Miguel 2009; Gilligan,
Pasquale and Samii 2014), or by heightened awareness of the actual cost of
war, which makes peace and reconciliation a more palatable option for directly
affected individuals (see Bakke et al. 2009; Fair et al. 2018; Tellez 2019).
We suggest that the findings can be further explained by the social identity
model of collective psychosocial resilience (Drury 2012; Drury et al. 2019):
when violence is collectively understood as shared across the conflict clea-
vage, it can foster the preservation or emergence of inclusive social identities,
which are the basis for pro-peace behaviour. For example, studies show that
inclusive social identities are at the core of rescue and solidarity behaviour in
genocides (Monroe 2008; Reicher et al. 2006) and that inclusive identities
among victims of violence enhance their support for reconciliation (see
Chapter 12 in this volume). Inclusive identities may be new (e.g. inclusive
victim groups) or rooted in existing social categories (e.g. inclusive local or
national identities).
Particularly telling is a study on the emergence of an inclusive identity and
resistance to violence in a context in which it would have been least expected:
the trench warfare in the First World War. With strongly bonded “brothers
in arms” in a persistent, violent and bloody conflict against the enemy guided
by the official “kill or be killed” policy, trench warfare seemingly epitomizes
the inherent link between intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression.
Yet Tony Ashworth (2000) showed systematic occurrences of “live and let
live” truces, whereby enemies stopped fighting by agreement for a period of
time, the best-known example being the Christmas truces in 1914. These
truces occurred despite being explicitly forbidden by authority and, hence,
were unofficial and illegal. The process of the emergence of truces described
by Ashworth largely corresponds to the social identity model of collective
psychosocial resilience. Ashworth describes how the conditions of close proxi-
mity and the shared experience of war eroded abstract images of the enemy
and fostered perception of similarities and common fate. This led to the
emergence of “a consciousness of kind among antagonists” (p. 133) and
“fellow-feelings” (p. 143), further strengthened through shared conversations,
humour, reciprocal singing and intertrench gossip. The emergence of the
perception of common fate and shared identity among trench soldiers was
facilitated by the structural similarities in conditions on both sides, as
powerfully voiced by one soldier:
When one is in the front line one cannot help having a fairly deep sym-
pathy for the wretched fellow in the other front line across ‘no-man’s-
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land’; one knows that he is going through just as many dangers and
discomforts, and that he is simply carrying out the orders of some gen-
eral whose dangers and discomforts are infinitely less, and the hatred
that you both have towards these generals breeds a common sympathy
that is irresistible.
(p. 141)
A growing number of studies further emphasize the importance of structural
characteristics of violence – in particular, the degree to which victimization is
shared across group boundaries – for the emergence of inclusive identities.
These studies show that collective exposure to symmetric violence, which
similarly affects members of opposing groups, can give rise to a perception of
commonality of fate and shared grievances that challenge the “us versus
them” framing of the conflict. By contrast, asymmetric violence, which dis-
proportionately affects one of the groups, tends to freeze group boundaries,
leave an enduring sense of the impossibility of togetherness and, thereby, fuel
intergroup animosities further (Penic et al. 2017, 2018; Spini 2008; Spini,
Morselli and Elcheroth 2019).
Other studies highlight the role of leaders and other influence agents in the
mobilization of inclusive identities (Haslam et al. 2010). Jana Krause (2018)
conducted a thick ethnographic analysis of two vulnerable communities – i.e.
religiously mixed and socially excluded – that managed to prevent violence
between religious groups in Nigeria and Indonesia. She showed that the key
social process involved the active mobilization of inclusive identities across
the conflict cleavage by local community leaders. This included the rejection
of simplistic conflict narratives and one-sided blame, and the promotion of
proactive “we-thinking” and inclusive local community identities (e.g. “us
people of Dadin Kowa” as opposed to Muslim versus Christian identities).
The inclusive community identity was a basis for the emergence of collective
agency and social control, such as the establishment of informal institutions
for conflict management, and the emergence of norms of repression of
radical individuals who wanted to instigate fighting.
As these various studies show, violence does not necessarily beget violence,
but it can foster support for peace and reconciliation. Within the scope of the
Pluralistic Memories Project, researchers from Burundi, Sri Lanka and
Palestine have collected some 200 testimonies among witnesses of collective
violence. The testimonies show that stories about identity-based victimization
tend to co-exist with stories that challenge the conflict-defined boundaries
and the simple representation of “us versus them”, for example the experi-
ences of help and support across frontlines in the midst of violence. Analyses
of nationally representative surveys conducted in Sri Lanka or in the West
Bank and Jerusalem show that such diverse conflict narratives are an
important resource for conflict transformation: being able to know and freely
communicate about diverse experiences that go beyond the simple “us versus
them” narrative is linked to increased community attachment and perceived
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efficacy (Penic and Elcheroth 2020), and to stronger support for the estab-
lishment of transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions,
impartial prosecutions or reparations (Penic et al. submitted).
Yet despite existing as valuable resources in the stock of lived experiences,
stories of inclusive resilience tend to remain invisible in public discourse. For
what reason? We have seen that leadership matters in mobilizing inclusive
identities, and the same observation applies to the mobilization of exclusive,
antagonistic identities (Haslam et al. 2010). Intergroup conflicts thus typi-
cally involve an interpretative struggle over the delineation of the boundaries
of common fate (Elcheroth and Reicher 2014; Herrera and Reicher 1998). As
part of this struggle, influence agents may selectively promote or suppress
stories of conflict experiences to give credence to their preferred narrative.
Stories of solidarity across “enemy” lines, in particular, tend to be omitted by
influential warmongering actors who emphasize more readily stories of
ingroup victimization (e.g. Ramanathapillai 2006). And such motivated
omissions are not limited to discourses of political and military leaders. In
the case of the 1914 Christmas truce, for instance, newspapers in belligerent
countries either minimized the extent of fraternization or – in the case of
France – even censored the stories entirely (Weintraub 2001). In times of war,
even in contemporary democracies, the mainstream media channels typically
construct conflict-supportive narratives, about ingroup victimization and
outgroup perpetration, while marginalizing or omitting contradictory infor-
mation (Bar-Tal et al. 2014; Feldman et al. 2015; Happer and Philo 2013;
Lewis 2004). Such politicized narratives are the main source of information
about the conflict for many people living far from the front lines. Ironically,
then, studies show that the greater the distance from the front lines, the lower
the support for peace (Tellez 2019), transitional justice principles (Elcheroth
and Spini 2014) or reconciliation (Bakke et al. 2009).
Political violence and the emergence of new identities
While collective violence can foster a sense of common fate along the
boundaries of already existing, psychologically meaningful groups (e.g. one’s
nation or local community), it can – through the same socio-psychological
mechanism – produce new forms of social categories and actors, such as
emergent survivor communities, for example (Drury and Reicher 2000;
Drury, Cocking and Reicher 2009a, 2009b ).
The power of events of collective violence to shape social identities has
been shown by Bady (2020), who examined how war experiences related to
social identities among a representative sample of the Sri Lankan population
eight years after the end of the civil war that tore the country for almost 30
years. Participants were asked to evaluate how 12 potential markers of iden-
tity (e.g. religion, language, economic situation) mattered to them and others
in various ways, as a basis for social identification, social support, dis-
crimination or perceived social norms, for example. Bady’s analysis not only
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showed that participants’ understanding of identity depended on the area’s
cumulative exposure to violence, but that it was shaped by specific historic
war events. These findings suggest that localized experiences of war have
sparked the emergence of shared conceptions of identity that remain tied to
the triggering event over years (in one case, the impact was still discernible
two and a half decades later).
To understand such longevity of identities that have arisen in specific cir-
cumstances, it is important to consider that subsequent (post-)war experi-
ences may be as important as the triggering event itself in drawing the
boundaries of common fate. Research among Syrian refugees in Jordan
showed that the longer refugees had been in exile, the more secondary stres-
sors (e.g. being unemployed) predicted identification with other refugees
through a sense of common fate (Alfadhli et al. 2019: 5–11). In line with the
social identity model of collective psychosocial resilience (Drury 2012; Drury
et al. 2019), identification with other refugees predicted providing as well as
expecting support from other refugees, the latter in turn predicting a sense of
collective efficacy (among Syrian refugees in both Turkey and Jordan;
Alfadhli et al. 2019).
Ethnographic observations and interviews with Syrian refugees in Jordan
further show that external actors and institutions create the context that
defines which shared identity is relevant and which forms of resilience are
possible. In order to access basic humanitarian aid, institutional mechanisms
categorize and treat refugees as a group, and hence help to define the
boundaries of mutual support by reinforcing a sense of shared identity
among them (Alfadhli and Drury 2018). The refugee identity is also a basis
of stigma and discrimination from the locals, which further reinforces a sense
of common fate and identity (Alfadhli and Drury 2018).
The so-called Northern Muslims in Sri Lanka constitute another instruc-
tive case discussed in detail by Surenthiraraj (2020; see also Chapter 6 in this
volume). It illustrates how a resilient community can emerge out of a war
experience, but also shows that the “victim” image entailed in transitional
justice and humanitarian mechanisms can, ironically, constrain possibilities
of resilience. In the midst of a civil war raging between the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE forcibly
evicted the entire Muslim population from the five Northern Province dis-
tricts of the island under its control. The expelled relocated mostly among
Muslim communities in other parts of the country, guided by expectations of
solidarity based on shared Muslim identity (Brun 2010; Surenthiraraj and de
Mel 2019). And, indeed, testimonies from the displaced typically emphasize
how host communities initially assisted them in many ways, such as offering
them shelter in their homes, land and schools, and providing them with food
and clothes (Brun 2010; Citizens’ Commission 2012; Surenthiraraj and de
Mel 2019). The label “Northern Muslim” gradually came to denote the new
community created by the common experience of expulsion, both for the
evicted themselves and for other Sri Lankans (Thiranagama 2011, 2013).
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As the displacement – first believed to be temporary – persisted, a number
of circumstances fostered tensions between guest and host communities. As
the Northern Muslims proved resilient in terms of educational and economic
advancement as well as in terms of political activism, some members of the
host communities came to perceive them as threatening competitors for lim-
ited resources who benefited from unfair advantages due to their displaced
status (Brun 2010; Citizens’ Commission 2012; Haniffa 2015). When return
became possible with the ending of the war, state and humanitarian agencies
considered that assistance for the Northern Muslims should have a low
priority compared to that for those displaced during the last stages of the
war. This illustrates an ironic consequence of humanitarian and transitional
justice discourse that evaluates victimhood in terms of “the greatest need”
(Haniffa 2015): their very resilience in facing the challenges of displacement
eventually complicated the implementation of the Northern Muslims’ rights
as well as their relations with the host communities where they have lived
in displacement. As a result, three decades after their eviction, many North-
ern Muslims have to prove their resilience once more in managing life
between two places.
As the case of the Northern Muslims shows, the resilience of war-affected
communities should not imply negating the responsibility of their state, or of
the international community, to protect and support them. The discourse of
“resilience” has sometimes been used as a cover by those in power to avoid
their responsibility of looking after the most vulnerable. For example, Juliet
Gardiner (2010) explains how the British government used the slogan “Brit-
ain can take it” as a propaganda tool when many people in London were
being killed and suffered during the Blitz air raids of the Second World War.
Civilians’ capacity to prevent and cope with collective violence cannot
replace adequate external protection, but should rather be acknowledged as a
crucial first step in planning protection and prevention. Models of resilience
need to specify and be explicit that the “strengths” of survivor groups and
others, in the long term, often depend on the role of the authorities in scaf-
folding their agency – through provision of appropriate information and
resources (Drury et al. 2019).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed multiple studies from various conflict-
affected societies that empirically show that civilians in armed conflicts are
not just passive victims, but can be remarkably resilient. These studies point
to the social and collective nature of resilience: whereas individuals may have
limited capacity to face collective violence alone, when they band together
they can develop social resources to jointly cope with hardship but also to
confront the divisive logic of violence itself. We have applied the social iden-
tity model of collective psychosocial resilience to explain this process: under
certain circumstances, collective violence can foster a sense of common fate
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and the emergence of shared social identity, which then serves as a basis for
solidarity and collective agency. Going beyond the predominant focus on the
conflict-defined identities in research on intergroup conflicts, the studies we
have reviewed show that violence can reinforce various existing social iden-
tities (e.g. local community identity), but also foster the emergence of new
social identities, and sometimes even inclusive identities beyond the conflict
cleavage.
Whereas collective resilience seems to be ubiquitous in conflict settings, it
remains a forgotten resource for conflict transformation in transitional jus-
tice discourse and practice, which tend to focus on the victimhood of affected
civilians. Yet there are concrete dangers of such misplaced focus. Whenever
transitional justice silences experiences of collective resilience, it is at risk of
feeding into history-writing that depicts communities as helpless, disoriented
or otherwise dependent on their state or on the international community to
guide, contain and protect them. This can be actively disempowering for the
affected communities, leaving them with little or no agency in challenging
power relations. Moreover, the focus on victimhood as a dominant form of
identity politics in post-conflict settings can foster a climate of competitive
victimhood claims that deny victim status to the “other”, thereby perpetuat-
ing conflict-defined divisions. It follows that when transitional justice practice
makes visible how communities have built social resources to jointly cope
with hardship or confront the divisive logic of violence, it conveys inspiring
experiences of collective empowerment. However, the recognition of com-
munity resilience does not absolve the state or international actors from the
responsibility of providing adequate civilian protection. Instead, it should be
a starting point for designing effective protection together with the directly
concerned communities, drawing upon their experiences and capacities.
For example, stories of collective resilience can be an important source for
social learning that can empower communities when faced with future risks
of violence. Moreover, stories about communities that have stood together
against the divisions can serve as symbols of hope, demonstrating that living
together and jointly working for reconciliation are valuable and realistic
objectives shared across conflict lines (see Krause 2018). The widespread
dissemination of such stories through transitional justice practice could
strengthen cooperative norms and the legitimacy of pro-peace leadership,
which are vital for the establishment of sustainable peace.
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Transitional justice stands, today, as the paradigmatic framework for justice
after the atrocities of wars, genocides and human rights abuses of autocratic
regimes. Reflecting on what it has so far achieved in a relatively short time span
of three decades or so, Pablo de Greiff (2020) noted that it has “helped to give
richer content to the notion of justice” by giving visibility to victims, shaping
key elements in criminal justice, facilitating reparations, establishing forums for
truth telling and mandates for institutional reform (p. 252). It has also bolstered,
notes de Greiff, the entrenchment of rights to justice both in doctrine and
practice, and has taught the criminal justice system how to cope with the con-
sequences of amnesties and statutes of limitation, develop prosecutorial
prioritization and provide plural formats for the delivery of justice (p. 252).
Ambitious projects, however, often court clay feet. It is possible to see,
with the hindsight of three decades, that many of the “settlements” brokered
by transitional justice’s mechanisms have been partial, ambiguous and even
contradictory. Their instability emerges from what de Greiff notes as chal-
lenges pertaining to all justice projects: “selectivity in the implementation of
human rights norms, the tendency to ‘securitize’ all sorts of topics, and …
the ‘closing of civic space’” (p. 253). In addition, transitional justice has been
specifically vulnerable to an instrumental use of its mechanisms for political
“turn-taking” and to paying insufficient attention to specific contexts,
resulting in an “isormorphic mimicry”, or belief that success in one place
automatically translates as the same in another (pp. 254–55). This is a pro-
blem which de Greiff sees as also arising from donor agendas and the work
of an elite global and mobile group of professionals within the field. What
follows is that technicalities take over, in “an institutional engineering” that
shapes questions such as how to set up a special court or truth commission,
rather than what may be the best way of satisfying victims’ rights to justice
(p. 255).
The chapters in this volume uphold de Greiff’s assessment of where tran-
sitional justice is at today, foregrounding in particular where it has failed its
promise. In doing so they contribute to questioning, on a scholarly register,
its framings and legacies, taking both a long, historical view and highlighting
its current tendencies – be these mandates, implementation, intransigent
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contexts, racialized geographies, shifting goalposts, or sidelined local resour-
ces, groups and experiences. Briony Jones argued in Chapter 11 for working
with resistance as a way of pointing to both the incomplete nature of
“knowing” and revitalizing the field. The impulse of this book has been
precisely this: taking seriously sources of disappointment and opposition, but
also engaging with transitional justice towards repair, conceptual gain and
course correction, rather than dismissing its legacy altogether.
A central tension within transitional justice, as pointed out in the different
contributions in this book but particularly foregrounded in Tim Murithi’s
opening chapter, is of the emphasis on accountability and restoration of
order based on a unifying master narrative versus a reckoning with the past
that is more inclusive of different points of view, ethical choices and ways of
remembering. While the first demands certitude, the latter acknowledges the
need for an open-ended process, prone to contestation as varied memories
and narratives of the past find their voice. In societies that have gone through
the atrocities of apartheid, genocide or civil warfare, the notion of transi-
tion – to a new regime or to post-war reconstruction – carries the comforting
certitude that the tragedy belongs to the past, and that a moral and social
victory draws a firm line between a divisive past and a consensual present.
Celebrating victory over a past that is “over” too quickly can come at a cost
however, especially when forms of injustice bigger than what can be undone
during an “extraordinary” transitional justice process, with a short-term
mandate, are part of the problem. As Rothberg (2019, p. 15) noted, citing
Robert Meister (2011, p. 26), rapid reconciliation based on a common
understanding that “the evil is past” can be a questionable priority when it
implies foregoing the necessary quest for social justice between the groups
that structurally benefited from criminal regimes and those that were
harmed.
The three contributions to the first section of this book provided vivid
accounts of how official consensus that “the evil is past” has been achieved
after apartheid in South Africa (Chapter 2), after the genocide in Rwanda
(Chapter 3) and after civil war in Sri Lanka (Chapter 4), resulted in social
fallout. Interestingly, while political will to create consensus is clearly dis-
cernible through each of these three cases, the relationship with human rights
discourse appears more complex. While the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) clearly foregrounded a language of
human rights, Rwanda’s multi-modal transitional justice experiment unfolded
through a complex mixture of running with the “global norm” and denoun-
cing its limitations, whereas the war-winning Sri Lankan government took a
path of open opposition to transitional justice delivered in the name of
international human rights norms (and to international institutions, such as
the United Nations Human Rights Council). One thing we can learn from
these three cases placed side-by-side is that the declaration of “moral victory”,
and the simultaneous postponement of “material redistribution”, can come
in different guises. Human rights is only one of the languages mobilized to
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prioritize reunification (on the terms of the victorious regime or coalition of
forces) over social and economic transformation. Depending on particular
political configurations and histories of struggle, appealing to collectively
cherished ideals of national emancipation and sovereignty, for example, can
serve similar functions of rallying a broad spectrum of actors around chosen
priorities.
The parallel (or sequential) tracks of special courts seeking accountability
for extraordinary violence, and truth commissions for reckoning, dialogue
and the admission of “smaller” crimes as windows into larger patterns, might
be seen as transitional justice’s current best answer to tackle the potentially
contradictory imperatives of settling certainties and opening up diverse per-
spectives. The two routes are, however, interlinked. Even though they abide
by distinct evidentiary processes, their respective focuses draw upon each
other to create a bigger picture. This is because the extraordinary violence
adjudicated in transitional justice courts is scripted on the “slow violence”
which Rob Nixon (2011) writes of in another context (of ecological destruc-
tion), but which has a bearing on what we discuss here. Here, “slow” stands
for the structural violence audible, for instance, at TRCs, which provides a
context and template for the proliferating and acute forms of violence (pp. 2–3).
Attentiveness to the longue durée of violence inevitably raises questions
about responsibility. Michael Rothberg’s (2019) recent discussion of the
“implicated subject” is particularly instructive here. The implicated subject is
both real people in situated, material contexts who bear responsibility, for
example as descendants and/or beneficiaries of systems of political violence,
economic privilege, social discrimination, ecological plunder and so on, as
well as “a trope for describing a contingent, shifting, and socially constituted
position in that world”. The implicated subject stands, therefore, for a
broader reckoning of both slow, attritional forms of violence – the historical
harms of racism, casteism, slavery and colonialism – and of the violence of
war economies, corruption, ecological destruction, indebtedness and dis-
tributive distortion (Arbor 2007; Mani 2008; Duthie 2008; Gready and
Robbins 2014; Urban-Walker 2016). Accountability and reparation for both
of these sets of harms have yet to take place, however, on a meaningful scale.
The contributions to the second section of this book vividly illustrated what
can be the price for such oversights in the delivery of transitional justice. This
ranges from societies that remain segregated along the same lines along
which the economic crimes have been committed historically (which are
racial lines in the case of South Africa, as discussed by Durrheim and
Murray in Chapter 5), to post-generations which are made, in the best of
cases, to claim rights responding to the trauma of their parents rather than
to the inherited challenges of their own living circumstances (Chapter 6), or
victim-survivors left with a potentially inflammatory combination of a lan-
guage of virtuous struggle and an unfulfilled promise of justice (Chapter 7).
According to Rothberg (2019, p. 10), traditional forms of accountability
for past misdeeds struggle to repair the harms of structural violence (such as
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economic crimes) because the spectrum of actors involved is discomforting,
and responsibility is elusive as long as the spotlight is on individual victims
and perpetrators. The figure of the implicated subject represents, therefore,
“not a solution but a problem” (p. 200), a nettle transitional justice has yet to
fully grasp. The challenges range from denial to scope: the “breadth of
implication in a globally connected world” (p. 200), and the elusiveness of its
“‘agents’ … [who] appear on the surface amorphous – more faceless and
nameless – than the perpetrators of legally defined and proscribed violations”
(Mani 2008, p. 255). To ignore these interlinked structural harms, to high-
light civil and political rights over socio-economic and cultural rights, is,
however, to risk losing credibility in the very societies that transitional justice
aims to benefit (Arbor 2007; Mani 2008). As Gready and Robbins (2014)
noted in their call for a shift from transitional to a more transformative jus-
tice, a “new agenda of practice” has become necessary. This demand also
implies a call for research as a critical practice on, and for, transitional jus-
tice that would find new and persuasive ways of analysing implication and
responsibility.
Working with complex forms of implication in past injustice is also a
condition for the inclusion of groups whose trajectories belie the victim-per-
petrator binary, such as the former combatants discussed by Usoof-Thow-
feek and Gunasekera in Chapter 10, whose pathways in and out of combat
have been marked by manifold forms of coercion and violence. Relatedly, it
provides a context to the experiences of actors kept “at a distance” in current
ways of delivering justice, either literally, as a consequence of conflict-
generated exile (Chapter 8), or when the gap between the legal procedures of
justice and cultural expectations of justice seems insurmountable (Chapter 9).
It thereby opens up hitherto under-explored possibilities for building more
inclusive processes for addressing past injustice, which are not only premised
on the establishment of proof for individual guilt, adversariality or individual
entitlement for reparation, but also collective patterns of historic violence
whose consequences span into the present. To be of pragmatic and ethical
value, these processes have to foreground the ethical, social and political
alliances capable of undoing, here and now, the consequences of past injus-
tice and facilitate what Rothberg (2019, p. 12) dubs long-distance solidarity
between diverse groups of beneficiaries and victims who move towards each
other in a joint commitment to create fairer structures.
This volume coalesced around the scholars, themes and issues that both
framed and emerged from the Lausanne Summer School on Transitional
Justice and Conflict Transformation, and the Pluralistic Memories Project
from which the summer school emanated, and the chapters reflect this
orientation. They offer insights on how group psychology, commemoration,
justice beyond the law, combatant reintegration, victim solidarities, diasporas
and postgenerations can add to the reconceptualization of transitional jus-
tice. They pay less attention, therefore, from a disciplinary lens of, say,
developmental or political science, or legal or security studies, to questions
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on post-war development, institutional reform (including constitutional,
legal and security sector restructuring), or the consolidation of democracy
and good governance. They stay interested in these topics, however, given
their intersections with the case studies at hand. Nor do they discuss at
length cultural work for peacebuilding and long-term change which de Greiff
(2020) rightly notes as “the least developed in terms of doctrine and prac-
tice” within transitional justice (p. 257); an observation endorsed in Chapter
3 on how individual commemorations on the Rwandan genocide through
music and art were overshadowed by official top-down imperatives of
remembering. Nor do they analyse the anatomy of the state – or more pre-
cisely, how we may move beyond what Ruti Teitel (2014) once called “steady-
state justice” (p. 4) to theorize the state not as an abstraction (which there-
after permits its stability to be constructed), but as an “archipelago”, or
chain of logics incorporating the cultural/ethno-nationalistic, juridical, neo-
liberal and militarized, which combine and reconfigure contingently (Amar
2013).
Addressing such a state requires new vocabularies and schemas from
transitional justice research including how we may avoid the ever-present
nation-state which influences, also in this book, the identification of the par-
ticular case studies. Our intuitive understanding of what defines a “case” is
typically bounded by the notion of a sovereign territory, even when some
case studies are comparative, or include diasporas and groups that claim a
right to return, or an anticipated state. For example, Parmentier, Rauschen-
bach and Hein’s contribution (Chapter 8) showed not only how the taken for
granted boundaries of national territories become visible (and problematic)
once we take into account justice stakeholders located beyond these bound-
aries, but also why the analysis necessarily has to work with national frames
as established social and political realities. We may not, therefore, want to
dismiss the nation-state as a unit of analysis altogether given its primacy in
international and humanitarian law) but, rather, we should be aware of the
paradox of keeping to its borders when the nationalisms that underwrite its
imaginaries have been turned into intractable grounds for violence.
To shed light on the unsettled nature of transitional justice, including
research in the field, then, is to acknowledge that transforming injustice is,
inherently, about work in progress. This refusal to settle often courts impa-
tience. Noting that, because transitional justice can never fully redress all
violations, de Greiff calls for a principled pragmatism invested in problem-
solving and prevention of violence, rather than the utopianism he sees
behind the endless rounds of critique that the human rights community has
fallen prey to (2020, p. 257). The binary, however, between continuous cri-
tical reflection – which is also the habitus of research – and a pragmatic,
ready-to-go practice on the basis of the gravities at stake, requires reframing.
Qadri Ismail (2013), addressing a conference on “Ethical Futures”, noted
that if “one understands ethics, very crudely, as making a claim upon the
good, and politics upon the possible, the statement challenges us to imagine
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the should, without being constrained by the could” (p. 2). Ethics is fre-
quently aligned with justice; the “could” signals political conditions and
judgements, and the “should” an anticipatory idealist promise. “Settlements”
after systemic violence teach us, however, that neither the “could” nor the
“should” is without politics.
Collective interpretations of what is desirable and feasible do not emerge in
a vacuum, but are actively shaped and mobilized by those who have a stake
in the outcome. Claims that peace is illusive (e.g. because the enemy is too
hateful) or that a fairer distribution of privilege is out of reach (e.g. because
people are intrinsically resistant to change) are typically easier to uphold
than the claim that peace and equity are intrinsically unwanted. In democ-
racy, everyone’s view of what “should be” is meant to be given the same
weight, but by orienting the collective perception of what “could be”, influ-
ential elites can effectively bypass democratic aspirations. If one thinks (as we
do) that scholars have a responsibility to facilitate transitional justice pro-
cesses that are more democratic and inclusive, this aim certainly cannot be
achieved through (technocratically) prescribing “the good”, but rather by
amending unduly narrow understandings of “the possible”. In transitional
justice, neglecting existing collective resources can sometimes lead to ignoring
the potentially most desirable options prematurely, i.e. a failure even to con-
sider them as serious options in the deliberative process.
The ethical and pragmatic implications highlighted in the four contribu-
tions presented in the final section of this book can, therefore, be far-reach-
ing. They brought into consideration options traditionally viewed as
impractical, such as working with spoilers (Chapter 11) or with people’s
capacity to connect with the suffering of communities different from their
own (Chapter 12). They also revealed that what communities can become is
not overdetermined, once and for all, by what they have been during the
darkest (or brightest) hours of their collective trajectory. Communities can
see their boundaries, values or capabilities shift in unpredictable ways by the
experiences they go through collectively, be it by gathering at the same time
and place as a crowd (Chapter 13) or by developing a sense of common fate
throughout a wider pattern of events (Chapter 14).
Critically, therefore, these contributions have reminded us that the concept
of transition applies equally to how we think about justice following violence,
as well as to the needs of justice stakeholders and to the pathways available
to meet these needs. Survivor expectations of, and settlements with, justice
change over time. What someone feels is just when beginning a post-war life,
for instance, may not be adequate justice later on in life. How justice is
experienced, defined, promised and understood by different constituencies is
shaped and measured along shifting individual and social relations. There-
fore, creating justice in the aftermath of violence, whether we understand it
as implication and responsibility (Rothberg 2019) or as ethical futures
(Ismail 2013), is best thought of as a heuristic, rather than a point of reso-
lution. It should be something that allows us to see further, and to open new
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pathways in the next act, rather than to celebrate victory or the final stroke
of a pen on a peace agreement. What applies to the political holy grails that
conflict actors strive for also applies to the intellectual ideal of conceptual
definitiveness. The chapters in this book, therefore, in dialogue with each
other as well as with other voices from within and without the transitional
justice community, might offer the transitional justice field something more
precious than new certainties: a nurturing of its continuous becoming.
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